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ABSTRACT 
 
THE LAKE CHILWA FISHING HOUSEHOLD STRATEGIES IN 
RESPONSE TO WATER LEVEL CHANGES: MIGRATION, 
CONFLICTS AND CO-MANAGEMENT  
 
Friday Jack Njaya 
 
PhD Thesis, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, University of 
the Western Cape 
 
In this thesis, I examine household strategies in response to water level 
fluctuations of Lake Chilwa. I also analyse the frequency and patterns of 
migration of fishers, conflicts due to migration of fishers and co-
management. The following are the key results:  
 
First, the seasonal and periodic lake level changes affect livelihoods of the 
households. As a coping strategy, the households depend on fishing in 
pools of water located in influent rivers and hunt birds for income and 
food while others migrate to find work as casual labourers. When the lake 
rises during the rain season, inundated areas become suitable for 
production of maize and rice. However, when the floods recede in the dry 
season, farming of winter maize and vegetables is common. 
 
Second, migration of fishers is common around Lake Chilwa. The pattern 
of migration varies according to the season and gear type. The northern 
marshes and floodplain where fishers land the highest catches composed 
mainly of Barbus paludinosus, attract more fishers operating different 
fishing gear types. Conflicts emerge due to the Nkacha seine operations, 
which require removal of aquatic vegetation. The local fishers believe that 
the aquatic vegetation is a source of food for fish. The conflicts are in 
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various forms including access to fishing grounds, authority to grant 
access to fishing areas and fish price competition between the local fishers 
and migrants. 
 
Third, the household strategies towards recovery of the fishery after 
recessions are inherent within the households’ traditional system. 
However, the introduction of co-management does not recognise key 
actors that include fishers and river-based fishing households that 
participated in the formulation of conservation strategies for remnant fish 
stocks in lagoon and rivers during the 1995 recession. Co-management is 
characterised by limited participation of the fishers especially those 
operating seines, district assemblies and non-governmental organisations. 
Similarly, there is low transparency especially with respect to how the key 
stakeholders, Department of Fisheries and traditional leaders, take 
decisions. In stark contrast, accountability among Beach Village Sub-
Committees is growing; hence more fishing households now perceive 
these as representing the interests of Department of Fisheries.  
 
Based on the above results, a diversified occupational change involving 
fishing, farming and trading is necessary. The co-management 
arrangement should be adaptive with consideration of the traditional 
customs and values of the participating households. Since these 
households are dependent on the availability of fisheries, it is thus 
imperative to promote maximum resource exploitation in between 
recessions and encourage a complete stop to fishing during recessions.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
Fish contributes substantially to the food security and livelihood of millions of 
people in Malawi. With 24% of the surface area of the country covered by water 
(ICLARM, 1991), both large- and small-scale capture fisheries contribute to food 
security and the poverty reduction goal of the Government of Malawi (GoM) as 
highlighted in Malawi Growth and Development Strategy Framework (MGDS) 
(GoM, 2006). The fisheries resources contribute over 60% of animal protein1 in 
the national diet of Malawians (Kent, 1987; Hara, 2001b). Townsley (1998) 
observes that the fisheries sector remains one of the few economic activities 
along the shores of Lake Malawi that generates surplus.  
 
From the late 1960s to the 1980s, contribution of the fisheries sector to Malawi’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)2 was 4%. During the same period, the per caput 
fish consumption for Malawi was 23kg in the late 1960s, peaked to 36kg in the 
1970s and then dropped to 11kg in the 1980s with the current figure hovering 
around 5.8kg (FAO, 1966; UNDP, 1971; Landes & Otte, 1983; GoM, 1999). The 
declining per caput fish consumption undoubtedly affects the nutritional status of 
the Malawian population, the majority of who are dependent on fish as a cheap 
source of animal protein. it is necessary therefore, to formulate management 
strategies aimed at increasing and sustaining fish supply in the country.   
 
An increased and sustainable fish supply to meet the growing demand in the 
country is a challenge. Key reasons include increased human population growth, 
limited employment opportunities, inappropriate management regimes, complex 
characteristics of the fisheries resources and limited application of traditional 
knowledge.  
                                                 
1 This figure is for the 1970s and no recent data are available.  
2 No latest figure for the fisheries sector contribution to GDP is available. 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
The 2008 Population and Housing Census (PHC) indicated that the total 
population of Malawi was 13.1 million in 2008, an increase of 32% from that of 
1998. This increase represents a 2.8% growth rate during the period. Similarly, 
the population density grew from 85 people per sq. km in 1978 to 105 people per 
sq. km in 1998 and then increased further to 159 people per sq. km in 2008 
(NSO, 2008). The population increase exerts pressure on natural resources 
including fish. Thus, annual catches declined from an average of 68,000 metric 
tonnes between 1976 and 1990 to an average of 55,000 metric tonnes between 
1993 and 2003. 
 
The limited or lack of alternative sources of income to fishing-related activities 
that include fishing, processing and trading compels rural people to turn to 
fishing to earn a living. Various options are available: one either directly engages 
in fishing, works as a crewmember on fishing boats or works as a fish processor. 
Similarly, fish trading has emerged as a major source of income for women. In 
poor farming seasons when crop yields slump, fishing becomes the chief source 
of income for lakeshore based rural households. In this context, fishing provides 
a safety net for the rural people due to intermittent failure of farming, their main 
economic activity. 
 
In an open access regime, regulating entry becomes difficult. While Malawi’s 
Department of Fisheries (DoF) attempts to regulate fishing through licensing of 
fishing gear, competition for resource exploitation is a threat to sustainability of 
the fish stocks. The overfishing phenomenon is mainly prevalent in shallow 
waters of Lake Malawi (Bulirani et al., 1999). Without formulation of an 
appropriate strategy, fish supply in the country will continue to decline against 
the increasing human population. 
 
The multi-species nature of fisheries poses a challenge on the exploitation of the 
targeted fish species. Fishers use both traditional and introduced or modern gear 
types. While there are fishing regulations to protect specific breeding fish species, 
the catch composition also includes significant quantities of the non-targeted 
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ones. For example, mesh sizes of gillnets aim to protect the juvenile Chambo 
(Oreochromis species), but the catch may also include Utaka Haplochromine 
species. In another scenario, small-scale fishers commonly use gillnets during 
certain times of the year, usually from May to July. This is profitable as it targets 
Utaka and yet when operated in shallower waters of Lake Malawi juvenile 
Chambo becomes another target. Only the populations of the non-targeted species 
are under threat. Additionally, even if the appropriate rules were in place, 
enforcement is another challenge.  
 
Rapidly evolving fishing technological advances among small-scale fishers 
challenge the formulation of appropriate policies and legislative frameworks 
necessary to govern sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources. Because of 
declining fish stocks over time, small-scale fishers have come up with new 
technologies to sustain their fishing business. Most of the fishing technologies are 
efficient although some are destructive. For example, while in the past, gill nets 
were static, they now operate as dynamic gear types akin to seines. Over the last 
decade, the fishers have developed Kandwindwi3 on Lake Malawi while on Lake 
Chilwa a fishing method locally called Usodzi wa Mululu4 has been in use since 
2000.   
 
Traditional and customary fishing practices that fishing communities used in the 
past in either direct or indirect control of natural resource exploitation in various 
parts of Africa are now rare (GTZ, 2001). Commercialisation of fisheries 
resources and the increase in human population are the key factors contributing to 
the erosion of tradition and custom. Consequently, there has been a declining 
trend of fish stocks in isolated fishing grounds of the country. In the past, fishing 
communities could declare sanctuary or closed areas by declaring them sacred 
places. In the closed areas, no fishing took place. For example, on Chisi Island 
(Lake Chilwa), fishers were barred from fishing in designated sacred places. 
                                                 
3 A seine net that looks like trawl net with long warps (over 2km) that a group of fishers operate 
to catch a combination of fish species located in shallow areas of Lake Malawi 
4 A fishing method that is common on Lake Chilwa since late 1990s. The fishing operation 
involves removal of aquatic weeds in the targeted fishing area before seining.  
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However, in recent times, there has been a paradigm change leading to the 
routine disregard of customary and traditional practices, which indirectly eased 
pressure on fish populations thereby sustaining resources.   
 
The main fish sources in Malawi include Lakes Malawi, Malombe, Chilwa, 
Chiuta and the Shire River system. Lake Chilwa is one of the most productive 
lakes in Africa due to its physical and ecological features that make nutrient 
recycling more efficient (Chiotha, 1996; Kalk McLachlan & Howard-Williams, 
1979). The lake is shallow and boasts an enclosed system with an estimated 
average catch of 13,000 tonnes per annum. In productive years, such as in 1979 
and 1991, the estimated annual catch can reach 25,000 tonnes. Lake Chilwa is 
important for the supply of animal protein to the local population of nearly one 
million in the densely populated southern region (Landes & Otte, 1983; GoM, 
1999). The lake also provides employment to around 8,000 fishers.  An additional 
number of actors (currently not counted) derive their livelihoods through 
downstream industries such as fish processing, trading, boat building, net 
construction and other ancillary industries (GoM, 2002a).  
 
Lake Chilwa goes through cyclic recessions due to persistent droughts that 
usually last for three to four years (Njaya et al., 1996). Records indicate eight 
occurrences of such recessions since 1879 (Kalk et al., 1979; Kabwazi & Wilson, 
1996; Njaya, 1998). When the lake recedes, the fishery collapses but recovers 
within three to four years after water refilling. For example, after the 1995 
recession, the estimated fish production on the lake in 1999 dropped to 12,500 
tonnes (GoM, 2005).  
 
Despite the water level fluctuations the DoF has since the 1970s, enforced fishing 
regulations including mesh size restrictions for gillnets, minimum allowable size 
of fish (Oreochromis species), licensing of gillnets and seine nets. In the 
aftermath of the 1995 recession, traditional leaders around Lake Chilwa reviewed 
fishing regulations and introduced a six-month closed season and prohibition of 
Nkacha seines. In 1997, the DoF introduced a co-management arrangement in 
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response to advocacy on popular community participation and decentralised 
natural resource management. This necessitated revision of the fisheries 
legislation and policy between 1997 and 1999.  
 
While Lowore and Lowore (1999) support the Lake Chilwa co-management 
strategy, their argument centres on a partnership that involves the DoF and 
traditional leaders. However, Sarch & Allison (2000) argue against introduction 
of the Lake Chilwa co-management system. The researchers submit that instsence 
on co-management arrangements in small-scale fisheries mainly focuses on 
regulating access and restrict migration of fishers: This assertion needs further 
analysis and partly motivated this study. 
 
Additionally, Kalk et al. (1979) and van Zwieten & Njaya (2003) argue that Lake 
Chilwa is resilient and will thus recover from any recession. Scholars and 
practitioners downplay the contribution of Lake Chilwa basin households (fishers 
and farmers) to the fishery’s ability to recover after a recession. In addition, it is 
still unclear on which conflicts emerge between migrant and local fishers because 
of access restriction. The study will thus explore the linkage between responses 
of the Lake Chilwa households in terms of their household strategies to water 
level changes.  
 
1.2 Study area 
1.2.1 Geographical features of Malawi 
Malawi, which lies between 9°20' and 17°10'S and 35°50E in the eastern-central 
Africa, is land locked (Figure 1). The country has a surface area of 118,500 km2 
of which nearly 29,000 km2 under are lakes and rivers. The north-south axis is 
901 km long and the east-west axis varies from 80 to 161 km. The north (475 km) 
shares borders with the United Republic of Tanzania, the east, south and west 
(1,569 km) with the Republic of Mozambique and the north-west (837 km) with 
the Republic of Zambia (ICLARM, 1991).  
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The country lies in the Great Rift Valley that traverses from north to south. In the 
deep trough lies Lake Malawi, the third largest lake in Africa. The Shire River 
flows from the south end of the lake and joins the Zambezi River 400 km farther 
south in Mozambique. To the east and west of the Rift Valley, the land forms 
high plateaus, generally between 900 and 1,200 m above seas level. In the north, 
the Nyika uplands peak at 2,600 m; south of the lake is the Shire Highlands with 
an elevation of 600-1,600 m, rising to Zomba and Mulanje mountains, 2,130 and 
3,048 m respectively. 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Malawi showing major water bodies including the study area, 
Lake Chilwa on the south-eastern part of Africa  
Source: NSO (2004) 
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For administrative purposes, Malawi has three regions, namely: South with 13 
districts, Centre having 9 districts and North comprising 6 districts. The South 
contains one-third of the total land area of which 39% is arable land. The North 
constitutes 29% of the country’s surface area of which 20% is arable while the 
Centre contains 32% of the total area of which 41% is arable land. Malawi is 
socially diverse with peaceful co-existence of various ethnic groups including 
Chewa, Nyanja, Yao, Tumbuka, Lomwe, Sena, Tonga, Ngoni and Nkhonde. In 
terms of religion, the country is multi-sectarian and is has Protestants, Roman 
Catholics, Muslims, and traditional indigenous believers. 
1.2.2 Socio-economic profile of Malawi 
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the southern African sub region with an 
average income of $132 per annum and over half of its population living below 
the poverty line (Mataya, Chulu, Khaila, Kumwenda, Machinjili & Mthindi, 
1998). The 2008 population census shows that the country has an estimated 
population of 13 million people (NSO, 2008).    
 
The country’s economy is predominantly agro-based. The agricultural sector is 
the largest source of employment, with over 80% of the labour force employed in 
the smallholder sub-sector and approximately 11% employed in the estate sub-
sector. Agricultural production accounts for 38.6% of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) (GOM, 2003c). The smallholder sub-sector with the majority of 
the rural population contributes 65% to the agricultural GDP while the estate sub-
sector contributes 35%. Crops account for 91% of agricultural output, livestock 
accounts for 7%, while fisheries and forestry contribute less than 1% (Mataya et 
al., 1998).  
 
In the early 1990s, agriculture contributed 90% to foreign exchange earnings with 
tobacco accounting for more than 65% followed by tea (8%) and sugar (7%). 
However, agricultural output had declined to 82.7% by 2003. The major concern 
remains on the decline in the manufacturing industrial sector from 17% of GDP 
in 1994 to 11.6% in 2001 (GoM, 2003c).  
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The Government of Malawi (GoM) emphasises poverty reduction and has since 
initiated the Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP), Vision 2020 and Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) as its main policy initiatives (Ibid). Within the 
poverty alleviation framework and the MDGs, the government has formulated 
policies on agriculture and livestock development, fisheries, forestry, 
environmental and natural resources.  
 
The government intends to achieve the goal of reducing poverty through the 
promotion of a broad-based and rapid agricultural development plan while 
ensuring sustainable use of natural resources. The priority areas for the country’s 
poverty reduction policy include promotion of growth-oriented policies, 
improving coverage and quality of basic social services, and establishing cost-
effective safety nets as enshrined in the Malawi Economic Growth Strategy 
(MEGS) framework that emphasises the partnership between the GoM and 
private sector. The policies aim at improving food security and nutritional status, 
promotion of small agro-based businesses, diversification of exports of crops and 
livestock products and increase of farm incomes. Sustainable use of natural 
resources is one of the key contributory factors to achieving such objectives 
(GoM, 2007). 
 
The government continues to initiate fresh economic public sector policy reforms 
that aim to improve service delivery. The Malawi Growth and Development 
Strategy (MGDS), a replacement of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP), provides an overarching strategy for an integrated implementation 
process (Ibid). Presently, there is a need to align sectoral plans against the MGDS 
goals by focusing on the mandate, strategic outcome, outputs, strategic outputs 
and implementation plans.  
 
The global change in the promotion of the rule of law has contributed to the 
transformation of the political and governance landscape of Malawi. After the 
end of the cold war, there was an increasing demand for African countries to 
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democratise and adopt Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) from its 
western donors led by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). In the early 1990s, there was political transformation that affected Sub-
Sahara Africa. Consequently, donors, including the Harare Declaration by the 
Commonwealth Heads on Good Governance, exerted more pressure on Malawi 
to democratise (Hara, 2001; Hara & Nielsen, 2003).  
 
The Declaration explicitly linked provision of aid with the notion of good 
governance of which Malawi was a target. In response to slow progress registered 
on the implementation of the proposed governance reforms, the Consultative 
Group of Donors (CGDs) froze all non-humanitarian aid to Malawi in May 1992. 
Accordingly, the country experienced a depreciation of the Malawi Kwacha 
(MK) currency by 22%, which became a recipe for change (Mvula, 2002). 
1.2.3 Fisheries sector 
The capture fisheries sector comprises traditional or small-scale, mechanised and 
aquarium sectors. While at global level the small-scale fisheries sector accounts 
for about 25% of fish production (FAO, 1991), in Malawi this sector contributes 
85-90% of the annual total landings (Bulirani et al., 1999). The sector directly 
employs about 60,000 people operating 15,303 fishing vessels of which 73% are 
dugout canoes, 23% boats without engines and the rest being powered boats 
(GoM, 2005). 
 
In the past, the largest proportion of the catch from the small-scale fisheries 
sector was mainly for subsistence use until the 1970s when the trend changed for 
cash income. The common gear types in the small-scale fishery include fish traps, 
hook and line, fishing baskets, cast nets, seines (beach and open water) and 
gillnets. Planked boats with or without engines and dugout canoes are widely 
used within the small-scale fisheries sector.  
 
The mechanised sector on the southern Lake Malawi lands between 10-15% of 
the annual total catch (GoM, 2004). Trawling, purse seining and lift netting are 
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common. Currently, the sector comprises 14 trawlers (five pair trawlers and nine 
stern trawlers). The aquarium trade involves catching and selling of cichlids, 
(Mbuna).  
 
Fish production is mainly from Lakes Malawi (24,208 km2) Chilwa 
(approximately 2,000 km2), Malombe (390 km2), Chiuta (200 km2) and the 
Lower Shire River system. The Malawian fisheries have experienced a 
considerable decline especially from early 1990s. Figure 2 shows the annual 
catches declining from an average of 68,000 metric tonnes (1976-1990) to an 
average of 55,000 metric tonnes (1993-2003).  
 
 
Figure 2: Estimated annual fish landings5 (metric tonnes) from major water 
bodies in Malawi from 1976-2002  
Source: GoM (2004)  
 
A combination of complex factors contributed to the decline including localised 
overfishing in some inshore stocks of Lake Malawi, climatic influence that 
results in drying up of Lake Chilwa and weak capacity of DoF to enforce 
fisheries regulations. Conversely, in the last decade, the number of fishers, 
                                                 
5 Problems associated with fish catch data estimates collection from Malawi’s waters have been 
outlined previously (Weyl, Manase, Namoto. & Banda, 1999)   
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fishing gears and fishing crafts has increased by 27%, 124% and 30%, 
respectively. 
 
1.2.4 Fish marketing 
Fishing, processing and marketing constitute a principal occupation for the 
majority of fishing households in Malawi. There has been an increase in fishing 
and fish trading since the 1940s mainly due to the rapid increase of the 
population between 1945 and 1966 (Agnew & Chipeta, 1979). The introduction 
of nylon threads in 1958 by a Blantyre factory in place of fibres from local plants 
was a defining technological advancement in the history of the fishing industry in 
the country.  
 
Processing of fish includes smoking, fresh and sun drying. The small-scale 
fishers use traditional open pits or in small smoking kilns made of bricks to 
smoke part of the catch. The smoking method is mainly for bigger fish like 
catfish (rolled Mlamba) and split Oreochromis species (Chambo). Traders can 
also sell Chambo in fresh form with the use of ice. Matiya (2005a) notes that fish 
prices vary according to fish species, preservation, weight and market type. 
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Figure 3: Graph showing fish exports (kg) and value (MK) for Malawi from 1997 
to 2004 
Source: NSO (2005); Njaya (2001) 
 
From 1997 to 2005, annual fish exports ranged from 0.1 to 256 tonnes with an 
average of 86 tonnes. In 2005, the country exported its highest fish quantities 
todate (255 tonnes). On the other hand, fish imported into the country fluctuates 
between 560 tonnes recorded in 1997 to 2,808 tonnes in 1999 with an average 
volume of 1,416 tonnes (Figure 3). These figures show that both locally exploited 
and imported fish will not meet Malawi’s fish needs estimated to grow to over 
80,000 tonnes by 2010 (Njaya, 2002).  
 
Generally, from 1997 to 2000 the values of fish exports were lower than those 
earned from imported fish products. However, since 2002 the trend has changed 
with the highest values of fish exports being higher than values of fish imports 
although quantity records show that fish exports are generally less than the fish 
imports (NSO, 2002).  
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Figure 4: Graph illustrates the value (MK) and quantity (kg) of fish imports for 
Malawi from 1997 to 2004 
Source: NSO (2005); Njaya (2001) 
 
Figure 4 shows that from the same period (1997 to 2005), Malawi earned the 
highest fish export value of about MK 160 million (about US$ 1.4 million6) in 
2004. On the other hand, the value of fish imports has steadily increased with the 
highest value of MK 117 million (about US$ 1 million) being recorded in 2005. 
Owing to the increased demand for fish in the country, the largest catch targets 
the domestic market with insignificant volumes destined for foreign markets.  
 
The aquarium fish mainly targets Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, 
Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and 
the United States of America. Malawi exported 5,099 units of aquarium fish at a 
value of approximately MK 4 million in 1997 while in 1999 the fish exports 
amounted to 40,821 units at a value of MK 8 million. The country does not 
import aquarium fish but live fish for consumption. On imports, the country 
purchased 25,200 live units of fish in 1997 while records for 1999 show that 717 
                                                 
6 Using exchange rate of approximately 1US$ to MK114 that prevailed around 1999-2003  
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units of fish at a value of only MK 51,652 were in bound (NSO, 2002; Njaya, 
2002).  
 
1.3 Lake Chilwa fishery 
1.3.1 Location and size 
Lake Chilwa lies at 624m above sea level between 35°45' E and 15°15' S in the 
centre of the low-lying Chilwa-Phalombe plain in the southern part of Malawi 
(FAO, 1966; Ratcliffe, 1971a). The lake is the second largest in Malawi and the 
twelfth in Africa (Banda, Bulirani, Kachinjika & Njaya, 1997). Lake Chilwa is 
shallow without any outlet and has a maximum depth of 6m at peak water level.  
Landes & Otte (1983) report that a reed belt of about 15km wide surrounds Lake 
Chilwa to the north and 1-2km wide on the north-eastern side (Figure 5).  
 
 
Figure 5: Lake Chilwa and its extensive associated marshes and floodplain 
Source: Kalk et al. (1979) 
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The size of the lake varies according to seasons but its maximum length is 38.5 
km while its maximum width is 27 km (FAO, 1966). In years with high water 
levels, the open water increases to 1,054 km2, Typha swamp to 640 km2, marshy 
area of 163 km2 and the flood plain grassland is around 220 km2. In low water 
level conditions the open water recedes to 678 km2, the Typha swamp is 699 km2, 
marshy area of 300 km2 and the flood plain grassland of 430 km2, giving a total 
of 2,077 km2 and 2,107 km2 respectively. The cultivated area is approximately 
233 km2, with 114 km2 under cultivated rice, irrigated rice (29 km2) and dimba 
(90 km2). The Lake Chilwa catchment area is 8,349 km2 with 5,669 km2 (68%) 
lying on the Malawian side and about 2,680 km2 (32%) on the Mozambican side 
(GoM, 1999; GoM, 2001).  
1.3.2 Water level changes 
Figure 6 illustrates changes of water levels for Lake Chilwa. The water level 
changes take two forms: on a seasonal basis due to changes in water levels with 
when some parts of the lake dry up and on a periodic basis when the lake dries up 
completely after some years (approximately 6 years) of a minor recession and 25 
years for a major one (Lancaster, 1979).  
 
The Scottish explorer, David Livingstone, was the first to provide information 
through observations about Lake Chilwa water level changes (Table 1). Since 
1879, Lake Chilwa has dried up completely on six occassions, partially dried up 
eight times and flooded six times. 
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Figure 6: Recorded water level changes for Lake Chilwa from 1962 to 1999  
Source: GoM (2000b) 
 
Records show that reduced catches and fish mortalities occurred during the minor 
and moderate severe recessions of 1879, 1900, 1914-15, 1922, 1931-32, 1934, 
1954, 1960-61, 1967, 1973 and 1995 (Kalk et al., 1979; Njaya et al., 1996; GoM, 
2000b). A 25-year record of low lake levels occurs, giving a clearer picture of 
periodicity of the behaviour of the lake (Agnew & Chipeta, 1979).  
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Table 1: Historical and observed water level changes in Lake Chilwa from 1859 
to 1995 
Year High Low Very low (dry) 
1859 Livingstone (observation)   
1860 O’Neill (1884)   
1870 Buchanan (1893)   
1879   Buchanan, 1893 
1880  O’Neill 1884  
1888 Drummond, (1902)   
1900   Chipeta, (1972); Duff 
1913-1915  -------------     Chipeta, 1972   -------------- 
1920-1922  -------------     Garson and Campbell-Smith 
Late 1930s Burgess (pers. comm.)   
1943  Chipeta (1972)  
1949  Chipeta (1972)  
1960-1961  Kalk (1979)  
1967-1968   Kalk (1979) 
1973  Kalk (1979)  
1976 Kalk (1979)    
1995   Njaya (1996) 
Source:  Kalk et al. (1979) and Njaya (1996) 
1.3.3 Temperature, evapotranspiration and humidity 
With high temperature ranging from 20-39o C, there is water loss through 
evaporation (GoM, 1999). From 1985-1992, evaporation averaged 1,779 mm at 
Domasi Rice Scheme while Makoka Agricultural Research Station recorded 
1,670 mm in 1999 (Figure 7). The two stations lie within the catchment area of 
Lake Chilwa. Water balance equation for Lake Chilwa basin shows an excessive 
loss of water resources through evapotranspiration processes as evidenced by the 
large value of the Et parameter of 1,670 mm, which exceeds the total precipitation 
hence Chavula (2000:30) concludes: 
It is not surprising that surface water bodies within the catchment area including Lake Chilwa 
itself are vulnerable to drying up during prolonged drought spells, as the rate of water loss is 
very high. 
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Figure 7: Rainfall (mm) and evaporation (mm) recorded at Domasi Rice Scheme 
from 1980 to 1995 and 1985 to 1992 respectively  
Source: Njaya, Chiotha & Kabwazi (1996) 
 
Humidity for the catchment area is 71% on average and has sunshine hours of an 
average of 7.1 while radiation is 4.4 mm per day on average and depending on 
seasons, wind speed of about 158 km/day on average (GoM, 1999). Its water 
budget depends on rainfall, water inflow from rivers and evaporation. The long-
term cyclic changes of water levels of 2-3m result in a partial or complete drying 
up of the lake (Landes & Otte, 1983). 
1.3.4 Rainfall 
The annual rainfall for the Lake Chilwa catchment is around 1,000 to 1,200 mm 
per year (Nicholson, 1998). The rainfall results from the Tropical Cyclones and 
Inter Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), which normally occur between 
November and April. The Tropical Cyclones cause rainfall in the catchment area 
as they cross the Mozambique Channel into Malawi. When the cyclone crosses 
the channel and moves over land there is a widespread heavy rainfall over the 
Lake Chilwa catchment. Consequently, the catchment experiences heavy down 
pours that cause excessive flooding and disasters.  
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When both the ITCZ and Tropical Cyclones are concurrently overhead in the 
catchment area, flood disasters become a common occurrence because of the 
resultant heavy rainfall. The temperature regime is tropical continental and 
changes in its spatial and temporal distribution mainly due to highlands and 
nearness of Lake Malawi. The country’s latitudinal location exposes it to the 
influence of extra-tropical systems that move eastwards around the southern 
African coast. This results in moist air influxes from the southern latitudes that 
periodically cause ground and air frost in the cold season from May-August 
(Chavula, 1999). 
1.3.5 Demography 
The 2008 population census shows that the catchment area has approximately 1.6 
million people with a density of 321 people km2 registering an increase of 
approximately 50% from that of 1998. The catchment areas of Lake Chilwa 
recorded population of 593,167 for Zomba, 290,946 for Chiradzulu, 488,996 for 
Machinga and 313,227 for Phalombe (NSO, 2008). The population figures 
indicate that the Lake Chilwa catchment is one of the most densely populated 
areas of Malawi. 
1.3.6 Description of dominant fish species 
Lake Chilwa harbours 27 fish species, but only three (the small minnow, B. 
paludinosus, the African catfish, Clarias gariepinus, and two tilapiine species, O. 
chilwae and Tilapia rendalli) are of commercial importance (Kalk et al., 1979). 
The valuable commercial species have high fecundity levels, reproducing at a 
relatively early age can persist in the swamp, lagoon and streams as well as in the 
open lake, have broad diets with considerable overlap and display opportunistic 
feeding behaviour (Moss, 1979). 
 
The maximum size of B. paludinosus (Matemba) with high fecundity (average of 
500 eggs per female) is 12 cm but they mature at 5cm (Banda et al., 1997). The 
highest spawning peak of the Barbus species is from September to December 
(Howard-Williams, Furse, Schulten-Senden, Bourn & Lenton, 1972). There is a 
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fall in catches of B. paludinosus from September to February in the open waters 
probably due to spawning that occurs in rivers (Furse, 1979).  
 
The endemic cichlid subspecies of Lake Chilwa, Oreochromis shiranus chilwae 
(Makumba) grows to a maximum of 15 cm (Msiska, 1991). The fecundity of the 
cichlid is 200 eggs per female (Banda et al., 1997). The fish spawns in 
surrounding pools, springs, and lagoons and has an extended breeding season 
from September to May. O. shiranus prefers to breed in shallow waters Furse et 
al. (1979). The fish species have two main spawning periods in an extended 
breeding that are suitable for the fluctuating environment. O. shiranus is more 
associated with the open water than Barbus and Clarias species, which move into 
the swamps to breed. Moss (1979) observes that O. shiranus chilwae has 
relatively lower resistance as shown in the delayed recovery of its populations 
after recessions. 
 
The Lake Chilwa catfish, Clarias gariepinus (Mlamba) is the only fish species 
that is smaller than other catfishes (Banda et al., 1997). Fecundity of C. 
gariepinus is high with 180,000 eggs per female for each breeding season. The 
unsexed C. gariepinus in Lake Chilwa matures earlier at 18.5 cm than the female 
ones from other lakes. The female C. gariepinus from Lake Kariba, Lake Tana 
and reservoirs in Burkina Faso matures at 34.0, 30.5cm and 37.5cm, respectively 
(Teugels, 1986). Spawning of C. gariepinus usually begins in September and 
continues during the rainy season in flooded delta areas and return to the river or 
the lake soon afterwards (Furse, Kirk, Morgan & Tweddle, 1979).  
 
 
 
 
 
 21 
 
1.3.7 Changes in fishers, craft and gear types  
1.3.7.1 Fishers 
The fishery is predominantly artisanal7. Commercial fishing operations using 
trawlers took place in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the fishing operations were 
unsuccessful mainly due to high unstable lake levels, poor infrastructure and lack 
of effective marketing strategies.  
 
 
Figure 8: Trends in counts of fishers from 1983 to 2002  
Source: GoM (2002a) 
 
Since the 1995 recession, the highest recorded numbers of gear owners and crew 
were 2,406 and 6,250, respectively recorded in 1998 (Figure 8). However, the 
numbers decreased to about 2,400 crew and 2,700 gear owners in 2002 (GoM, 
2005) mainly due to migration of fishers. Schuijt (1999) estimated that Lake 
                                                 
7 In this study, I use the terms “artisanal” or “small-scale” fishery interchangeably by referring to 
the nature of the fishing gears and types of craft used. The definition may not apply to other lakes 
in Malawi or elsewhere. On fishing gears, fish trap, gillnet and long lines are artisanal in nature 
while Matemba seine nets, Nkacha and trawl nets are commercial. On craft type, dug out canoes 
are artisanal while planked boats are commercial.    
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Chilwa had 3,720 fish traders, 17 boat builders and a considerable number of 
people involved in other ancillary industries.  
1.3.7.2 Craft 
Transportation on the lake mainly involves use of polled dugout canoes and a few 
planked boats (Landes & Otte, 1983). The number of dugout and planked boats 
increased from 1990 with counts of 350 and 300 respectively (Figure 9). After 
the 1995 recession, the number of dugout canoes was about 4,600 while planked 
boats were 600 (GoM, 2005). The increase in craft was mainly due to increased 
number of fishers, migration of seine fishers from Lake Malombe, replacement of 
old dugout canoes, which became unsafe because of cracks that developed as a 
result of exposure to sun heat.  
 
Figure 9: Trends in counts of craft from 1984 to 2002  
By 2002, the numbers of dugout canoes and planked boats decreased to 1,100 and 
1,950 respectively in response to declining catches attributed to the introduced 
Usodzi wa Mululu fishing method that involved use of introduced non-selective 
‘gauze’ wire seines especially since early 2000s. The fishing method requires 
clearing of aquatic vegetation, thereby increasing vulnerability of the fish to 
exploitation. Of particular importance is the change in craft type from dugout to 
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planked boats, which reflects investment opportunities existing in the fishery 
especially in exploiting offshore resources and scarcity of suitable trees for 
dugout canoes due to deforestation within the Lake Chilwa catchment area. 
1.3.7.3 Fishing gear 
Lake Chilwa fishers use fish traps, gillnets, seine nets and long lines. However, 
fish traps are common because they are less expensive as they are made of local 
materials compared to other gear types that need synthetic materials. Gillnets are 
also cheaper than seines.  Two types of seines exist in Lake Chilwa. First, 
Matemba seines that local Lake Chilwa fishers use are adapted to the ecological 
conditions of the lake. Second, Nkacha seines that the Lake Malombe in-migrants 
operate in the lake. Fish traps and seines mainly catch Matemba while gillnets 
and long lines target large fish species such as Makumba and Mlamba.   
 
Since 1983, the highest number of gillnets was about 9,000 counted in 1988, 
2000 and 2002. The largest number of seines was 738 registered in 1998 after the 
1995/96 recession while use of fish traps was highest (33,000) in 1992 before the 
recession. Fishers operating long lines are common in the southern part of the 
lake, which is deeper. Pair trawling experiments conducted between 1970 and 
1971 (Ratcliffe, 1971b) indicate that there is great potential in exploitation of the 
fisheries resources in the lake but the challenge is on the variability of the lake 
levels.  
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1.3.8 Fish production 
Between 1976 and 2003, the annual fish production of Lake Chilwa was 13,000 
tonnes on average with production exceeding 25,000 tonnes in 1979 and 1990 
(Figure 10). During the recession period (1995-96), fishing operations were 
suspended or reduced to a lower scale in river mouths.  
 
 
Figure 10: Estimated catch (tonnes) for Lake Chilwa from 1962 to 2004  
Source: GoM (2005) 
 
Contribution of fish landings from the lake to the national production levels 
varies on an annual basis with an average of 18% from 1993 to 2003 (excluding 
1995 and 1996 when the lake dried up). After the previous recession, the highest 
contribution of fish supply recorded in 1999 was 27% (Figure 11).  
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Figure 11: Estimated Lake Chilwa catch contribution to national fish production 
from 1993 to 2003  
Source: GoM (2005) 
 
Based on water level and fishery changes, Lake Chilwa fish production follows 
three distinct phases (Kalk et al., 1979; Njaya, 2002). Firstly, fish production in 
the normal fishing phase, which occurs in between two to three years before or 
after major recessions. During this time, water level changes are on a seasonal 
basis. Secondly, the drying phase, which is normally the period at least two years 
before a major recession. Thirdly, the refilling phase which takes place after two 
years from a major recession.  
1.3.9 Institutional framework 
The importance of Lake Chilwa as a commercial fishery dates back to the 1940s, 
although earlier reports show that fish products were traded under a barter system 
in the 1800s after the arrival of the Nyanja, Yao and Portuguese (GoM, 1962; 
Kalk et al., 1979; Vaughan, 1982). Malawi exported dried Matemba, to 
neighbouring Zimbabwe and Zambia in the 1980s although larger proportions 
targeted domestic markets (Salama & Jones, 1982). The other commercially 
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valuable fish species, Makumba and Mlamba, are usually destined for local 
markets.  
 
In terms of the fishery value, Schuijt (1999) estimated an annual value of US$ 17 
million of fishing from Lake Chilwa while Njaya (2002) estimated a seine 
fishery8 value of about US$ 8 million per year during a ‘normal’ fishing year. 
The substantial value provides livelihoods of over 9,000 households (fishers and 
crew). With individuals along the chain, including fish processors and traders, the 
figure can double to over 1.4 million, which is about one-tenth of the population. 
Therefore, Lake Chilwa is important for sustaining the livelihoods of many 
people in Malawi, especially in between recessions. 
 
Owing to the commercial importance of the Lake Chilwa fishery, the British 
Colonial Office formulated regulations to govern its exploitation levels in the 
1930s. The Office introduced the first Ordinance for Wildlife and Tsetse. The 
Government of Malawi (GoM) established the Department of Fisheries (DoF) 
through an Act of parliament in 1964 to provide a mandate for proper 
development and management of the fisheries on the lake.  
 
DoF has since the 1960s expanded in terms of functions from data collection and 
extension to policy and planning and adopted the participatory fisheries 
management in the 1990s. Currently, it has 322 technical and professional staff. 
However, the recent expansion of its activities to include fish farming in almost 
all districts of Malawi and a high staff turnover have negatively affected 
operations of the department in terms of its delivery of services. 
 
The DoF revised the fisheries policy and legislation between 1997 and 2001. The 
National Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy (NFAP) that GoM approved in 2001, 
provides an integrated framework for fisheries and aquaculture development in 
Malawi. The policy goal aims at achieving optimal exploitation and utilisation of 
                                                 
8 On Lake Chilwa, seines include the traditional Matemba seines and the open water nkacha 
originally from Lake Malombe.  
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the fisheries of Malawi’s water bodies and promotion of investment in both 
capture and culture fisheries. Its objective is to manage the fisheries resources for 
sustainable utilisation, protection, and conservation of aquatic biodiversity. The 
Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) guide implementation of 
activities of the DoF. The outstanding feature lies on the sharing of responsibility 
for fish resource management between DoF and the resource users in a co-
management or as popularly termed in Malawi, the participatory fisheries 
management (PFM) arrangement. 
 
The Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) of 1997 contains 
articles governing the management and utilisation of the fisheries resources. The 
Act has a section (Part III) on local community participation in fisheries 
conservation and management and provides penalties for any violation of the 
regulations. 
 
1.4 Significance of the study 
The thesis contributes to the understanding of the patterns and frequency of fisher 
migrations based on gear type use. It also examines the contribution of household 
strategies to the recovery and resilience of the fishery. Finally, the thesis 
establishes the dynamic nature of management systems associated with the water 
level changes and transformation of the political economy. The information will 
provide a meaningful basis for a proper policy review aimed at poverty reduction 
among the Chilwa basin households through optimal utilisation of the fisheries 
resources.  
 
At national level, the thesis will provide a basis for a poverty reduction policy 
among lakeshore based communities. This will contribute to the implementation 
of the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) and the attainment of 
the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) based on Goals 1, 4 
and 7 that focus on eradication of poverty, hunger, reduced child mortality and 
environmental sustainability (Box 1). 
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Box 1: Millennium Development Goals relevant to the thesis 
 
Goal 1 focuses on eradication of extreme poverty and hunger.  
Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one 
dollar a day. 
Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger 
 
Goal 4 provides information on reduced child mortality due to protein supply. 
Target 5: Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate 
 
Goal 7 emphasises the need for environmental sustainability. 
Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and 
programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources  
 
Based on the background outlined above, the thesis contributes to the 
understanding of the impact of water level changes on fisher migration and co-
management as household strategies within the Lake Chilwa basin. Of particular 
interest are the periodic and seasonal variations in water level changes that result 
in flooding and recessions thereby influencing changes in the household 
strategies.  
 
Firstly, the thesis focuses on its contribution to the understanding of the 
frequency and patterns of fisher migrations within Lake Chilwa and between the 
lake and others. The current study specifically examines fisher migrations by gear 
type. Secondly, the thesis looks at the impact of water level changes on the co-
management arrangement for Lake Chilwa. Being an ecosystem that exhibits 
floodplain and open waters the intriguing aspect is on the understanding of 
whether the type of co-management varies with any particular water level regime. 
Thirdly, by looking at the migration and co-management arrangement as 
household strategies, there is a need to identify conflicts that arise mainly in 
terms of resource access and power to authorise migrant fishers. With findings 
from this study, relevant authorities can develop a proper policy portfolio for 
improved livelihood strategies of the Lake Chilwa households.  
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1.5 Problem definition  
Previous research studies conducted on Lake Chilwa were in most cases 
biologically oriented until recently when interest in social studies developed. The 
main research studies conducted on the lake started in the 1960s (Ratcliffe, 
1971). The Department of Fisheries formerly called Department of Game, Fish 
and Tsetse fly Control funded a study on gillnet selectivity in 1960. The main 
findings of the research centred on 100 mm as the minimum size of Makumba 
(Oreochromis shiranus chilwae). Later on, the department conducted a trawling 
experiment to assess whether the fishery was biologically and economically 
viable for commercial exploitation. The experiment recommended trawling as a 
commercial fishing operation on the lake, but because of the variable nature of 
the ecosystem in terms of water level changes, the operations did not justify its 
economic sustainability.  
 
Scientists from the University of Malawi conducted comprehensive research 
studies in the 1970s (Kalk et al., 1979). The research focused on biological and 
socio-economic dimensions of the fishery. A detailed publication of the results in 
1979 by Margaret Kalk was one of the key deliverables of the research study. The 
major findings included the following: first, impacts of water level changes on 
the fish species and chemical and physical processes of the ecosystem. Second, 
biological aspects of the fisheries resources with Catfish (Clarias gariepinus) 
having biological characteristics that makes it to survive during recessions. Third, 
changes in the morphology of the lake, social change in terms of human 
settlement in relation to their dependence on fishing, trading and farming 
activities and lastly, fishery development programmes by indicating the need to 
allocate skilled fisheries extension agents around the lake and development of 
infrastructure like feeder roads for easy access to fishing areas. 
 
The Department of Parks and Wildlife and the University of Malawi 
commissioned studies in 1996 that focused on social and biological issues. On the 
social issues, the study recommended involvement of the local community 
participation in natural resource management including birds and fish. The study 
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also found that the ecosystem harboured 153 species of resident and 30 species of 
palearctic (migratory) waterbirds, which led to the declaration of the Lake Chilwa 
wetland as a Ramsar9 Site No 869 in 1997 (Ramsar Convention Bureau, 1999).  
 
From 2001 to 2003, the World Fish Centre (WFC) and Innovative Fisheries 
Management (IFM) jointly coordinated a study on the Lake Chilwa co-
management arrangement (Wilson, Ahmed, Delaney, Donda, Kapasa, Malasha, 
Muyangali, Njaya, Olesen, Poiosse & Raakjær-Nielsen, 2005). The study applied 
the institutional analysis framework that examined contextual variables and 
outcomes of the co-management arrangement. The key finding of the study was 
that the Lake Chilwa co-management was largely consultative. 
 
As part of the Sustainable Livelihood Programme (SLP), the Department for 
International Development (DFID) funded studies on the diversification of 
livelihoods in two villages along Lake Chilwa (Allison & Mvula 2002). 
Migration of the fishers was one of the focused areas. The study highlighted 
importance of migration and that any regulatory mechanism that focused on 
migration of fishers was counterproductive to their livelihood.  
 
None of the previous research work links the household strategies (migration and 
co-management) in response to water level changes by gear type. It is difficult to 
understand how the households adapt to the water level changes. While previous 
livelihood studies (Allison & Mvula, 2002) touched on vulnerability aspects, the 
results were just generalised.  
 
                                                 
9 The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, which is reffred to as the Ramsar 
Convention, is an intergovernmental treaty that provides the framework for national action and 
international cooperation for the conservation and wise use of wetlands and their resources. The 
Convention came into force for Malawi on 14 March 1997. Malawi presently has one site, Lake 
Chilwa designated as a Wetland of International Importance, with a surface area of 224,800 
hectares. The lake supports internationally important numbers of 153 species of resident and 30 
species of palearctic (migratory) waterbirds. Apart from human settlements, activities include 
fishing, agriculture (rice and dimba cultivation), and livestock grazing. 
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There is no documentation on the impact of changes in the management system 
of Lake Chilwa from pre-colonial rule to Malawi’s independence and multiparty 
democratic era on the role of traditional leaders. Specifically, while previous 
qualitative studies have shown limited support of Traditional Authorities (TAs) 
towards Beach Village Committees (BVCs) or Beach Village Sub-Committees 
(BVSC)10, there has been limited quantitative assessment on the attitude of the 
households. 
 
With support from Malawi Germany Fisheries and Aquaculture Development 
Project (MAGFAD) and Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), 
local leaders formulated management measures for Lake Chilwa in a co-
management arrangement. This triggered a debate by some researchers with 
arguments against the introduction of the co-management approach. Sarch & 
Allison (2000) agued that co-management could be a basis for establishment of 
user and access rights and hence restrict other resource users. This is mainly in 
cases where co-management focuses on restricting migration of certain fishers 
from other lakes to operate in Lake Chilwa or vice versa. The researchers 
consider migration as a livelihood strategy, and hence a need for government to 
support this.  
 
Linked to the same issue of migration, Landes & Otte (1983:12) observe that 
migration has been common on Lake Chilwa including “at periods of stable water 
level”. While this is the case, there has never been any empirical evidence on the 
magnitude of the migration, its pattern and in what context it occurs. It is difficult 
to know which fishers by gear type do migrate in terms of seasonality and 
periodicity. It is also important to have information on the role of other livelihood 
strategies within the Chilwa basin considering the lake level changes that at times 
result in exposing fertile land for crop farming.   
                                                 
10 A Beach Village Committee (BVC) is composed of people engaged in fishing-related activities 
(fishing, processing and trading) at a particular beach while a Beach Village Sub-Committee 
(BVSC) is the elected body of 10-12 members representing interests of the BVC. This is a 
definition from the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (GoM 1997), which I use in the 
thesis. 
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Lowore & Lowore (1999) observe that there was lack of justifiable reasons for 
introducing management measures for Lake Chilwa within the fabric of co-
management framework. Of particular criticism was the involvement of 
traditional leaders as key participants in the co-management process. The 
arguments centre on the fact the local leaders formulated the fishing rules without 
any scientific basis.  
 
Based on the forgoing arguments and observations, the thesis aims at contributing 
to the understanding of changes in management systems, migration and co-
management. Firstly, there is need to understand how Chilwa households adapt to 
changes in water levels in terms of the strategies they apply to sustain their 
livelihoods. Secondly, it is necessary to describe the nature of migration of 
fishers by gear type for proper policy formulation; and finally assess perception 
of fishers, BVCs and households how they view support from their Traditional 
Authorities and other partners in the co-management arrangement for their 
livelihood strategies.  
 
1.6 Research objectives 
Following the issues highlighted above (Section 1.3), the primary objective of the 
research study is to investigate social and institutional responses of the fishing 
households to the water level fluctuations of Lake Chilwa. Its specific objectives 
are to:   
(a) study fishing-farming households strategies in response to the seasonal 
and periodic lake level variability 
(b) analyse magnitude and pattern of seasonal and periodic migration of 
fishers and associated conflicts 
(c) assess Lake Chilwa co-management arrangement in terms of 
participation, transparency and accountability. 
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1.7 Research questions 
Linked to the objectives above and the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 
3 (Figure 12), the following research questions form a basis of the thesis:  
(a) What is the impact of seasonal and periodic lake level changes on the 
livelihoods of the Lake Chilwa fishing households? 
(b) How do the Lake Chilwa basin households respond to the variable lake 
levels?  
(c) What is the extent and pattern of the fisher migrations in Lake Chilwa? 
(d) What is the nature of conflicts that exist between resident and in-migrant 
resource users?  
(e) Are key actors in the Lake Chilwa co-management transparent and 
accountable? 
(f) Do the BVCs get support from the Traditional Authorities? 
 
Chapter 3 that outlines the conceptual and conceptual frameworks provides 
details of the research questions to guide the study. 
 
1.8 Organisation of the thesis 
The thesis is composed of nine chapters. Chapter 1 presents background to the 
study. The chapter outlines the importance of the fisheries sector and industry to 
Malawi’s economy. Additionally, it focuses on the socio-economic contribution 
that Lake Chilwa fisheries make to the local population and Malawi as a whole. 
Finally, the chapter describes the study site and outlines the research problem, 
objectives and rationale.  
 
Chapter 2 contains a review of concepts and paradigms related to management of 
small-scale fisheries in a fluctuating environment. Specifically, it contains 
definitions and objectives of fisheries management and presents problems of 
managing small-scale fisheries. Finally, the chapter looks at application of 
traditional knowledge in fish resource management. 
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Chapter 3 describes the research design and methodology and a conceptual 
framework as a guiding tool for this study. The chapter also outlines data analysis 
and limitations of the methodology in relation to data collection and analysis.  
 
Chapters 4-6 present results of the study based on the research objectives, 
questions and conceptual framework. In Chapter 4, the thesis presents findings on 
the responses of the Lake Chilwa basin households to seasonal and periodic water 
level changes. The chapter also contains results on the migration of fishers in 
form of frequency and patterns for both intra- and inter-lake migration types. It 
further gives detailed results on the migration of fishers in relation to seasonal 
and periodic water level changes. It also presents household strategies and 
adaptability.  
 
Results on fisheries-related conflicts are in Chapter 5. The conflicts relate to 
cultural and ecological, technological and socio-economic contexts. It further 
outlines results on power and authority in terms of fishing gear ownership and 
operations.  
 
Chapter 6 presents results on the assessment of the type of co-management 
practised on Lake Chilwa. The results are from the co-management attitude 
survey, which quantitatively analysed perceptions of support the local level 
community committees (BVCs), fishers and household heads get from the 
Traditional Authorities (TAs). It also looks at the support the District Assemblies 
(DAs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and DoF give to the BVCs.  
 
Chapter 7 discusses the results and draws key lessons from the study. Particular 
focus is on water level changes and livelihoods, migration in terms of frequency 
and patterns and tenure systems. The discussion also centres on the roles of 
traditional leaders in the co-management framework and the outcomes of co-
management typology in form of partnership, transparency and accountability.  
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Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the study and presents proposed recommendations. 
It draws also issues on household strategies, migration, conflicts and co-
management in terms of how effective the DoF and BVCs can formulate policies 
on the fluctuating Lake Chilwa ecosystem.  
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CHAPTER 2 
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
 
This Chapter reviews definitions and concepts of fisheries management. A major 
focus is on the objectives and problems of managing fisheries resources as 
common pool resources (CPRs), and then drawing attention to the theoretical 
basis of fisheries co-management and migration. The Chapter centres on the 
relationship between water level changes and household strategies that include 
migration, on one hand, and co-management on the other. It also reviews 
conflicts that emerge in the migration and co-management as shown in the 
conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 3.  
 
There is a conceptual relationship between lake level changes and migration of 
fishers but without any empirical evidence. Therefore, a review of previous 
studies on migration and its linkage to lake level and fish stock changes is 
important. The review also centres on the applicability of conventional 
management measures in the fluctuating environments due to climatic influence 
that would lead to appropriate policy recommendations for optimal utilisation of 
the Lake Chilwa fisheries resources. 
 
2.1 Objectives of managing fisheries resources  
Management of fisheries resources takes many forms and approaches depending 
on the type of fishery and its biological dimension and socio-economic 
importance. There is no clear and generally agreed definition of fisheries 
management. However, FAO (1997:7) adopted the following working definition: 
The integrated process of information gathering, analysis, planning, consultation, decision-
making, allocation of resources and formulation and implementation, with enforcement as 
necessary, of regulations or rules which govern fisheries activities in order to ensure the 
continued productivity of the resources and  accomplishment of other fisheries objectives. 
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The most common elements of fisheries management include the setting of 
specific objectives to regulate the fishing effort and control use of the fisheries 
resources (Panayotou, 1982). A key function of a fisheries management 
institution is to formulate and implement rules and procedures whereby relevant 
authorities conduct the fishery in a sustainable manner to meet set objectives 
(FAO, 1997). In contrast to fisheries management, a resource management 
regime refers to “a structure of rights and duties characterizing the relationship of 
individuals to one another with respect to that particular environmental resource” 
(Bromley, 1991:22).  
 
Over the past decades, there has been development of institutional arrangements 
that refer to the structure of rights and duties. The institutional arrangements aim 
to define a specific property regime that governs management of the commons. 
Bromley (1991) outlines institutional arrangements that include the state or 
centralised property regimes; private property regimes; common property 
regimes; and non-property regimes. Nevertheless, Ostrom (1990) argues that 
although management of the natural resources can be achieved through control by 
either a state or market, neither of the two can successfully lead to sustained long-
term production levels of the natural resource. The argument implies that a 
combined control of the regimes is a commonly ideal situation.  
 
Jentoft, McCay & Wilson (1997) observe that community-based natural resource 
governance regimes, to a greater or lesser extent, are associated with state 
property systems. As such, state actors set the margins for co-management 
regimes and define the level of participation of key partners, hence, the focus of 
this analysis on the state actors. It is also important to understand that in every 
co-management arrangement the level of participation and the characteristics of 
different partnerships are dynamic.  
 
Regulation is the focus of many fisheries management regimes although 
biologists, economists and social scientists approach the issue from different 
perspectives. The biological proponents of regulating fishing effort indicate that 
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if the fisheries remained unregulated, over-fishing would occur (van der Burg, 
2000). Successful management of fisheries resources demands a successful 
modelling.  Waugh (1984) recommends the need to look at the abundance, size 
and age structure of the population, which determines the rate of growth of the 
population. The biological perspective is justified by looking at the harvesting of 
too many fish to allow adequate spawning, recruitment, and sustainability. 
However, from an economic perspective, the lack of property rights or other 
institutions are the main causes of over-fishing. The main element is the absence 
of exclusivity in the use of the resources (Winpenny, 1991).  
 
Apart from the biological and economic perspectives, Wilson, Acheson, Metcalfe 
& Kleban (1994) regard fisheries management as a social problem. This is 
because decision-making processes need to be made at various levels including 
the resource users. Considering the open access nature of a fishery, there is a 
challenge to the achievement of an optimal level of resource exploitation (Hanna, 
2003). Practically, it means that aspects of economic, social and biological 
orientation are significant for sustainable utilisation of the fisheries resources. 
 
The basic objectives in managing a fishery are many and may include adequate 
supply of more food, improved living standards for a fisher and more 
employment opportunities (Bagenal, 1978). The management objectives are in 
three categories (Waugh, 1984). First, the maximum sustainable yield that 
focuses on sustainable yield in an equilibrium manner. Second, the maximum 
economic yield by measuring benefits in value terms and costs and finally, 
optimum yields whereby social issues are necessary.  
 
Many developed and developing countries have been applying various 
management strategies since the 1950s. Ahmed & Delgado (2000: 227) states:  
The dominance of open access prior to 1970s, combination of regulations with market-led --- 
incentives and stakeholder participation in fisheries management around 1980s and 1990s such 
as fishing rights systems that allocate private property limited entry including the introduction 
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of buy-back schemes and, lastly, modifications to rights of access --- have become popular in 
the developed countries.  
 
In developing countries, fishing effort control through licensing has remained a 
key management strategy. For example, there is a requirement by law to license 
gear types (seines and gillnets) for the small-scale fishery sector and trawl nets 
for the commercial sector in Malawi. However, the licensing strategy seems to 
aim at revenue generation rather than resource management. 
 
2.2  Fisheries management challenges 
With continued declining trends of capture fisheries resources in many water 
bodies across the globe, an array of reasons attribute to such a situation. The 
open-access nature of the fisheries resources has largely contributed to resource 
decline in many parts of the world. Nhantumbo, Norfolk & Pereira (2003) assert 
that the colonial introduction of property right systems in Africa that were 
incongruent with existing “traditional” arrangements, contributes to the current 
de facto open-access nature of the many resources. In addition, Berkes (1996) 
and Bromley (1991) for example, name the unclear institutional arrangements 
regarding property rights. Both scholars refer to the institutional arrangements as 
rules applied within a particular community to regulate access to the resources, 
amount allowed for exploitation, when this can take place and who has powers to 
enforce these rules.  
 
Failure to exclude outsiders (people not belonging to community that claims to 
“own” the resource) from accessing a fishery is a continuous problem for local 
resource users. Jentoft, McCay & Wilson (1997) associate the problem of 
outsiders’ intrusion to the lack of clear property rights. The situation is 
aggravated when governments fail to support local communities to sanction 
illegal fishers. This can be due lack of resources. However, the people accessing 
the resources with destructive fishing methods are usually politically more 
powerful (Knox & Meinzen-Dick, 2001).  
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Different fisheries models need to regulate fishing effort, which exist in many 
countries. However, the models fail to recognize the variability nature of small-
scale fisheries such as Lake Chilwa, which seasonally fluctuates and periodically 
dries up. Sarch & Allison, (2000) observe that many small-scale fisheries in 
Africa play a significant role in rural economies through creation of employment 
opportunities, food security and livelihoods. However, they argue that despite the 
variability nature of some of the ecosystems, central management authorities 
continue to apply the conventional measures that have little effect on the 
sustainability of the fisheries resources.   
 
Winpenny (1991:10) points out that “fisheries are highly prone to natural 
variability in their environment, in ways which can be both complex and 
unpredictable, and may interact with human interventions to produce serious 
consequences”. However, the rapid responses of many fresh water fish stocks to 
fluctuating environmental conditions challenge the accurate assessments of the 
fish stocks. Breuil (1997) also states that the estimated fish production from 
several lakes in Africa is not reliable. The main reasons include varied physical 
environment; the unreliability of catch data methods; the high fishing levels in 
the major fisheries including large lakes and floodplains and the technology 
levels (Sverdrup-Jensen, 1999).  
 
Fish stocks in many inland waters of Africa fluctuate considerably. The fish stock 
fluctuations are in most cases climate-driven and cannot be stabilised by any 
conventional measures. The situation is complicated in cases where among other 
factors, the ecological systems experience prolonged drought conditions (Lae, 
1997; Sarch & Allison, 2000). Conway, Allison, Felstead & Goulden (2005) note 
that rainfall variability and trends in climate factors such as temperature and wind 
speed impact on farming systems, thereby affecting the livelihood strategies of 
producers, particularly farmers who live around the shores of the major lakes, 
wetlands and river flood plains. This means that the rural population that are 
dependent on both fishing and farming become vulnerable to climate changes. 
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There is even a school of thought that climate variability is a major factor in catch 
declines around the southern African region apart from overfishing, habitat 
degradation and others (Jul-Larsen et al., 2003). They recommend applying the 
conventional measures with caution mostly in lakes that exhibit high responses to 
climatic influences with multi-species fisheries, especially in shallow and 
enclosed ecosystems such as Lake Chilwa. They further argue that there is little 
scope for any biological explanation to recommend effort control. Landes & Otte 
(1983:15) support this observation:  
[The] main problem for the fishery itself is the unpredictable nature of Lake Chilwa. The 
seasonal and long-term cyclic changes of Lake Chilwa with its major recessions and periodic 
drying out influence all environmental parameters of the lake. This instability does not allow 
development of an appropriate fishery management system based on the productivity of the 
maximum sustainability yield (MSY). 
 
Kolding (1994) indicates that there are significant correlations between catch per 
unit effort and mean water levels in an artisanal offshore Kapenta experiment on 
Lake Kariba and Matemba on Lake Chilwa, respectively. Furse et al. (1979) also 
observe that yields and species compositions in Lake Chilwa varied with the lake 
levels. Based on the water level changes, they argue that due to the high 
regenerative capacity of Lake Chilwa, there is no justification in setting up 
management measures, as the fishery recovers naturally after a recession. Jul-
Larsen, Kolding, Overå, Raakjær Nielsen & van Zwieten (2003), also caution 
against effort regulation in small and medium water bodies such as Lakes Chilwa, 
Malombe, Chiuta, Mweru and Kariba. With such research findings, management 
paradigms to regulate exploitation of the fisheries resources in water bodies need 
a concrete biological basis and other considerations.  
 
Climatic influence has also been associated with fish catch fluctuations due to 
occurrence of flooding and recessions. Any increase in temperature due to 
climate change would result in an increase in ‘the rate of evaporation, resulting in 
greater water loss from Lake Chilwa (GoM, 2001:12). Goulden (2005:1) also 
links climate change with sustainable livelihoods in fluctuating environments:  
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The impacts of climate variability can be particularly severe in communities that are highly 
dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods and also experience the impacts of 
extreme climate events such as floods and droughts as well as other sources of stress to their 
livelihoods such as disease, conflict and increased population pressure.  
 
Sverdrup-Jensen (1999) observes that the rapid responses of many fresh water 
fish stocks to fluctuating environmental conditions obscure an accurate 
assessment of the resource situation. Sarch & Allison (2000) argue that fish 
stocks in many of Africa’s inland waters fluctuate considerably, and that these 
fluctuations are climate driven and cannot be stabilized by conventional 
measures. Lae (1997) indicates that among other factors, the appearance of an 
extended drought period greatly affects African ecological systems.  
 
The relationship between potential and actual production in Africa’s inland 
waters was not sufficient as a basis for definite development policies mainly 
because of the following reasons: First, the unreliability of potential and actual 
fish production estimates in a varied and often changing physical environment. 
Second, the unreliability of the collected data on fish landings collected in 
various fishing areas. Third, the high fishing levels in the major fisheries (large 
lakes and floodplains), and lastly, the level of technology (Breuil, 1997). 
Therefore, it is necessary to keep records of water level changes and other 
parameters to correlate them with catch data in long-term data series for 
meaningful interpretation of the fluctuations. 
 
2.3 Theoretical basis of fisheries co-management 
Since the 1990s, many scholars and practitioners have pursued a debate on 
institutional arrangements and governance reforms mainly sparked by the decline 
in small-scale fish resources (FAO, 1993; Bell & Donda, 1993; Sowman, 
Beaumont, Bergh, Maharaj & K. Salo, 1998; Hachongela, Jackson, Malasha I & 
Sen, 1998; Lopes, Poisse, Wilson, Kromer, Manuel, Cululo & Pinto, 1998; 
Geheb & Sarch, 2002). In the discussions, the open access and common property 
nature of the resources feature highly as reasons for the decline of the resources. 
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In response, governments and other agencies have introduced fisheries co-
management arrangements in several African countries.  
 
For example, Malawi’s Department of Fisheries (DoF) initiated the participatory 
fisheries management programmes on Lakes Malombe, Chilwa, and Chiuta 
between 1993 and 1995 (Bell & Donda, 1993; Hara, 1996; Njaya, 2002). Other 
examples in the region include Zambia and Zimbabwe, where co-management 
arrangements have been in practice on Lake Kariba since the mid-1990s 
(Hachongela et al., 1998; Malasha, 2003), and Mozambique and South Africa in 
selected areas along the coast (Lopes et al., 1998; Sowman et al., 1998). 
Community participation in decision-making processes regarding resource 
monitoring and control through formulation and enforcement of fisheries 
regulations is a key element in these arrangements. Nonetheless, the state remains 
an important actor in the creation of an enabling environment for community 
participation. 
 
In fisheries management, the social scientists consider community based or co-
management arrangements as an alternative strategy due to failure of the 
centralised or conventional fisheries management regime. Jentoft & McCay 
(1995) note that fisheries managers pursue multiple goals, as a major focus 
cannot be only on biological terms but also on the resource users. This entails the 
resource users’ organisational and rule-making arrangements. Berkes (1996) 
argues that the decline of fisheries in many cases is mainly because of the open-
access nature of the fisheries, which in many cases the colonial masters or 
centralised authorities introduced. He recommends that there is need to consider 
traditional institutions and practices.  
 
Many recommendations regarding sustainable common pool resource (CPR) 
governance include some allusion to dealing with the unclear property rights 
regime. Several of those dealing with CPR property rights regimes do so in direct 
or indirect reaction to Hardin (1968), who in his description and solution of the 
tragedy of the commons limited himself to either private or state property. The 
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view sidelines the capacity of the community to self-regulate the exploitation of 
the common pool resources (Jentoft, 2000; Ostrom, 1990).  
 
The idea of active participation of local communities in development and 
management is not a new idea as it has been part of the development process in 
certain parts of the world since 1960s (Pomeroy, 2003a). Community 
participation refers to an active involvement of individuals or groups in an 
activity (Campbell & Townsley, 1996). If management is to succeed, fishers must 
support management efforts through formulation and enforcement of rules 
(Wilson & Dickie, 1995). However, the degree of user group involvement may 
differ from one country to another (Jentoft & McCay, 1995). The fisheries 
management ineffectiveness resulting in overexploitation of the stocks justifies 
the participatory management, as has been the case with Lake Malombe. In a 
situation where an elite group or politically powerful individuals attempt to 
access the resources, the local community should seek support from the 
government (Knox & Meinzen-Dick, 2001). The aim is to secure protection of 
the rights of the community or to institute sanctions to illegal fishers.  
 
For an effective co-management, the user community should have power for 
them to make decisions. Miller, VeneKlasen, Reilly & Clark (2002) view power 
as an individual, collective and political force that can either undermine or 
empower citizens and their organizations. Power is a force that alternatively can 
facilitate, hasten or halt the process of change promoted through advocacy. 
Power dynamics exist within spaces in each place in various ways, with 
participatory activities relating to different aspects of empowerment. Participation 
can affect power relations in three ways including visible, hidden and invisible 
(VeneKlasen & Miller, 2002).  This implies that in any co-management 
arrangement it is important to identify where power exist in terms of space and 
how the partners that mainly include the government and local community in the 
context of Malawi exercise their power. 
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Concepts that emerge from the debate about the problems with CPR governance 
include co-management, governance, and decentralisation. There is a 
relationship among the three concepts. Participation, transparency and 
accountability of key actors determine the type of co-management while power 
distribution among partners especially between government and user community 
is a dominant element in governance. In decentralisation, power transfer from 
centralised to local government structures is the main factor that shows how the 
user community are dependent on the government in its decision-making 
processes.  
 
Co-management is a participatory form of fisheries management. It is an 
arrangement where user groups and government share the power and authority to 
manage a fisheries resource (Sen & Nielsen, 1996). Co-management is about the 
inclusive right to participate in making key decisions about how, when, where, 
how much, and by whom fishing will occur.  
 
The concept of co-management focuses on the recognition that user groups have 
to be more actively involved in fisheries management if the regime is to be both 
effective and legitimate. It was one of the required conditions by donors in the 
1990s natural resource management (Katerere & Moyo, 2001; Wolmer, 2003). 
Pomeroy (2003b) incorporates other stakeholders beside users and government, 
for example non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or civil society groups as 
well. The definition, of co-management, therefore becomes broader. Pinkerton 
(2003:73) asserts: 
There is a tendency to talk about co-management as being an arrangement between the state 
and users or user groups. Users are sometimes conceptualised as individuals who may or may 
not be organized into fishing associations, and are sometimes spoken of as synonymous with 
civil society. Co-management is thus often seen in its broadest sense as a reform of 
promoting greater participatory democracy, against indirect electoral democracy. It is simply 
making things work more as they are ideally intended to work. 
 
There has been a ‘traditional management’ of natural resources from time 
immemorial in Malawi. People have survived on farming, harvesting forestry 
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products and aquatic resources (MBERU, 2002). On Lake Chiuta the traditional 
fisheries management system successfully evolved into co-management in the 
1990s (Dissi & Njaya, 1995). On central Lake Malawi (Mbenji Island) the 
traditional fisheries management is undergoing a similar evolution but its success 
may be different due to the nature of fishery. On the Island, the fishery is 
commercially oriented unlike on Lake Chiuta where it is largely small-scale.  
 
A problem with the actual design and implementation of co-management 
arrangements is the fact that some users may get disproportionate power in 
decision-making process in the governance of the resources (Jentoft et al., 1997) 
Also, as with any form of collective action, ‘free riding’ may occur. This has led 
to the conceptualisation that smaller group sizes, and the relative homogeneity of 
communities are more conducive to collective action (Olson, 1965). In general, 
co-management seems to be more feasible for small-scale fisheries. 
 
The core function of co-management should be a way for the state to use its 
authority and power to contain and channel fisheries conflicts in creative ways. 
This means using authority to make it possible for more open and culturally 
embedded communications to play an effective role in institutional decision-
making processes. Co-management requires a clear commitment on the part of 
government to the sharing of power and authority with local government and 
community organizations (Wilson, 2003).  
 
In many countries, government programmes and projects emphasise development 
of local organisations and autonomy to handle some aspects of fisheries 
management (Pomeroy & Viswanathan, 2003). Rarely, however, is adequate 
attention given to the establishment of administrative and policy structures that 
define the legal status, rights and authorities essential for the effective 
performance of local organisations. Many attempts at decentralisation have not 
delivered real sharing of resource management power. 
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Co-management builds on the active involvement in regulatory decision-making 
of those people whose livelihoods depend on the viability of the natural resource 
(Jentoft, Mikalsen & Hernes, 2003). However, they warn that attractive as they 
may appear, co-management arrangements are certainly no panacea to the many 
problems associated with the resource decline. The success of the community 
self-management will depend on many factors to the fisheries sector (Allison & 
Mvula 2002). The policy and legal frameworks, interests of donors, 
implementation strategy and dependence on the resource are necessary for 
sustainable management of the fisheries resources.  
 
Co-management regimes are dynamic and various partnership arrangements are 
in practice. Decision-making powers can range from absolute state control to 
complete community autonomy (Sen & Nielsen, 1996). Important components of 
co-management are the sharing of responsibility, decision-making and authority 
(Mohamed, 2002). The formulation of local objectives and the inclusion of users 
in the decision-making process vary from case to case. 
 
Based on the variation in roles and the level of power sharing between partners, 
there are five broad types of co-management (Sen & Nielsen, 1996), as 
summarised in Box 2. The instructive type of co-management involves a minimal 
exchange of information between government and fishers. This type of co-
management is different from centralised management in the sense that there is a 
mechanism for dialogue with fishers, but in the end, the government imposes a 
management plan and just informs the fishers about them. 
 
The Consultative co-management involves a government that consults more 
actively with the community. However, the government remains responsible for 
making final decisions. In the cooperative type of co-management, the 
government and fishers have equal powers in the decision-making processes.  
 
In the advisory type, the fishers provide advice to government on appropriate 
decisions, which the government endorses.  
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The informative type involves the actual delegation of authority to fishers. In 
practice, it may not be a formal arrangement but a traditional form of fisheries 
management recognized by the government. Informative co-management can 
take the form of delegation in a formal arrangement or of a tradition in a 
customary set-up that exists in some African countries. 
 
Box 2: Typology of co-management  
 
Instructive: Where minimal exchange of information takes places between government and 
fishers as key partners.  
 
Consultative: In this scenario, the partners consult, but the government makes final decisions.  
 
Cooperative: This is where the government and fishers cooperate as equal partners in decision-
making processes. 
 
Advisory: In this case, the fishers advise the government but still seek government’s approval of 
their own decisions.  
 
Informative: At this level, the government delegates authority to make decisions to fisher 
committees that are responsible for informing the government of these decisions. 
 
Many co-management initiatives in Malawi tend to lean towards government 
dominance in the decision-making processes. They are often of a consultative 
type. The Lakes Malombe and Chilwa participatory fisheries management 
programmes in Malawi are good examples of this tendency. In these cases, 
government representatives that show little or no consideration for traditional 
practices and local knowledge of the resource users still primarily do the setting 
of objectives for the co-management arrangements (Hara, Donda & Njaya, 1999; 
Hara Donda & Njaya, 2002; Mohamed, 2002). In Malawi, only Lake Chiuta, 
Mbenji Island on Lake Malawi, and Sinazongwe on Lake Kariba (bordering 
Zambia and Zimbabwe) demonstrate a shift towards cooperative co-management 
types. 
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There are varied outcomes in terms of co-management between or among lakes 
and even within lakes themselves. For example, in the early 1990s, involvement 
of a local leader who appointed members in one of the BVCs on the eastern Lake 
Malombe resulted in poor performance of such a committee unlike the one at 
Nasite on the north-western shoreline of the same lake (Mtika, 1996; Hara et al., 
2002). Generally, the Lake Chiuta BVCs on the northern side were more active in 
terms of enforcement and conducting meetings than those on the southern side 
(Njaya, 2003).  
 
Involvement of the Traditional Authorities (TA) in development work dates back 
to the colonial era when they were integrated into or even created by the British 
colonial administrative system known as “indirect rule” (Chirwa, 1996). The 
author also notes that the responsibility of the native chiefs mainly centred on 
collecting hut and poll taxes out of which they obtained a certain amount of 
money, which consolidated their allegiance to their colonial masters. The level of 
their accountability to the people they represent is often low as outlined in 
various decentralization research reports (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2002).  
 
At independence, management of the fisheries resources usually shifted to central 
government while at local level the traditional leaders have continuously assumed 
their roles. The contestation for power between the traditional leaders and the 
local level committees has been common in fisheries co-management (Hara et al., 
2002). Wilson et al. (2005) suggest the need for inclusiveness, accountability and 
transparency. This also applies in decentralised fisheries resource frameworks 
where governance becomes an issue. However, Ribot (2002) observes that most 
decentralisation reforms in resource management seem to manage downward 
accountability and rarely the opposite happens. This means that the local level 
committees are accountable to the Department of Fisheries and not the fishers.  
 
The involvement of TAs in resource management could resolve the problems of 
co-management that is ‘top down’. While often well respected in their 
communities, there is also contestation of their authority and the relationship 
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between the TAs and the central governments is often strained. For example, in 
Mozambique despite efforts from politicians, the traditional institutions are de 
facto the most respected authorities in the community, much more so than are the 
formal government authorities (Lopes & Gervasio, 1999). This is evident on Lake 
Chiuta where villagers may not respect government officials or politicians in the 
same way as the Rigulo (chief). Outcomes of co-management that involve TAs 
vary from one site to another. In Zambia, for example, chiefs play a significant 
role in co-management activities especially in controlling access and 
enforcement.  
 
The composition of the community-level organizations (BVCs) or Beach 
Executive Committee (BECs) as called in the Mangochi District Assembly 
(Njaya, Gomiwa & Kachala, 2006), has posed an institutional problem. The 
BVCs on Lake Malombe have a smaller proportion of members who are fishers 
(nearly 30%) while on Lake Chiuta the proportion of fishers is over 70 per cent 
(Njaya, Donda & Hara, 1999; Donda, 2001; Njaya, 2002). The key partners in 
these co-management programmes are the fisher representative committees with 
guidance from their local leaders on one hand, and the Department of Fisheries 
on the other hand.  
 
However, Lake Chilwa co-management is different in the sense that the main 
partners include the Traditional Authorities (TAs) and the Department of 
Fisheries (Njaya, 1998; Lowore & Lowore, 1999; Njaya, 2002). The roles of the 
local leaders in co-management programmes are unclear as in some areas they 
demonstrate a supportive role while in others they tend to benefit from the co-
management arrangement by supporting illegal seine fishers after getting 
financial inducements (cha-kwa-mfumu). In effect, the intended purpose of co-
management in entrenching legitimacy of rules to sustain fish resources becomes 
unsuccessful. 
 
The different organisational arrangements can result in varied outcomes, as 
various authorities at different levels determine decision-making processes, 
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establishment of institutions and the level of participation. There is need to vest 
the power with the fishers who have self-interest in the management of the 
resource, and not the chiefs (Lowore & Lowore, 1999). In contrast, on Lake 
Malombe, Hara (1996) and Donda (2001) proposed that the BVCs should have a 
large composition of fishers. Previous studies in evaluating various co-
management programmes on Lakes Malombe, Chiuta and Chilwa in Malawi and 
in other African countries such as Lakes Kariba (Zambia and Zimbabwe), have 
shown mixed outcomes (Donda, Njaya & Hara, 1999; Hara & Nielsen, 2003).  
 
A second concept that is gaining popularity in the literature, and that deserves 
attention in the thesis is governance. Governance refers to ‘how power and 
decision-making is shared among different components of society’ (Béné & 
Neiland, 2005:7). These components include individuals as well as community-
groups and organizations. Specifically, governance arrangements include legal, 
social, economic and political issues applied to the management of fisheries 
resources. There is need to create an enabling political environment that allows 
various stakeholders to exercise their powers and authorities over the 
management of fisheries resources through decentralised systems. This takes into 
consideration the mechanisms of governance that include transparency, 
accountability and participation (Béné & Neiland, 2005). Fisheries governance 
involves objectives, knowledge base and implementation (Nielsen, Degnbol, 
Viswanathan, Ahmed, Hara & Abdulla, 2003). 
 
Decentralisation is a third concept with relevance for the search for feasible, 
participatory CPR governance arrangements. It refers to any act in which a 
central government systematically transfers part of its powers, authority, and 
responsibilities to local government structures such as district assemblies and 
community level committees (Ribot, 2002; Béné & Neiland, 2005). Democratic 
decentralisation reforms offer an opportunity to legally supported forms of 
popular participation in the management of fisheries. This is dependent on the 
establishment of prerequisites for a fair and transparent system of electing fisher 
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representatives in committees, which is crucial for the legitimacy of such 
community level institutions.  
 
Devolution is another term popular among community-based natural resource 
scholars. The concept refers to the transfer of rights and responsibilities to user 
groups at community level. The community-based organisations (CBOs) need to 
be accountable to the fishing community. In relation to devolution is the concept 
of collective action, which refers to a conscious working together in a group such 
as by investing in a resource or excluding non-members from utilising the 
resource (Knox & Meinzen-Dick, 2001). Misunderstandings of the terms 
associated with management of the commons bring a varying degree of 
evaluation frameworks, performance in terms of equity, efficiency and 
sustainability of the regimes.  
 
In many parts of the world, local arrangements referred to as “traditional” exist 
for management of certain fisheries related activities (WHAT, 2000). It is 
apparent that the introduction of any governance regime should take into account 
the existence of such traditional arrangements at the community level. The role of 
traditional chiefs in co-management arrangements is controversial in the 
literature. Questions about the roles of chiefs in these arrangements abound, on 
the one hand, and important questions of democracy and accountability, on the 
other (Lowore & Lowore, 1999; Ribot, 2003). 
 
2.4 Traditional knowledge 
The fishing communities have developed knowledge systems, which they pass 
from one generation to another. The knowledge systems go by various terms. The 
most popular terms include “Traditional Ecological Knowledge” (TEC). The past 
decade has seen an emergence of an interest in Local and Traditional Ecological 
Knowledge (LO-TEK), mainly in response to failure of centralised fisheries 
resource management in maintaining sustainable levels of the resources, settling 
conflicts and inadequate budgets for management, research and enforcement of 
regulations.  
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Raufflet (2000) points out that failure of large-scale ecosystems have challenged 
natural resource management in both theory and practice. Despite the outlined 
shortfalls in sustaining utilisation of natural resources including fish, there seems 
to be a continued disregard for local knowledge. Hobson (1992) notes that 
western scientists often dismiss indeginous knowledge that they consider  
anecdotal, non-quantitative, unmethodical, and unscientific. However, he argues 
that what is important is to develop a system that provides traditional knowledge 
with a “scientific” framework and allows application of both local and scientific 
knowledge.  
 
Hipwell (1998) observes that various studies have demonstrated that knowledge 
systems developed over generations by indigenous and non-indigenous local 
communities can provide useful data superior to that available through 
conventional scientific research methods. GTZ (2001:5) argues further by stating 
that: 
 ---a better acknowledgement of traditional resources management and enhancement systems 
is an essential component of a more appropriate and effective approach to inland fisheries and 
aquaculture development. 
 
2.5 Migration 
Migration rate is the proportional change in population size due to moving out of 
a given area over the previous year (Bunce & Pomeroy, 2003). Seasonal 
migration is a vital livelihood adaptation that fishing communities make in many 
parts of the world (Salagrama, 2005). Migration of fishers is common among 
various water bodies in Malawi. One of the short-term choices of fishers during 
Lake Chilwa recession period involves transfer of the fishers to nearby Lakes 
Chiuta, Malawi and Malombe (Agnew, 1979; Agnew & Chipeta, 1979). This 
periodic migration occurs during periodic recessions that normally takes place 
after 25 years (Kalk et al., 1979). Migration therefore, means movement of 
people across a specified boundary for establishing a new or semi-permanent 
residence or for a livelihood.  
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Migration takes different forms: migration within a lake (intra-lake migration) 
and between lakes (inter-lake migration). It can also be seasonal or periodic. A 
shift in occupation with or without corresponding change is another complex 
form of seasonal migration, which may or may not be dependent on geographical 
location (Salagrama, 2005). In some cases, long-term migrations both into fishing 
and into non-fishing activities occur. It may also involve migration of fishers 
from villages to towns or cities at particular times of the year either to sell fish or 
to settle and look for alternative livelihood activities when catches are poor 
(Ibid). 
 
In coastal states and transboundary ecosystems, migration involves mobility of 
trawl fishers from one region or country to another. Kraan (2005) notes that 
migration in Ghana or West Africa has not only involved local fishers only, but 
also fishers from European and Asian countries. Migration of fishers in most 
countries has not yet received adequate research coverage. Knowledge of impacts 
of migration on fisheries management and household strategies is therefore 
necessary. Reasons for migration include ecological and economic nature 
including pull and push factors.  
 
The ecological reason is fundamental as it links migration of fishers to seasonal 
upwelling of coastal waters, which attracts large schools of Sardinella (Ibid). 
These schools of fish move from the west to east of Cote d’Ivoire and proceed to 
the eastern part of Ghana and so do fishers that follow the migrating fish. The 
economic reason includes fishers migrating to earn more cash earnings, usually 
the case where fishers from one country migrate to earn money in another 
currency (Ibid).  
 
2.6 Conflicts 
FAO (2000) defines natural resource conflicts as disagreements and disputes that 
occur due to access to, and control of appropriation. Tubtim (2006:147) argues 
that: “Community-based natural resource management [CBNRM] is not a process 
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in which people agree on everything.” Conflicts in the CBNRM arrangements 
are, therefore, inevitable. 
 
Conflicts can emerge within common property regimes between resource users 
and can be either violent or non-violent (Pomeroy & Rivera-Guieb, 2005; 
Warner, 2000). Usually the conflicts arise because people have varying utilisation 
of the commons such as fisheries or want to manage them in various ways based 
on their objectives. Singh (2002:5) notes: “Conflicts and disturbances arise when 
there are varied interests of people in a particular resource.” The author adds that 
conflicts are natural and are avoidable and their frequency of occurrence is 
dependent on the demand for the resource.  
 
Disagreements can also arise due to incompatible needs, or exclusion of priorities 
of some fishing communities in relation to the formulation of policies, 
programmes and projects. Such conflicts of interest are an inevitable feature of all 
societies (FAO, 2000). Therefore, conflict management should become an 
important element when considering co-management arrangements.  
 
In the fisheries sector, the scope and magnitude of natural resource conflicts have 
increased and intensified mainly because of poverty, declining trends of the fish 
stocks and increasing population. Transboundary conflicts sometimes escalate 
into violence when user committees exclude certain gear types, for example, 
Nkacha seines (Njaya, 2002). Co-management can be one of the strategies to 
manage and resolve conflicts that occur within fisheries sectors (Hauck & 
Sowman, 2005). Given time and skills, however, conflicts can provide a basis for 
a stronger management regime. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
From the literature review, I draw key lessons on fisheries management, co-
management and conflicts. Issues about fisheries management are complex. 
Management of fisheries resources takes many forms and approaches depending 
on the type of fishery and its biological dimension and socio-economic 
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importance. There has been development of institutional arrangements that refer 
to the structure of rights and duties over the past decades. The institutional 
arrangements aim to define a specific property regime that governs management 
of the commons. Nevertheless, there are observations that although management 
of the natural resources can be achieved through the control by either a state or 
market, neither of the two can successfully lead to sustained long-term 
production levels of the natural resource. The argument implies that a combined 
control of the regimes is a commonly ideal situation.  
 
Climatic influence has also been associated with fish catch fluctuations due to 
occurrence of flooding and recessions. Any increase in temperature due to 
climate change would result in increasing the rate of evaporation, resulting in 
greater water loss from Lake Chilwa. The rapid responses of many fresh water 
fish stocks to fluctuating environmental conditions obscure an accurate 
assessment of the resource situation. Fish stocks in many of Africa’s inland 
waters fluctuate considerably, and these fluctuations are climate driven and 
cannot be stabilized by conventional measures. Among other factors, the 
appearance of an extended drought period greatly affects African ecological 
systems. 
 
The review also provides lessons on the problems of CPR governance mainly in 
relation to co-management arrangements. Many co-management initiatives tend 
to lean towards government dominance in decision-making processes. They are 
often of a consultative type. The Lakes Malombe and Chilwa participatory 
fisheries management programmes in Malawi are good examples of this 
tendency. In these cases, government representatives that show little or no 
consideration for traditional practices and local knowledge of the resource users 
still primarily set objectives for the co-management arrangements.  
 
In the thesis, there is need to highlight the importance of fisheries co-
management since issues of governance relate to partnership, accountability and 
transparency mechanisms. Furthermore, power distribution between the user 
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community and government is a linchpin to success of any co-management 
arrangement.  
 
Issues about migration of fishers are common in fisheries management. Migration 
takes different forms: migration within a lake (intra-lake migration) and between 
lakes (inter-lake migration). It can also be seasonal or periodic. A shift in 
occupation with or without corresponding change is another complex form of 
seasonal migration, which may or may not be dependent on geographical 
location. In some cases, long-term migrations both into fishing and into non-
fishing activities occur. It may also involve migration of fishers from villages to 
towns or cities at particular times of the year either to sell fish or to settle and 
look for alternative livelihoods when catches are poor. 
 
Finally, conflicts feature highly in fisheries management regimes. Conflicts can 
emerge within common property regimes between resource users and can be 
either violent or non-violent. Usually the conflicts arise because people have 
varying utilisation of the commons such as fisheries or want to manage them in 
various ways based on their objectives. Disagreements can arise due to 
incompatible needs, or exclusion of priorities of some fishing communities in 
relation to the formulation of policies, programmes and projects. Such conflicts 
of interest are an inevitable feature of all societies. Therefore, conflict 
management should become an important element when considering co-
management arrangements. In the fisheries sector, the scope and magnitude of 
natural resource conflicts have increased and intensified mainly because of 
poverty, declining trends of the fish stocks and increasing population. Given time 
and skills, however, conflicts can provide a basis for a stronger management 
regime. 
 
In this thesis, I will focus on the impact of the water level changes on the 
household strategies that include migration and co-management. The migration 
of the fishers centres on the number of transfers that they make within Lake 
Chilwa or from or to other lakes mainly Lake Malombe. There is also a need to 
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look at reasons for the migration and relate to the review. The pattern of 
migration by season in form of direction the migrants take within the lake or 
across to other lakes is another dimension.  
 
I highlight conflicts that emerge due to migration of the fishers and co-
management. The conflicts are fisheries-related and to a certain extent I present 
land issues since fishing and farming are the main income sources for Lake 
Chilwa basin households. I also relate the conflicts that emerge due to rules with 
the local knowledge of the households in the management of fisheries resources.  
Therefore, I apply the concept of traditional knowledge to examine the conflicts 
between Department of Fisheries (DoF) and fishing households. Migration in 
forms of geographic and occupational is responsive to Lake Chilwa ecosystem 
condition based on the traditional knowledge systems that exist within the local 
fishing-farming households. A study on the livelihood strategies among the Lake 
Chilwa households needs to consider issues of migration patterns as grounded 
within their traditions and values.   
 
Finally, the thesis will centre on the fisheries co-management mainly on the roles 
of the traditional leaders. I determine the Lake Chilwa co-management 
arrangement in relation to the typology of co-management outlined in the review 
(Box 2). The typology is for the whole lake but also by fishing zone that fall 
under respective Traditional Authorities.  
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 CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework (Figure 12) provides a basis for the study. I used 
secondary sources through literature reviews and collected primary data through 
surveys. Field data collection involved a combination of research techniques and 
tools including key informant interviews and focus group discussions (Krueger & 
Casey, 2001; Kirsch, 2001). In addition, the study draws results from migration 
and co-management attitude surveys.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Conceptualised relationship on the impact of water level changes on 
migration of fishers and co-management 
 
For institutional analysis, I also apply the theoretical co-management framework 
developed by IFM (1998) specifically by focusing on the patterns of interactions 
among the patterns and the co-management outputs. The study will examine 
linkages of water level changes and their impact on the migration of fishers as 
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their livelihood strategy. I also study linkages between co-management as a 
response to dynamic nature of the ecosystem and migration mainly in relation to 
resource access, and emergence of conflicts in such situations.    
 
The migration survey focused on collecting data related to migration of the 
fishers by analysing frequency and patterns by gear type, fishing zone according 
to shallowness of the area and season. In the survey, I also collected additional 
data on conflicts, socio-cultural profiles, life histories, timeline of events, 
calendar of events, and collective action.  
 
Data collection involved use of structured questions that I administered to 
individual fishers found on selected beaches followed by in-depth interviews with 
key informants. There were also Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) in each of the 
fishing zones in the northern, central and southern parts of Lake Chilwa. Frame 
survey data and field reports from DoF provided secondary data sources for the 
study.   
 
The co-management attitude survey had three specific aims. First, to assess the 
attitude of the respondents towards the support that TAs give to Beach Village 
Sub-Committees (BVCs) in the Lake Chilwa co-management arrangement. For 
comparative purposes, the assessment included support given by the DoF, 
District Assemblies (DAs), TAs and Village Heads (VHs). The data collection 
tools involved structured interviews followed by in-depth interviews with key 
informants to get further clarification on certain questions.  
 
Second, the survey aimed to examine how transparent and accountable the BVCs 
were in the eyes of the respondents. Transparency focused on how the authorities 
(DoF, TAs, BVCs, DAs, and traditional leaders made decisions on fish resource 
management measures. The questions centred on whether the co-management 
partners made decisions publicly, whether meetings they conducted were open 
and how the authorities reported on the use of funds. This idea was to determine 
whether the BVCs were accountable to their fishers (downward accountability) or 
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local leaders, DoF and district assembly (upward accountability). 
 
Finally, the aim of the survey was to determine attitudes of respondents towards 
the work of the user committees (BVCs) by looking at whether the respondents 
thought there was more fish now because of the work of the BVCs. Another 
question was on whether the households thought that the village was better off 
because of the user committees and how regular the respondents attended BVCs 
meetings in their villages.  
 
The following sections provide a detailed research technique and data collection 
in the selected sites. 
 
3.2 Primary data collection 
Collection of primary data in the migration and co-management attitude studies 
involved both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The following 
details the research methods in both studies. 
 
3.2.1 Migration survey 
I conducted the migration survey from June 2003 to May 2004 in selected 
beaches around Lake Chilwa. Data gathered during the survey included 
frequency and pattern of migration of the fishers based on gear type and seasons. 
The survey applied a combination of data collection tools including interviews 
with individual fishers, in-depth interviews with selected 24 key informants, 9 
focus group discussions (FGDs) as shown in Annexes 4a and 4b and field 
observations.  
3.2.1.1 Individual interviews 
A migration survey form (Annex 2) targeted fishers operating various gear types 
including gillnet, long lines, fish traps and seines. The survey covered 9 beaches 
around the lake (Table 2). I applied purposive selection technique when choosing 
the respondents in three randomly selected beaches. There were three beaches in 
each of the fishing zones of the northern, central and southern Lake Chilwa. I 
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interviewed the fishers that were operating on the beaches from June to July 
2004. The survey questions centred on whether there had been any changes in 
fishing beaches over the past five years (1999 to 2004). I considered three years 
long enough to influence migration. While historical data may always not be 
reliable, it was interesting to note that most of them could recall where they were 
since the 1960s.  
 
In the northern fishing zone, mostly a floodplain and marshy area, I interviewed a 
total sample of 354 fishers at the following locations: Chipakwe, Ntila and Mposa 
beaches in the northern flood plain, Mchenga, Kachulu and Phimbi in the central 
(1.5-2m) and Malagani, Swang’oma and Thanga fishing zone in the southern 
fishing zone (over 2m deep on average). The sampled number of 354 fishers 
represented about 12% of all fishers in Lake Chilwa. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of respondents (N=354) by fishing zone interviewed on 
selected beaches during the migration survey in 2004 
Fishing zone  
 
Beaches Number of 
Respondents 
Percent 
North (Floodplain area) Mposa 
Chipakwe 
Ntila 
167 47 
Centre (1.5-2m deep) Kachulu 
Phimbi 
Mchenga 
144 41 
South (>2m deep)  Swang’oma 
Malagani 
Thanga 
43 12 
Total  354 100 
 
The survey process included a day of inspection of the beaches by observing 
what took place and another day for the survey. On the first day, I arranged with 
a village head and a Beach Village Sub-Committee (BVSC) chair so that they 
could inform all fishers about the survey and where possible have their beach 
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registers11 ready. In addition, the village head arranged an appropriate day and 
time of  the meeting with fishers, and in most cases, it was a day when some 
fishers come out of their zimbowera (temporary shelters constructed around the 
lake) to sell their dry fish on beaches.  
 
On the day of the survey, I checked their beach registers. The only problem, 
however, was that beach registers were first used between 1998 and 2000 while 
the survey targeted transfers that the fishers had made from 1994 to 2004. The 
main question centred on whether the fishers had ever migrated to other water 
bodies such as Lakes Chiuta, Malombe or Malawi.   
3.2.1.2 Focus group discussions 
From May to November 2004, I conducted 7 Focused Group Discussions (FGDs) 
and in August 2006, I had 2 FGDs (Annexes 4a and 4b) to collect data on 
conflicts, socio-cultural profiles, timeline of events, calendar of events, collective 
action. I had one FGD for each of the fishing zones. I also had in-depth 
interviews with key informants that I purposively selected during the FGDs. I 
based my selection of the key informants on their experience in fishing. I 
interviewed all the fishers I found on the selected beaches but during analysis, I 
only analysed data captured from those that had fished for more than five years. 
The questions centred on collective action, livelihood diversity, adaptive 
capacity, and coping mechanisms particularly during recessions. In both FGDs 
and individual interviews, I used a guiding question sheet in the Chichewa 
language, for consistency (Annex 3). The questions were open-ended.   
 
Other issues I tackled during the FGDs and key informant interviews included the 
timeline of events starting from 1960 before the 1968 recession, their life 
histories and calendar of activities. Over half of the number of respondents 
recalled what had happened in late 1940s when the lake dried up. I asked them 
                                                 
11 Some BVCs had beach registers in which they recorded transfer of fishers. However, that 
system started in 1998 in the co-management arrangement, but prior to that, the fishers could 
recall beaches they had been to while fishing between 1994 and 2004 
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how they coped with the intermittent recessions so that I could learn more on 
their livelihood diversity, adaptability and coping mechanisms.  
 
On the calendar of events, the idea was to find out whether fishers (by gear type 
such as seine, fish trap and long lines) were able to combine fishing with other 
economic activities such as farming and trading. Additionally, it was also 
important to find out at precisely when during the year or years the economic 
activities occur.  
 
I also looked at questions on their activities during recessions. This was limited to 
fishers only who are either resident in lakeshore villages or migrant fishers. In 
terms of socio-cultural issues, I inquired on their traditions and customs, 
collective action as to whether they come together to tackle developmental issues 
or problems and whether the practices interfere with or support resource 
management.  
 
Before the survey, I trained four researchers based at Zomba Fisheries Office. 
The training session, which covered interviewing technics and FGDs, was for 
three days. At the training, we agreed to have the FDGs during village meetings 
called by traditional leaders. After the training session, the research team 
conducted the survey in 7 Traditional Authorities including Kawinga and Mposa 
(floodplain area), Kumtumanji and Mwambo (with depth between 1.5 and 2m), 
and Mkumbira, Mkhumba and Chiwalo (over 2m depth).  
 
The research team arranged a day and venue of the community meeting with the 
TA or his/her sub-TA or Group Village Head. The team asked the local leader to 
organise the meeting to entice all fishers to attend and participate as the 
traditional leaders wield more influence than the researchers did. All invited 
fishers and other households participated in the meetings whose objective was on 
the state of the fisheries resources from the past (over 20-30 years ago) to the 
present.  
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At the meeting a selected facilitator briefed the participants on the objectives of 
the meeting and then asked the participants to form three or four groups based on 
gender, status (whether one is a local leader or not) and occupation (fishing, 
farming or any other business). Apart from the local leaders who were mainly 
one to two, each group had at least 10-12 participants as normally recommended 
in rapid appraisals (Grenier 1998; Krueger & Casey 2001).  
 
The participants in groups because in most African societies women and the 
youth tend to be quiet when men are present: Hence, the decision to separate the 
participants according to gender and age. When local leaders are present, 
subordinates tend to be reserved during discussions as a mark of respect. We 
distributed flip charts and markers to the groups and asked them to choose a note 
taker. The discussions were based on the guiding questions we provided (Annex 
3). The group discussions lasted 1-2 hours after which one member of the group 
made a presentation on behalf of his/her members. The research team and other 
participants sought clarifications and comments.  
3.2.1.3 Key informant interviews 
Collection of the data from key informants involved use of a question guide 
(Annex 3) that was in Chichewa/Nyanja, the local language for easy 
communication. I selected three beaches (one in each fishing zone) for the in-
depth interviews with purposely-selected four fishers and a village head. Annex 4 
shows a list of the key informants. The main issues centred on the impact of Lake 
Chilwa water level changes on the livelihoods of the fishing community, 
historical information about differences of the two previous recessions in 1995 
and 1968 in relation to degree of lakebed dryness.  The interviews also focused 
on the life histories in terms of their settlement: when they started fishing and the 
strategies, they apply in response to the lake level changes. In this context, the 
unit of measurement included individual, beach or village level, and fishing zone 
levels. 
 
The process started with the selection of key informants during the FGDs and 
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village meetings. I identified people who were over 50 years old and had 
experienced the two previous Lake Chilwa recessions in 1968 and 1995 for the 
interviews. I chose a day for the interview. Analysis of the recorded interviews 
and arrangement into theme patterns took two months between January and 
February 2005.  
3.2.1.4 Field observations 
In terms of seasonal variations, I observed the drying pattern from the north to 
south in August 2003 to July 2004. Key features included the dry period of the 
northern floodplain area between October and early December in 2003 through 
the flooding period between February and March in 2005. This means that I 
observed the pattern for the whole year covering both rain and hot dry seasons. I 
also had focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with selected fishers to 
supplement my observations.  
3.2.1 Co-management survey 
I conducted the co-management attitude survey in 2003 to collect data on support 
that BVCs get from the co-management partners as shown in the conceptual 
framework (Figure 12). The selected sites included the three fishing zones in 
Traditional Authorities Kawinga and Mlomba (floodplain area), Kumtumanji and 
Mposa (with depth between 1.5 and 2m), and Mkumbira and Chiwalo (over 2m 
depth) as shown in Table 3 and Annex 6. Annex 7 shows operationalisation of the 
survey. I concentrated on the demography, external and institutional 
organisational arrangements and conflicts.  
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Table 3: Distribution of respondents (N=166) by fishing zone and Traditional 
Authority in the co-management attitude survey  
Fishing zone Traditional Authority Number of Respondents 
North (Floodplain area) TA Kawinga   47 
 TA Mlomba  
Centre (1.5-2m deep) TA Mposa   43 
 TA Kumtumanji  
South (>2m deep) TA Mkumbira   76 
 TA Chiwalo  
Total  166 
I assessed the strength of the co-management arrangement by examining 
demography, that is, fisher population changes on beaches and lake, as the main 
attribute and then the conflicts that arise due to the demographic changes. 
Attitude of the respondents towards the Lake Chilwa co-management 
arrangement was the focus of the study. Further qualitative in-depth interviews 
with key informants mainly composed of three traditional leaders, three Beach 
Village Sub-Committee members and three groups of fishers located in each of 
the three fishing zones provided further clarification on points that were unclear 
from the analysed data. 
 
I used scale questions (three- or six-step ladders) as shown in Annex 8 to assess 
the co-management strength (as a dependent variable) by analysing perception of 
the BVCs, fishers and households. Independent variables included the level of 
participation of the stakeholders in the co-management arrangement specifically 
by looking at how the stakeholders (local leaders, district assemblies and non-
governmental organization) support the co-management institutions.  
 
Finally, I compared the socio-economic profile of both migrant and non-migrant 
fishers in the co-management attitude survey. I focused on the age, ethnicity and 
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education levels between the migrants and non-migrants. The co-management 
survey involved interviews with 166 respondents out of which 110 were fishers.  
 
For analysis of the data, I worked out migration and wealth scales (Annex 12) 
based on the co-management attitude survey. The main reason was to examine 
how migrants differ from the rest of the population based on age, education and 
wealth. Annex 5 contains the questions.  
3.2.2.2 Field data collection 
The survey targeted three groups, namely BVCs, fishers and households, which 
in this study they refer to people eating together. I identified a six-member 
research team (same one that I involved in the migration survey) composed of 
field-based technical fisheries staff. The team went through a one week-training 
session in conducting interviews and sampling of the villages. We randomly 
selected the BVCs by using playing cards. This was to reduce the danger of 
getting biased results.  
 
I assigned two researchers to conduct the interviews in two villages randomly 
selected from one Traditional Authority (TA) in which they took a maximum of 
one week conducting 32 interviews. This meant doing 16 interviews in each 
village as follows: four BVC member interviews; eight fisher interviews and four 
household heads interviews. I conducted 166 interviews in 13 villages around 
Lake Chilwa.  
3.2.2.3 Variables 
To assess support from the TAs to BVCs, I focused on survey questions outlined 
in Section 6 of the question schedule (Annex 6). The survey questions that were 
both qualitative and quantitative in nature centred on the following types 
variables.  
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(a) Demography 
I collected demographic data that included number of fishers, fishing gear and 
craft to estimate size of the Lake Chilwa fishery. I conducted documentary 
research and thorough observations over five years (2003-2008). The level of 
operation of the demography variable was a fishing zone and in terms of 
operationalisation, I estimated the population of the fishers by gear and craft type 
located on a beach or village.  
 
(b) Support for co-management by stakeholders 
I applied primary sources and conducted in-depth qualitative interviews using 
guiding questions as shown in Annex 3. I had in-depth interviews with key 
informants to determine the level of support that Traditional Authorities give to 
BVCs. The point was that since the TAs seemed to be key partners in the co-
management of Lake Chilwa there was a need to assess the support that BVCs 
get from the traditional leaders.   
 
(c) Process variables 
I looked at the age of the co-management, relations with TAs, representation, 
NGO participation, District Assembly (DA) participation, relations with other 
community-based organisations (CBOs). Other variables included transparency, 
accountability and ladder of co-management activity as process variables. In all 
the process variables, I made my observations at individual, village and TA and 
fishing zone levels. I had in-depth qualitative interviews with key informants and 
applied secondary sources.  
 
To operationalise the age variable, I looked at when the Lake Chilwa co-
management started. Consequently, I developed a timeline of events for the co-
management arrangement.  
 
On the support for local co-management, I posed a question on whether in the 
eyes of the respondents DoF supports the BVCs with more than just talking. The 
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support might include legal and material support. Similarly, I asked the 
respondents about the District Assembly (DA), non-governmental organisations 
and (NGOs) and village heads (VHs).  
 
On the transparency of co-management, questions included the following: 
(i) Do authorities make decisions publicly? 
(ii) Are meetings open? 
(iii)Do authorities report about use of funds publicly? 
 
I determined the typology of Lake Chilwa co-management by looking at where 
the project fell in terms of the ladder from instructive to informative as detailed in 
the literature review (Chapter 2).  
 
(d) Conflicts 
To identify conflicts, I focused on class or power structures, gear types, theft, 
marketing, and issues on multiple users of fishing grounds and locals against 
outsiders as the main variables. I asked the questions as outlined in Annex 3 and 
in the co-management survey (Annex 5, Section 2) by looking at whether the in-
migrants and local fishers operate their gear types in the same area. The questions 
were the same as those outlined in (a) above, that is, the demography section.  
 
I did variable measurements at individual, village and fishing zone and used 
documentation, in-depth interviews, made observations and survey questions. 
The aim was to assess the degree to which conflicts of the various types were 
salient within the fisheries of interest.  
 
Based on the migration scale I created in the co-management attitude survey, I 
did the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to determine whether there were any 
significant differences between non-migrant and migrant fishers due to age, 
ethnicity, education levels and wealth. The questions are in Annex 5, Sections 4 
and 5. 
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3.3 Fishing-farming household incomes 
I applied secondary data on frame survey (Annex 9) conducted in 2001 to assess 
value of Lake Chilwa fishery as a whole and by gear type. First, this aimed at 
assessing the importance of the gear types in terms of value of landed catch. 
Second, the test aimed to examine the impact of recessions on the local economy 
and how it, in turn, affects livelihoods of the fishing households. During the 
survey that involved the BVCs, I estimated weekly income earnings from fish 
sales through interviews.  
 
3.4 Additional data 
Secondary data collection involved review of literature, published reports and 
data on water levels, fisheries, evaporation, value of the fishery and rainfall to 
assess variability of the Lake Chilwa ecosystem. In particular, the data sets 
included water levels, fish catch, value, frame survey, demography and socio-
economic aspects of the area. I got the reports from the Departments of Fisheries, 
Water, Parks and Wildlife and Fisheries, National Statistical Office, University of 
Malawi, and libraries at PLAAS and IFM. I also used internet websites to search 
for certain information about Lake Chilwa.  
 
3.5 Data analysis 
I used the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) Version 12 and 
Microsoft Excel for data entry, cleaning and analysis. I worked out frequencies 
and mean comparisons about mean perceptions to assess strength of the co-
management institutions in selected study sites of Lake Chilwa. I produced trends 
as shown in tables and graphs for water levels, catch data, evaporation and frame 
survey. Illustrations by drawing graphs involved use of SPSS and Excel 
Worksheets to calculate proportions (percentage) of fishers moving out against 
those coming in or just settled by year and gear type, and to show differences in 
opinions and frequency of migration of the fishers and analysing the data through 
statistical tests including Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). This aimed to compare 
means and variability of data on the perceptions, frequency of migrations by 
season, area and gear type and water level or depth. 
 
 
 
 
 72 
 
3.5.1 Proportion of migrants 
Using data from the migration survey, I analysed the percentages of migrants by 
gear type and fishing area or landing beach. I made a further analysis to 
determine the number of transfers made, that is, transfer frequencies by fisher 
category in terms of gear operated. This took into account any fisher that had 
been operating from 1994 to 2004. This was to establish which fishers by gear 
type migrated more frequently within the lake.  
 
Another dimension on migration was to make comparisons of transfer 
frequencies between resident fishers and in-migrant fishers especially those from 
Lake Malombe who use Nkacha seines. This was to examine the pattern of 
migration in terms of when they seasonally and periodically migrate to Lake 
Chilwa and reasons behind that. I gathered such information by use of 
percentages to examine whether migration is a livelihood strategy and if it was, 
for which fishers between resident and in-migrant fishers. 
3.5.2 Impacts of migration on co-management and livelihoods 
I used Excel and SPSS to analyse data from the qualitative interviews from 
individual and group interviews to assess impact of migrations on the co-
management. In specific terms, this referred to conflicts associated with fishing 
grounds between resident and migrant fishers and strategies that the local fishing-
farming households applied to manage such conflicts. The assumption was that if 
there were problems associated with migrations then that could influence 
livelihoods of Lake Chilwa fishers through their impacts on co-management.    
 
Additionally, I analysed the data to examine whether conflicts influenced 
collective action within the co-management framework in relation to property 
rights. The assumption was that conflicts that occur due to exclusion of in-
migrant seine fishers from Lake Chilwa could be a basis for analysis of resource 
tenure. A further analysis of co-management strength focused on the support by 
TAs to the BVCs. I did the analysis in relation to an assumption that the influence 
of TAs in co-management is necessary for resilience of the co-management 
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institutions. With data from the co-management survey, I used the SPSS 
programme to determine the mean level of perceptions of the respondents by 
graphical presentations and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) by testing any 
statistical differences in perceptions by fishing zone within Lake Chilwa. 
 
Further data analysis on the livelihood strategies that the Lake Chilwa fishing-
farming households apply focused on both seasonal and periodic bases. This was 
mainly to assess the importance of fishing to the local community. On seasonal 
terms, questions on their calendar of activities could determine what they do 
when the lake is in flood during the rain season. I also needed to find out whether 
the fishers still operate their gear types in other areas when the water recedes in 
the northern marshy areas. Annex 3 shows the guiding questions.  
 
I used the Microsoft Excel to analyse the data by sorting out the answers based on 
thematic areas based on the study sites in terms of fishing water depth as 
differences in occupations would occur. The main reasons could be land 
ownership, soil type for farming, access to markets and other infrastructural 
development. I also investigated the types of migration that exist in the lake.  
 
3.6 Problems in data collection and analysis 
The main problems I encountered during the surveys included access to fishing 
beaches, time taken to conduct the interview and unreliability of data based on 
memory and perceptions. Access to fishing areas especially those near the border 
with Mozambique proved difficult. Neither a vessel nor vehicle could easily 
make it to the areas at a time when water levels were low. Therefore, in some 
cases the research team asked third parties to conduct the interviews thus 
increasing chances of changes in meaning of some questions occuring.  
 
Time taken to conduct the co-management attitude interview with one respondent 
ranged from 45 minutes to over one hour. This was too long and invariably 
affected the concentration levels of both the researcher and the respondent. This 
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means that some information gathered towards the end of such an interview 
might be unreliable.  
 
The migration survey involved asking fishers where they had been fishing from 
1995 to 2004. While most respondents recalled the beaches on which they had 
landed their catches since they started fishing, a few could not. However, use of 
the frame survey data validated a trend of the number of fisher counts during the 
same period. 
 
Nonetheless, use of scale questions as a research technique to analyse individual 
perceptions is that answers can be subjective depending on various factors like 
number of years one has been in the village and fishing business, dependency of 
household income on fishing and gear type. However, due to the number of the 
respondents (166) a pattern of answers emerged which provided some reliability 
of the survey results. Additionally, the key in-depth qualitative interviews I had 
with key informants can provide further information and clarification. 
 
Furthermore, some fishers especially when they were about to go for fishing were 
reluctant to fully respond to questions. At times, they just nonchalantly replied, “I 
do not know” which increased gaps and missing cases during data analysis.   
 
Finally, the number of cases for the co-management survey dropped to 92 from a 
possible 166 for the whole lake. The reason was that the researchers terminated 
interviews with respondents who were unfamiliar with the work of the BVCs. 
The ultimate aim was to get information from people who were knowledgable 
about BVCs or those who were involved in the activities of the committees. The 
fewer cases posed a challenge on conducting a statistical analysis mainly on 
means tests as in each fishing zone I ended up having less than 30 observed 
cases. However, I continued with the analysis mainly by comparing the mean 
perception levels by fishing zone.   
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CHAPTER 4   
RESPONSES TO WATER LEVEL CHANGES 
 
This chapter presents the study results related to the research question on the 
impact of water level changes on the livelihood of the Lake Chilwa basin 
households. First, I used data from both the co-management attitude and 
migration surveys to examine the socio-economic profile of the 166 respondents 
(BVCs, fishers and households). Specifically, I compared age, education, wealth 
and ethnicity of the migrants and non-migrant respondents.  
 
Second, I analysed migration frequency of the fishers in response to water 
fluctuations both on seasonal and periodic basis by using the migration survey 
data with 396 respondents. The migration frequencies refer to the number of 
times that a particular fisher had shifted from his/her fishing village or beach to 
another from 1994 to 2004. I also present the impact of the water level changes 
on household income from fishing.  
 
4.1 Socio-economic profile of the respondents 
In this section, I present a socio-economic profile of both migrant and non-
migrant fishers in the co-management survey. I focus on the age, ethnicity and 
education levels between the migrants and non-migrants. The co-management 
survey involved interviews with 166 fishers. To determine migration by gear 
types, I administered the migration survey with 396 fishers operating seines, 
gillnets, fish traps, long lines and mosquito nets. The survey examined migration 
frequency and patterns based on completed migration survey forms (Annex 2) 
and qualitative interviews with key informants and focus group discussions 
conducted in the three fishing zones.  
4.1.1 Distribution of respondents by migration status 
On migration status, the respondents were in 4 categories (Annex 5, Section 5, 
Question 12) including those from within the village that the interview was 
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taking place, from nearby villages, from another village within the district of 
interview and from outside the district (Table 4). For the non-migrants the 
majority (77%) were from villages in which the interviews took place and the rest 
from nearby villages. On the other hand, the majority of the migrants were from 
another village within the district.  
 
Table 4: Percentage distribution of respondents based on migration status and 
places they came from. Excluded cases (3) were due to failure to record the 
responses. All numerals are in percentages except the Ns in the far right column   
Place of origin Non-migrants Migrants Total 
Within village 77   0   69 
Nearby village 23   1   22 
Another village within the district   0 51   37 
Outside the district   0 48   35 
Total 100 100 163 
Source: Co-management survey (2003) 
4.1.2 Age of respondents 
The age of the interviewed fisher households (N=166) ranged from 19 to 98 
(Table 5). By category, the age of the non-migrants ranged from 19 to 64 with a 
mean of 39 while the migrants aged from 22-98 with a mean of 43. An age group 
of 31-40 years was dominant in both non-migrants and migrants. The Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) showed no significant differences between the migrant and 
non-migrant at F(1,5)=1.51, p>0.05 due to the age ranges. 
 
On the other hand, the mean scores of the age ranges were significantly different, 
F(5,1) = 37.14, p<0.05. Majority, 38% and 30% of the non-migrants and 
migrants respectively aged between 31 and 40. One non-migrant was less than 20 
years old. On the other hand, 7% constituted the migrants above the age of 60 
years while for non-migrants they scored 3% only.  
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Table 5: Table showing age ranges between non-migrant and migrants fishers 
(N=166) out of which 163 respondents provided answers while 3 did not know 
when they were born. All numerals are in percentages except the Ns in the far 
right column   
 
Age range 
Non-migrants 
(%) 
Migrants 
(%) 
Total 
(N) 
<20    1   0   1 
21-30 19  19 31 
31-40  38  30 56 
41-50  28  30 47 
51-60   11  14 20 
>60    3   7   8 
Total 100 100 163 
4.1.3 Ethnicity  
The Lomwe people dominated the fisher respondents for both migrants and non-
migrants. Nearly 58% and 61% of the non-migrants and migrants respectively 
were Lomwe as shown in Table 6. The Nyanja were second in both categories. 
There were no significant differences at F(1,4)=0.23, p>0.05 between migrants 
and non-migrants due to ethnicity. However, the main effect of migration on 
ethnicity yielded an F ratio of F(1,4) = 171.39, p<0.05, indicating a significant 
difference.  
 
For the non-migrants, majority (58%) were Lomwe followed by the Nyanja 
(22%). Yao scored 17% while the least were the Chewa. There was a similar 
pattern among migrants; the Lomwe represented the biggest number (61%) 
seconded by Nyanja (18%) and the Yao (14%). The Chewa and Sena were in 
minority constituting 4% and 3%, respectively.  
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Table 6: Table showing ethnic composition of the respondents between non-
migrants and migrants (N=166) out of which 110 responded while 56 were 
excluded cases due to failure to record responses. All numerals are in percentages 
except the Ns in the far right column   
Ethnic origin 
Non-migrants 
(Percentage) 
Migrants 
(Percentage)
Total 
(N) 
Chewa   3   4     3 
Lomwe 58 61   65 
Nyanja 22 18   22 
Sena   0   3     3 
Yao 17 14   17 
Total         100       100 110 
Source: Co-management attitude survey (2003) 
4.1.4 Education level 
The results showed that 23% of the respondents had never been to school. 
Majority of both non-migrants and migrants were primary school (junior and 
senior classes) leavers registering 72% and 64% respectively as Table 7 shows. 
The illiterate respondents, that is, those who had never been to school constituted 
23% in both the non-migrant and migrant groups. Nearly 13% of the migrants 
attained junior secondary school education while only 5% was for the non-
migrants. Only 1% of the non-migrants attained senior secondary school 
education. There were no significant differences between the non-migrants and 
migrants as regards education level, F(1,4) = 1.92, p>0.05. However, the mean 
scores of education levels yielded an F ratio of F(4,1)=19.53, p<0.05, indicating 
significant differences.  
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Table 7: Table showing education levels of the respondents between non-
migrants and migrants (N=166) of which 9 did not respond. All numerals are in 
percentages except the Ns in the far right column   
Education level 
Non-migrant 
(Percentage) 
Migrant 
(Percentage)
Total (N) 
Never been to school     23   23 36 
Junior Primary School (Std 1-5)     47   45 72 
Senior Primary school (Std 6-8)     25   19 35 
Junior Secondary school       4   13       13 
Senior Secondary school       1     0   1 
Total           100 100     157 
4.1.5 Household income  
Data from the co-management survey (Figure 13) shows that fishing is an 
important livelihood strategy for Lake Chilwa basin households. Over 60% of 
household income is from fishing and other fishing-related businesses such as 
fish processing and trading.  
 
Figure 13: Proportion of household income (N= 166) earned from fishing 
activities with 113 valid cases, 24 not responding and 29 not knowing 
Source: Co-management survey  
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With such importance of the fishery, it means that any intervention that 
disregards the fishing community’s dependence on the resource may result in 
entrenching poverty with increased vulnerability of the communities to food 
insecurity. By interview type, 33% of the fishers earned their income from 
fishing. In contrast, many BVC members and household heads showed that they 
earn their incomes from other occupations mainly farming (Table 8). The results 
showed no significant difference12 due to both interview type, F(2,4)= 0.52, 
p>0.05 and effect of proportion of income from fishing, F(4,2) = 0.72, p>0.05. 
 
Table 8: Proportion of household income from fishing by respondent type (BVC 
members, fishers and households) with N=166. There were 113 valid cases, 24 
respondents did not respond while 29 indicated that they did not know 
Household income 
% from fishing 
Respondent type (%) Total 
BVC 
member 
Fisher Household 
0 10   1 21   32 
1-20   2   2   1     5 
21-40   2   5   0     8 
41-60   3   9   2   14 
>60   4 33   0   41 
Total 21 50 24 100 
Source: Co-management survey (2003) 
 
The analysed 2001 frame survey data demonstrates economic importance of the 
Lake Chilwa fishery by looking at gear types operating in Lake Chilwa. Table 9 
shows estimated weekly gross income from fishing by gear type. The survey 
covered all landing beaches with involvement of the BVCs by asking fishers their 
estimated weekly average revenue from fish sales within the month of September 
2001. While it was difficult to give the exact ‘average’ amount by just recalling 
many fishers just gave figures from the previous week’s sales.  
                                                 
12 In this thesis 0.05 was the alpha level of significance 
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The estimated mean weekly gross income from fish sales per fisher (gear owner) 
from Lake Chilwa was MK1,070.63 (Table 9). The seine nets registered the 
highest weekly cash earnings for the whole lake seconded by long lines. There 
were significant differences due to fishing gear, F(4,2) = 24.23, p<0.05.  By 
fishing area, the Lake Chilwa South recorded the highest weekly cash incomes 
while the Lake Chilwa Central was the least. However, there was no effect of the 
gear type on fishing area, F(2,4)=1.29, p>0.05.  
 
Table 9: Mean weekly gross income from fish sales (MK) by fishing gear and 
fishing zone recorded in 2001 Frame Survey with gear owners (N=2,354) 
Fishing gear Northern 
Lake Chilwa 
Central Lake 
Chilwa 
Southern Lake 
Chilwa 
Average 
Seine net 3755 2241.5 4189 3395.17 
Gill net 684 530.5 576.5 597 
Fish trap 402 282 358.5 347.50 
Long line 447 724 686.5 619.17 
Hand line 609 237.5 336.5 394.33 
Average 1179.4 803.1 1229.4 1070.63 
Source: GoM (2001) 
  
The annual catch estimates show that the northern marshy and floodplain areas 
are seasonally highly productive in terms of Matemba catches mainly during the 
rain season and catches decline during dry seasons when the water level drops 
(GoM 1999). The most productive gear type is the seine net used for catching 
Matemba. Walter (1988) found similar results with estimated 167 seines in Lake 
Chilwa of which 54% concentrated in the northern and north-western beaches 
with only 20% operating on a full-time basis. He also found that the same 
beaches had the highest number of fish traps (about 10,000). Therefore, Namanja 
(the floodplain and marshy area in the northern Lake Chilwa) is the highly 
productive fishing area.  
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4.1.6 Asset ownership and income earnings  
In the thesis, creation of the wealth scale involved asset ownership, cash savings, 
house type and regular remuneration from other sources as detailed in Annex 12. 
The results (Table 10) showed that the majority of the non-migrants were 
dominant in all the three wealth categories as compared to the migrants 
registering 61%, 57% and 61% of the poor, rich and very rich non-migrants 
respectively. Although the study failed to specify the fishers in terms of gear 
ownership or crew status, it is most likely that most of the poor were the fishers 
that owned fish traps, long lines and gillnets because the gear types land less 
catches than seines. Additionally the crew members remain poor due to the nature 
of the remuneration system that involves equal sharing between crew and gear 
owner (chikomeni).  
 
Table 10: Wealth status of respondents (N=166) with 14 respondents failing to 
indicate their assets. All numerals are in percentages except the Ns in the far right 
column   
Migration status Wealth category Total (N) 
Poor 
(Percentage) 
Rich 
(Percentage) 
Very rich 
(Percentage) 
Non-migrants   61   57   61   85 
Migrants   39   43  39   57 
Total 100 100 100 142 
 
The wealth categorisation was not similar to that of the households’ perspective 
reported during the village meetings. In this thesis, wealth of the households is in 
three categories: poor, rich and very rich. The participants in a focus group 
discussions at Chinguma and Mposa similarly categorised wealth into the same 
groups, namely poor (wosauka), rich (wopezako bwino) and very rich 
(wolemera). On asset holding, the participants included other attributes mainly 
type of gear and craft owned. The villagers claimed that someone with a seine net 
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was very rich while someone with a gill net can be just a rich person and 
someone with a fish trap being poor and without any gear as a very poor person. 
Similarly, ownership of a plank boat with or without engine symbolises wealth 
while a canoe shows poverty. The co-management survey excluded the fishing 
assets, which is different from what the households describe as their wealth 
status. 
 
It was surprising to find a few people not regarding land as being a very 
important asset. They rather perceive someone with a large harvest or owning 
livestock like cattle as being rich or very rich. The households argued that many 
people had pieces of land but did not use it for farming due to limited capital or 
failing to acquire farming inputs mainly chemical fertilizer. Therefore, limitation 
on the analysis of the data was on the exclusion of fishing asset ownership mainly 
for gear and craft.   
4.1.7 Occupation 
About 58% of the respondents indicated that they stayed at the beaches from their 
original homes because of fishing while 17% reported that they were involved in 
fish processing and trading. The rest stated that they were located in those 
villages for farming and running small-scale businesses. This shows that nearly 
75% of the respondents were involved in fish-related businesses including 
fishing, processing and trading. Fishing is, therefore, their main occupation. 
4.1.8 Vulnerability aspects  
I assessed vulnerability of the households during particular times of the year and 
recession. The assessment examined availability of household cash savings, 
access to farming land, livestock ownership and availability of lending 
institutions in relation to seasonal and periodic recessions. The four economic 
factors are necessary for survival of the vulnerable households during recessions. 
The results showed that the majority (91%) of the household heads had no cash 
savings, which they could use in case of an emergency (Table 11).  
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Despite the high economic potential of Lake Chilwa to surrounding districts, the 
households are highly vulnerable to food insecurity and poverty. This implies that 
majority of Lake Chilwa households are vulnerable to food insecurity during 
closed seasons (November to March) in which no seining operations take place 
and during droughts or recessions. 
 
Table 11: Distribution of households with cash savings in the co-management 
attitude survey with N=166 (162 valid cases and 3 missing cases due to 
respondents not answering the question 
Cash savings Frequency Percent 
Not available 148   91 
Available   14     9 
Total 162 100 
 
Over half of the households with cash savings indicated that they could not 
depend on the savings for more than a year. This implies that during recession 
periods, which take around 5-6 years, the majority of the households remain poor. 
Only 4% of the households receive money from their relatives. Most of the 
households just depend on incomes they get from fishing, farming and other self-
employed activities.   
 
4.2 Adaptive measures 
4.2.1 Responses to seasonal water level changes  
The responses of the fishing households mainly relate to seasonal drying up of 
the floodplain areas of the lake. Additionally, the response also refers to periodic 
recessions that occur after 20-25 years as Lancaster (1979) predicted. The 
common feature of the seasonal drying up is prevalent in the northern marshy and 
floodplain areas. When the lake is in flood by March-April, majority of fishers 
with gillnets, seines, fish traps and long line operate their gears in the northern 
part of Lake Chilwa.  
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The results show that fishing-farming households have the ability to adapt to 
alternative occupations for their livelihoods. Subsequently, change in occupation 
occurs on seasonal, periodic basis and area (part of the lake depending on 
farming potential and water depth) basis. There are coping strategies during 
particular times of the year especially from October to December. The strategies 
mainly include farming, securing temporary work and doing small-scale 
businesses. 
 
Seasonally, farming is the main occupation for the fishers that stop fishing in the 
northern floodplain area. The northern floodplain fishers irrigate their crops 
during the dry season in addition to the rain-fed crops they grow during the rainy 
season. One fisher stated: 
Seasonally, we the gill net and fish trap fishers grow vegetables, maize and rice. This 
happens when we see that fishing grounds are far away from here. A few of us migrate to 
Mulanje and Thyolo where we work in tea estates. Sometime we are picked by tobacco estate 
owners from central region [of Malawi] to work in tobacco estates. In general, we find 
farming being more profitable especially nowadays when the prices of rice and other crops 
have gone up. When our fishing ground is flooded we come back to start fishing. 
  
Findings from the study show that during recessions, most fishers stop fishing. 
They become farmers in the wetland area. A group of fishers and fish traders at 
Mchenga stated: 
During recession like the one that occurred in 1995, our livelihoods become threatened. We 
rely on handouts from the government, churches and non-governmental organisations. Some 
of us migrate to Mozambique to work in farms to earn money, which we use to support our 
families. The main problem is that during recession, the boats develop cracks due to heat of 
the sun.  For the crew, some migrate to central region where they work in tobacco estates. 
The fortunate ones especially the seine owners are able to go to South Africa where they 
work in mines and come back to invest in fishing after recovery of the lake. For women that 
trade in fish, it really becomes difficult for them to go to other lakes since they are used to 
come here in Lake Chilwa. There can be additional cost if we decide to go to Lakes Malawi 
and Malombe. Moreover, the fish traders seem to be specialised in the fish species they deal 
with.  
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Additionally, a group of fishers at Ntila indicated: 
For economic reason, there is no justification for us, gillnet and fish traps fishers to travel 
long distance (over 100km) to Lake Malombe during recessions to fish for cash. Even within 
Lake Chilwa we usually operate gillnet and fish traps on part-time basis, as we also depend 
on farming for our livelihoods. When water level drops, one-third of the north-based seine 
fishers also stop seining mainly from September to December and venture into farming crops 
including rice, maize and vegetables. It is only the full-time fishers, both resident and in-
migrants, that continue fishing while dwelling in zimbowera. Very few of us do small-scale 
businesses including selling wares, weaving baskets or baking especially our wives.  
 
The explanation above shows that there are inherent occupational changes that 
mainly involve fishing, farming and working in estates. To sustain their 
livelihoods the fishing-farming households demand policy interventions that 
would promote farming as their main occupation and supplement the income with 
fishing. Lake Chilwa is highly variable in terms of water level changes and 
periodically recedes. Therefore, farming is one of the main occupations. 
Although land ownership is small, (about 0.8ha) due to the increased population, 
with use of fertilizer the households can harvest enough for sale and 
consumption. The current input subsidy programme that the government 
launched in 2004 should continue to support livelihoods of the most vulnerable 
groups. 
 
On a seasonal variation, the respondents reported that the northern marshes 
become active in terms of fishing during rainy season, mainly from February to 
April. All gear types operate there when water is available but after April, the 
area progressively dries up taking the southward direction. By September, many 
fishers operating fish traps and gillnets stop fishing as it becomes unprofitable. 
The fishers stated that the main reason was on difficulties to access fishing areas 
especially during the drying periods. For example, a seine fisher from northern 
Lake Chilwa outlined the costs (Table 12) that he incurred during the drying 
period of 2004. This involves a five-crew fishing unit. 
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Table 12: Analysis of costs and revenue from fishing when northern marshes 
receded (September-December, 2004) 
Costs Amount (MK) Revenue  Amount (MK) 
Advance payment (ya 
ndege)  
Flour 
5000 
   
  500 
Fish sales 5000 
Salt   100   
Firewood   200   
Total Costs 5800 Total Revenue 5000 
Gross Profit -800   
Source: Field data from a seine fisher interviewed at Ntila, (northern floodplain 
of Lake Chilwa) on 17 October 2004 
 
Furthermore, the chikomeni13 system exacerbates the situation. The gear owner 
and the fishing crew share equally the daily fish revenue after subtracting all 
costs apart from ya ndege14. In Table 16 above, it means the gear owner made a 
loss during that fishing day. In contrast, during the rain season fishing becomes 
profitable as demonstrated in Table 13 with data provided by one seine fisher at 
Ntila. 
 
In this context, fisher migration in the northern marshy areas is common to 
operators whose livelihoods largely depend on fishing. To avoid the losses that 
fishers incurred from fishing especially from September to December 2007, the 
fishers stopped fishing. Instead, they were growing vegetables, maize and rice. 
Those who continued fishing were mostly the seine fishers who were in most 
cases landing on the western shore and not the northern areas due to distance. 
 
 
                                                 
13 Sharing of fish catches between gear owners and fishing crew as payment and has been 
common since 1990s 
14 Advance money that the gear owner gives to crew before fishing for meals 
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Table 13: Analysis of daily costs and revenue from fishing when the northern 
marshes are flooded (January to April, 2007)  
Costs Amount MK) Revenue Amount MK) 
Advance payment (ya 
ndege)  
  5000 Fish sales 10000 
Flour     500   
Salt     100   
Firewood     200   
Total Costs   5800 Total Revenue 10000 
Gross Profit   4200     
Source: Field data from a seine fisher interviewed at Ntila, northern floodplain of 
Lake Chilwa on 9 April 2007 
 
During interviews in February 2004, one resident fisher in the floodplain area 
described the fishing operations in terms of the fish species that the fishers target: 
This is the time [rain season] for good catches of Matemba after their breeding season in 
rivers when they migrate to swampy shallow areas for growth. Mlamba [Clarias gariepinus] 
and Makumba [Oreochromis shiranus] are also in breeding season and hence plenty of 
immature ones are vulnerable to exploitation during this particular time of the year. At this 
time, more seine fishers including those from within and outside the lake, mainly Lake 
Malombe migrate to this area mainly for the lucrative Matemba [Barbus paludinosus] 
fishery.  
 
As the northern floodplain recedes from June to July, the distance to fishing 
grounds becomes so long that fishers from the area start shifting to land near their 
catches on the western part. The full-time15 fishers who are mainly from Lake 
Malombe and a few from Lake Chilwa also start using the western beaches for 
landings. The fishers begin to stay in offshore temporary shelters (zimbowera) for 
more than two weeks while fishing and processing their catches. During market 
                                                 
15 In this study full-time fishers are defined as those that spend over 8 months fishing in a year 
(Landes & Otte, 1983) 
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days, the fishers come out of the lake to sell their dry fish at the western beach 
(Mposa).  
 
By September, the majority of the fishers in the northern part, mainly those who 
operate gillnets and fish traps and long lines, abandon fishing and start dimba 
farming for rice, green maize and vegetables. During group focus discussion at 
Namanja in the northern floodplain area, the fishers explained: 
…at this time farming becomes more profitable than fishing since we, the gillnet fishers, 
progressively spend longer time to reach fishing waters and most of the times we catch  less 
from which we cannot realise adequate cash for buying food.  
 
This means that fishing becomes a part-time business to majority of the fishers 
operating traditional gear types (gillnets, fish traps and long lines) by this time. 
Owing to the occupational combination, the resident households are fishers and 
farmers. However, in the southern part where water is available throughout the 
year, the traditional fishers continue to operate their gears, but they combine 
fishing with agricultural activities. The only difference is that they do not 
abandon fishing as the fishers in the northern part. As Table 14 shows, farming is 
one of the main occupations for income for the households. 
 
Table 4 presents a calendar of activities for the fishing households from focus 
group discussions (FGDs) conducted at Chinguza, (Lake Chilwa north). The 
fishing households conduct several activities in a year, some of which follow a 
seasonal pattern such as irrigated maize farming during dry season and rain-fed 
maize and rice growing during rainy season. In terms of fishing, setting gillnets 
and fish traps are common during floods while fish poisoning in rivers is 
prevalent during dry season. 
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Table 14: Annual calendar of activities obtained from Swang’oma households 
(Lake Chilwa south) in May 2004 
Month Activity 
January Gillnet fishing in open waters of LakeChilwa and Mnembo River 
Fish trap fishing in flooded areas 
Rice and maize farming   
February Rice and maize farming  
Gill net fishing in open waters of LakeChilwa and Mnembo River 
March Rice and maize farming  
Gillnet fishing in open waters of LakeChilwa and Mnembo River 
Picking and curing tobacco leaf  
April Harvesting rice, maize and pulses (pegieon peas and beans) 
Harvesting crops (maize and rice)  
Grading tobacco 
Gillnet fishing in open waters of LakeChilwa and Mnembo River 
May Harvesting rice, maize and pulses (pegieon peas and beans) 
Clearing gardens in dambo areas 
Gillnet and seine fishing in LakeChilwa 
June    Gillnet, fish trap and seine fishing 
Harvesting rice  
Selling tobacco 
July Gillnet and seine fishing Clearing gardens 
Preparing tobacco nursery beds 
August Seine fishing  
Clearing gardens 
September Seine fishing 
October    Seine fishing 
November     Seine fishing 
Planting seeds 
Transplanting tobacco seedlings 
December Farming – weeding gardens and fertiliser application 
Seine fishing 
Source: Migration survey (2004) 
 
During periodic flooding regimes, I observed changes in settlement patterns 
during the 2004/05 fishing season. The fishing-farming households relocate to 
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upland areas within the Lake Chilwa plain. In a community with dominance of 
vulnerable households that do not have adequate savings to support their 
household members (Table 7), the flooding situation threatens their survival 
strategies.  
 
The coping strategies include resettlement in upland areas, asking for food 
handouts from the government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
relatives and seeking piecework in towns and other villages. Crop production 
becomes low due to the floods that wash away maize and rice. Consequently, the 
households become food insecure and vulnerable to diseases related to 
malnutrition, for example, kwashiorkor, as observed in under-five children.  
 
The problems are characteristic of Lake Chilwa fishing households, which can 
experience both extremes in terms of wealth and poverty. The lake has potential 
to secure cash for the households but in terms of catastrophes like drought and 
flooding, this can also bring about severe suffering.     
 
Women process and sell fish during the rain season when fishing in the northern 
marsh is more active. Seasonal recessions affect their businesses and hence 
confine them to the southern fishing areas where they can buy fresh fish from 
beaches. Being women there are some restrictions on their presence in the 
zimbowera where men usually camp and fish. A certain woman fish trader at 
Kachulu stated: “we fear men who are in those zimbowera, as they can rape us”. 
The fear just confines them to buy fresh Matemba fish and dry it on landing 
beaches.  
 
However, in modern times, a few women fish traders are able to go to the 
zimbowera to buy and process fish for a few days before going to markets, as one 
fisher at Mposa stated: “Nowadays women can go and buy fish but they come 
back within the same day.” This is easier for women who reside with their fisher 
husbands but social problems can occur if a woman stayed in a man’s 
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chimbowera16 where there is no relationship between the two. A certain woman 
fish trader at Kachulu explained:  
I fear to go to chimbowera to buy fish alone as it seems like I will be offering myself for sex, 
since men can be there operating their seines and gillnets for a long time without their wives. 
Of course, we have heard that several women in Lake Chilwa and other lakes are engaged in 
[transactional] sex, but not me. I would rather stick to my business… it is dangerous 
nowadays due to HIV/AIDS to change men like clothes … 
4.2.2 Response of the households to periodic recessions 
Periodic recessions refer to the drying of the whole lake usually occurring after 
20-25 years (Lancaster, 1979). In the lake recession, the fishers that are nomadic 
within Lake Chilwa stop fishing and concentrate on other livelihood sources 
usually farming activities. One to two years before recession, fishing becomes 
diverse with introduction of destructive methods that include poisoning and use 
of fine meshed seine to exploit remnant fish stocks in river mouths and lagoon. 
The fishing practises are common in major influent rivers and they target 
Matemba. Women use poisonous plants or herbs while very few own seines, 
gillnet and long lines. In this context, migration is one of the household strategies 
applied for livelihoods within the Lake Chilwa basin, especially for seine fishers, 
which agrees with the conceptual framework (Figure 12). Sarch & Allison (2000) 
also observed that migration was a livelihood strategy of the Lake Chilwa fishing 
households.  
 
During FGDs conducted in the three fishing zones, fishers and households 
indicated that the fisher migration becomes prominent during the recession 
period, which lasts for 2-3 years. In a group focus discussion at Kachulu beach, 
fishers explained: 
Few fishers especially the seine fishing crew migrate to towns and Mozambique to look for 
piecework for cash. The fishing crew that operate seines go to tea or tobacco estates for work. 
Some even go as far as South Africa to look for work. Poor households with limited land for 
farming become food insecure since hunger is prevalent during the recession periods. 
Consequently, there is closure of shops, restaurants, vending centres and rest houses in active 
                                                 
16 Chimbowera is singular term for zimbowera which are temporary make shift structures that 
fishers use while fishing in open waters of Lake Chilwa 
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places like Kachulu, Namanja, Swang’oma and Mposa. When the lakebed is predominantly 
muddy, it becomes difficult for people to cross from mainland to island or from the west to 
east to the east. In general, there is an economic downturn due to decline of the fishery.   
 
Although there is a possibility to migrate to Lakes Malombe and Malawi, the 
fishers stated that high costs of transporting fishing equipment become a 
hindrance to many fishers. In addition it may not be economically sound 
especially fishing in Lake Malombe where the stocks have also declined from 
15,000 tonnes in 1980s to less than 4,000 tonnes (FAO, 1993; Bulirani et al,. 
1999; GoM, 2006). One woman who owned a seine net at Mchenga beach 
commented:  
… fishers migrate to other areas or venture into farming for two to three years while waiting 
for recovery of the lake [Lake Chilwa]. Businesses in fishing and fish trading collapse and 
hence threatens livelihoods of many households especially us, the women. The seine fishers 
do not like to switch from catching Matemba from Lake Chilwa to Kambuzi from Lake 
Malombe due to increased transportation costs and preference of the former fish species over 
the latter. Therefore, majority of us, the fish traders, just go home and start farming, as the 
fishers do.  
 
Another aspect includes technical operations of the Nkacha seine as the crew 
from Lake Chilwa I interviewed at Namanja beach indicated that:  
We cannot operate Nkacha as efficiently as the Lake Malombe fishers do because it needs a 
highly skilled fishing crew from where the seine originated. The problem is that it demands 
one crewmember to dive into water and form a bag by tying the footrope of the seine. 
However, since Lake Chilwa is muddy they have modified the operation by making sure that 
instead of diving the crew insert a strong pole into the lake bed and then pull the seine net 
around it. 
 
Fishers with adequate pieces of farming land shift to farming activities mainly 
during the dry season in wetlands (dambo) areas. For example, one fisher from 
the eastern Lake Chilwa stated:  
…I produce rice and maize in large quantities like in this year [2006] I harvested 70 bags of 
rice, which I will sell at MK150,000. The amount of money I will earn is adequate to buy 
food and necessary household items. In contrast, a fisher transferring to Lake Malombe may 
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not easily earn such an amount considering costs of transport, advance payment made to the 
fishing crew and the sharing system in form of remuneration.  
 
The increase in population threatens the livelihoods of the households in 
recession times. There are fishers that migrate from Lake Malombe to Lake 
Chilwa and do not go back to their original home in times of recession. Counts of 
in-migrants locally called obwera or alendo for those settling on pieces of land 
(Peters, 2002) show a steady increase of fishers settling in Lake Chilwa. Chapter 
6 presents the emerging conflicts related to fishing and farming. 
 
During major recessions, fishers abandon fishing and seek employment 
elsewhere while others shift to farming on the fringes of the lake where the soils 
are fertile. This is the time when land property rights are prevalent as clamied by 
one gillnet fisher interviewed at Mposa. The local leaders reclaim their land and 
apportion it to their subjects either on a free basis or at a rental fee. Fishers 
indicated that the practice was more common on a seasonal basis in the western 
and northern marshes than in the southern part where water levels are more or 
less stable.   
 
4.3 Migration 
4.3.1 Intra-lake fisher migrations: frequency of transfers  
Intra-lake migration, in the thesis, refers to migration of fishers taking place 
within Lake Chilwa. Frequency of transfers is the number of transfers that a 
fisher had made during his/her fishing period for over three years. Migration 
patterns look at a general trend in terms of directions that the migrants take either 
at a seasonal or periodic level. In this section, analysis of the migration data 
focuses on the number of transfers a fisher made for a fishing period of over three 
years and assess whether there were any distinct migration directions across the 
lake.  
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The distribution of migrants and non-migrants in the study sites showed that 
majority (50%) of the migrants were located in the northern marsh while and 
majority (54%) of the non-migrants were in the southern part of Lake Chilwa 
(Table 15). The majority of the non-migrants were located in the northern 
floodplain. By fishing zone, the north and southern fishing areas had more 
migrants than the centre. The migrant fishers at Chipakwe beach indicated 
The northern part has always been more productive for Matemba unlike the other areas. We 
get good catches here. That is why we migrate from Kachulu [Centre] to this place to get 
more money. Apart from that, we easily transport our bags of Matemba to Lilongwe or 
Blantyre cities due to the railway line that passes along the northern Lake Chilwa beaches to 
Mozambique. 
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Table 15: Distribution of respondents (N=354) by migration status in the study 
sites. Numerals are in both percentages and Ns. There were significant mean 
differences between the migrants and non-migrants due to beach site, F(1,8) 
=2.72, p>0.05  
Fishing 
zone 
Beach Migration Status Total (N) 
Migrant Non-migrant 
N Percentage N Percentage 
Northern Chipakwe     6     5   32   13   38 
 Mposa   22   20   25   10   47 
 Ntila   28   25   54   22   82 
Central Kachulu   11   10   31   13   42 
 Mchenga     1     1   68   28   69 
 Phimbi     1     1   32   13   33 
Southern Malagani     3     3     0     0    3 
 Swang’oma   20   18     1     0   21 
 Thanga   18   16     1     0   19 
Total  110 100 244 100 354 
 
 
On why their colleagues in the south do not migrate as frequently as they do, they 
indicated that cost was a major factor. A certain seine fisher at Ntila beach stated: 
For us, the seine fishers, we always work out costs that include hiring a vehicle to pick the 
seine nets and crew. Looking at a distance of over 80 km, we sometimes fail to move. 
Instead, you will find our colleagues in the south not migrating to where we are [Ntila, 
northern floodplain area].  
 
The migration pattern occurs seasonally as mobility of the fishers goes 
northwards from January to May and then fishers migrate southwards during the 
dry season from September to November. However, one seine fisher at Namanja 
beach indicated:  
…the seine fishers and a few gillnet fishers migrate southwards as water recedes unlike the 
fish trap and some gillnet fishers that abandon fishing during the dry season. We fish when 
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our fishing area here in the north gets flooded mainly from January to July and later on 
decide to farm or do businesses.  
 
The observation by the fisher shows that although fishers migrate to the south 
during the dry season the number of fishers is the same that comes to the north 
for fishing in the rain season. However, just a few north based fishers migrate 
southwards. The fishers operating during the rain season when Lake Chilwa north 
floods are higher than the operators do in the south during the dry season since 
some northern resident fishers abandon fishing during the dry season.  
4.3.1.1 Migration by gear type 
Majority of the seine fishers were operating in the northern floodplain area 
followed by the southern deeper part of the lake (Table 16). The reason centred 
on maximising their income. A seine net operator at Mposa stated: 
We invest a lot to have a seine net, boat and paddles. You are talking about spending over 
K200,000 nowadays. Therefore, we try to migrate to where catches are, of course by also 
looking at how much you can spend on transport. In our case, we fish to get money- it is our 
business. Of course gillnet fishers can do but their investment costs are very low. We like 
fishing in the south and north because of two reasons: In the north, you always get more 
catches from January to April when the area is flooded. In the south, you get more fish prices 
because there are few fishers. In Kachulu [centre], we are there during cold months especially 
from June to early August. Caches become low on the lake but prices are high at Kachulu 
because of many traders and good road to Zomba [city]. 
  
The explanation shows that fishers in Lake Chilwa choose where to go based on 
seasons and economic factors. In addition, they also consider distance when 
deciding about migrating to other fishing areas. They hire vehicles to transport 
boats and seine nets and hence calculate whether any fishing operations would 
cover the costs. 
 
The migrant fish trap and long line fishers that operate on part time were also 
area-specific. The migrant fish trap fishers were in the north and south operating 
in the fringes of the lake for Matemba fishery. The long line fishers operate in 
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deep areas were, therefore, mainly in the south targeting Mlamba, which are 
larger fish species.    
 
Table 16: Distribution of migrants and non-migrant fishers (N=354) by gear type 
and fishing zone. All numerals are in percentages except the Ns in the far right 
column   
Fishing gear Fishing zone Migration Status Total (N) 
Migrant 
(Percentage) 
Non-migrant 
(Percentage) 
Seine North   59   33   71 
 Centre   13   66   79 
 South   28     1   18 
Total  100 100  168 
Gillnet North   52   44   47 
 Centre   20   55   48 
 South   28     1     8 
Total  100 100 103 
Fish trap North   54   89   41 
 Centre     0   11     4 
 South   46     0     6 
Total  100 100    51 
Long line North    0    38     8 
 Centre    0    62   13 
 South         100     0   11 
Total  110  100   32 
Source: Migration survey 
 
In contrast, the majority of non-migrant seine fishers were in the centre (Table 
14). Majority of the seine fishers were at Kachulu (southern Lake Chilwa) beach 
but operated in different fishing grounds located in the north or centre, as one 
group of seine fishers indicated:  
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Although we the seine fishers appear to be here, we fish in distant fishing grounds. We go to 
fish in Mposa and Thongwe Island (northern area) and then come here to sell our Matemba 
fish to traders who find it easier to transport the dried fish product to Zomba due to good 
road. We find it difficult to migrate due to high transportation costs. When life becomes 
tough, we just resort to farming as what other villagers do here. 
 
For gillnet fishers they were in the majority in the northern part (floodplain area), 
the same as the seine fishers.  A group of gillnet fishers at Ntila explained: 
… fishing with gillnets depends on water levels. We target Makumba [Oreochromis shiranus 
chilwae] that breed in shallow areas. Therefore, during this month [August] we migrate to 
this northern part because we know this is another breeding time. You know Makumba 
reproduce twice, from January to March and August to October. However, the highest 
breeding period is from January to March. The only problem we face is that the seine fishers 
destroy our nets in water. They fish where we normally set our nets. 
 
From the explanation, reasons for gillnet fishers to migrate also depend on where 
and when they can get good catches. They target breeding stocks of Makumba for 
higher prices. Conflicts arise between the gillnet and seine fishers due to 
competition over fishing grounds as already presented in Chapter 4.  
4.3.1.2 Number of transfers 
Majority of the fishers (69%) had never transferred to other beaches apart from 
their villages. The results show that despite the variability of the Lake Chilwa 
ecosystem in terms of water levels, not many fishers migrate. For the migrants, 
the number of transfers ranged from 1 to 8 with seine fisher being the highest 
(Table 17). Generally, fishers transferred either once or twice. The fishers are 
also farmers and hence fish on part-time basis, as a group of fishers at Chipakwe 
started: 
Here we depend on fishing and farming. We fish when the lake is full of water during rainy 
season. We resort to farming in dambo areas when the flooded area is dry during the dry 
season. Therefore, our livelihoods depend on both fishing and farming. 
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Table 17: Number of transfers that fishers (N=354) made by fishing zone and 
gear type  
Fishing 
Zone 
Gear type Number of transfers made Total 
(N) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
North Seine 35 27 8 1      71 
 Gillnet 34   6 7       47 
 Fish trap 34   5 2       41 
 Long line   8         8 
Centre Seine 71   6 2       79 
 Gillnet 43   2 3       48 
 Fish trap   4         4 
 Long line 13         13 
South Seine   1   5 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 18 
 Gillnet   1   2 3 1 1     8 
 Fish trap    1 3    2   6 
 Long line    2 7 1 1     11 
Total  244 56 38 5 4 2 3 1 1 354 
Source: Migration survey 
4.3.2 Inter-lake fisher migrations 
Inter-lake migrations mainly involve fishers from Lake Malombe who migrate to 
Lake Chilwa either on a seasonal or periodic basis. For example, a record of 
migrants showed an increase of migrant fishers from only two beaches (Mwalija 
and Chapola) on Lake Malombe to Lake Chilwa. The data showed that 9 fishers 
migrated to Lake Chilwa in 1997, 15 fishers in 2001 and 25 fishers in 2006. 
Assuming the counts were for all fishing beaches around Lake Malombe, which 
totals 35, the migrants could be more than 25.  
 
During a group meeting with Lake Malombe fishers at Chapola beach, fishers 
indicated that they seasonally and periodically move to Lake Chilwa for good 
catches as they stated: 
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Lake Malombe catches have been low for the past 20 years. When we heard that Lake Chilwa 
stocks recovered after the 1995 recession, we came here to do our fishing business. We heard 
that fishers here were making more money between 1998 ad 2000. However, the catches 
have now gone down.  
 
On why the catches went down in Lake Chilwa, the fishers indicated that it was 
just because of changes in water levels. They did not believe in increased number 
of seines or fishers as their local fisher colleagues believed in.  
 
The inter-lake migrant fishers operated their seines on a full-time basis. The in-
migrants were dependent on fishing for their livelihoods. Almost 30% of the 
interviewed fishers had more than two Nkacha seines, one for Lake Malombe to 
catch Kambuzi and the second one on Lake Chilwa to catch Matemba. Since the 
fishers had adapted to seasonal and periodic changes of fish catches on both 
lakes, they developed a mechanism of spreading the risk by investing in fishing 
businesses in both lakes.  
 
An issue of concern to the local fishers was not the migration per se, but the 
“introduced fishing technologies such as gauze wire, Nkacha and Usodzi wa 
Mululu”, as one fisher at Mposa indicated. However, Jul-Larsen et al. (2004) 
argue that where African ecosystems fluctuate naturally, horizontal 
intensification, based on a simple increase in numbers of fishers, may not have a 
major impact on the stock levels but a disastrous effect comes from the vertical 
intensification, which is dependent on new technology and large-scale markets. 
Kalk et al. (1979) caution damage to the aquatic vegetation in Lake Chilwa as it 
might result in overfishing of the fish resources.  
 
4.4 Reasons for migration in both inter- and intra-lake migrations 
Figure 14 presents a summary of reasons for migration. The major reasons for the 
migration centre on socio-economic, technological, fishing skills, dependence on 
fishing for livelihoods and regulatory issues as described in the following sub-
sections. The fishers also migrate for fear of paying cha-kwa-mfumu (catch 
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portions as tribute to local leaders), seasonal water levels changes, closed seasons 
and conflicts. Although not explicitly mentioned, a health issue in terms of 
cholera outbreaks is also one of the reasons.  
 
Figure 14: Frequency distribution of reasons for migration of fishers (N=354) in 
the migration survey out of which 14 respondents did not respond 
 
 
Source: Migration survey (2004) 
4.4.1 Economic reasons  
Reasons for migration include ecological and economic nature based on pulls and 
push factors. The ecological reason is fundamental as it links migration of fishers 
to seasonal upwelling of waters, which attracts large schools of fish. The 
economic reason includes fishers migrating to earn more money. Considering the 
Nkacha fishery in Lake Chilwa with abundant stocks of Matemba, the seine 
fishers including the migrant Lake Malombe fishers register higher revenue17 
within a short period. With the collapse of Kambuzi (Haplochromine spp.) 
fishery on Lake Malombe (FAO, 1994; Hara, 1996; Donda, 2001), there has been 
an increase of fishers migrating to Lake Chilwa.   
                                                 
17 In 2002 one lady fisher owning a seine net operated her seine net for only three months but she 
got over MK600,000, which used to invest in houses and a vehicle.  
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
Better returns
Seasonal water changes
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Fish catch portions for local leaders
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4.4.2 Technological aspects  
Fishers reported that it was easy to modify Nkacha seine net to catch Matemba in 
Lake Chilwa as compared to modifying the Matemba seine net for Kambuzi 
(Haplochromine species) in Lake Malombe. It is for this reason that migration in 
the other direction (Lake Chilwa to Lake Malombe) is almost non-existent. The 
Lake Malombe fishers simply reduce depth of their Nkacha seines and add 
mosquito net lining or smaller meshed net bundles on the bunt. In contrast, it is 
not easy with the Matemba seines, which would demand a complete change of 
the whole net thereby demanding more capital investment. 
4.4.3 Fishing skills  
The Lake Malombe fishers introduced Nkacha fishery to Lake Chilwa. The Lake 
Chilwa fishers reported that they found it difficult to operate the gear, as it 
demanded specialised skills in diving and tying the footrope while in water. This 
fishing practice restricted the Lake Chilwa fishers to their smaller depth Matemba 
seines as opposed to Nkacha seine that could be as deep as 7m from operating in 
Lake Malombe. 
4.4.4 Dependency on fishing activities for livelihoods 
Lake Chilwa fishers are used to switching between fishing and farming unlike 
Lake Malombe fishers who depend solely on fishing. The latter are ‘full-time’ 
fishers and ensure that they migrate to places where fish resources are available. 
Only a third of the local Chilwa basin area fishers operate on full-time basis 
(Walter 1988).  
4.4.5 Disease outbreak 
Disease outbreak is one of the major reasons that cause fishers to migrate from 
one beach to another. A group of seine fishers at Mposa stated: 
We are highly vulnerable to diseases mainly cholera and malaria. This occurs especially 
during rain season when many areas are flooded. Sometimes what we do is to migrate from 
beaches with outbreak of diseases to where it is safe. There is no reason to continue staying 
on such beaches with cholera outbreak when we know we can die there due to absence of 
hospitals and clinics.  
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The above explanation shows that fishers are conscious of their health when 
deciding where to go fishing. With lack of health facilities especially on the 
eastern part of Lake Chilwa, health risks are high for migrant fishers. 
    
4.5 Conclusion 
The study results in terms of age, ethnicity, education and wealth status showed 
some differences between the non-migrant and migrants fishers though not 
statistically different. On age, the non-migrants ranged from 19 to 64 years with a 
mean of 39 while the migrants aged from 22-98 with a mean of 43. Both non-
migrants and migrants were dominant by an age group of 31-40 years. The 
Lomwe people dominated the fisher respondents for both migrants and non-
migrants while the Nyanja came second for both non-migrants and migrants.  
 
Majority of both non-migrants and migrants were primary school leavers. Only a 
few had never been to school while an even smaller number had attained 
secondary school education. On wealth status, the results showed that there were 
many poor non-migrant fishers as compared to the migrants, though not 
statistically different. Failure to categorise fishers in terms of fishing gear and 
craft ownership could have contributed to the results on wealth status. The fishers 
categorise people with seines and boats being richer than those with gillnets or 
fish traps and canoes. 
 
Lake Chilwa can be characterised into three fishing ecological zones: open water 
(mainly southern part), marshy areas (mainly central) and floodplain (largely 
northern part). The ecological zones affect the livelihoods of the fishing-farming 
households due to changes in water levels at particular times of the year. The 
results show that water level changes of Lake Chilwa trigger migration of fishers 
within the lake and between Lake Chilwa and Lake Malombe. The fisher 
migration is one of the strategies that households apply for their livelihoods.  
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This study shows that very few resident fishers migrate within Lake Chilwa. 
However, migration is high for fishers that come to fish in the lake from Lake 
Malombe. In this case, there is caution when examining migration issues. They 
depend on gear type and type of fishers (resident or migrant). Majority of the 
resident fishers operating gear types of all types have never migrated to other 
beaches within the lake or to other lakes despite the high variability of the 
ecosystem. The results differ from those by Allison & Mvula (2002) and Mvula 
(2002) on livelihood strategies.  
 
While migration is a livelihood strategy, generalisation of their results without 
considering gear type and fishing area, cannot provide an appropriate policy 
direction with strategies for consideration during recessions, normal fishing 
period and floods. Fishers operating seine and gillnets  are more mobile within 
the lake than those operating fish trap and long lines, the dominant gear types. 
There are more in-migrant seine fishers from Lake Malombe both at seasonal and 
periodic levels than out-migrants from Lake Chilwa. The main reason lies on 
differences in seine construction design and economic returns.  
 
The migration of fishers is dependent on seasonality. However, the northern 
marshes that are highly productive in terms of Matemba catches attract more 
fishers of all gear types during the rain season especially from January to April. 
The economic implication is that with long distance to fishing grounds, fishers 
spend more time paddling rather than fishing, which leads to reduced fish 
catches.  In addition, as water levels recede further, fishers switch to farming. The 
water receding pattern exposed dimba18 areas of the northern marsh for irrigated 
maize farming from May to November 2004 and rice growing from December to 
April 2005. The results, therefore, demonstrate an inherent adaptive mechanism 
within the fishing-farming households that enable them to cope with changes in 
fish catches. The fishers just switch to farming activities both at seasonal and 
                                                 
18 In this study, I refer to dambos as ‘any permanently or seasonally wetlands in valleys, 
depressions, or floodplains with open herbaceous vegetation, mainly grasses and sedges, and an 
absence of trees’ (Kambewa 2005: 31-1). 
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periodic levels. They realise higher incomes from rice growing than fishing 
during dry seasons or recession.   
 
The implication is that development initiatives that aim to enhance livelihood 
strategies for Lake Chilwa residents should involve participation of the resident 
households. It is clear from this Chapter that fishing and farming are part of the 
livelihood strategies of the Lake Chilwa basin households. Therefore, there is a 
need to promote farming technologies for food security while fishing can be a 
safety net strategy. 
 
The annual catch estimates vary with fishing areas. The northern marshy and 
floodplain areas are seasonally highly productive in terms of Matemba catches 
mainly during rainy season and catches decline during dry season when water 
level drops. The most productive gear type is the seine net used for catching 
Matemba.  
 
Despite the high economic potential of Lake Chilwa to surrounding districts, the 
households are highly vulnerable to food insecurity and poverty. This implies that 
majority of Lake Chilwa households are vulnerable to food insecurity during 
closed seasons (November to March) in which no seining operations take place 
and during droughts or recessions. Although vulnerability to food insecurity is 
high due to recessions, the Chilwa basin households have adapted to such 
conditions over the past generations. 
 
The study examined conflicts in relation to fishing especially due to migration of 
fishers. Chapter 5 presents results of the identified conflicts and their impact on 
access to resources such as fish and land. 
  
 
 
 
 
 107 
 
CHAPTER 5  
 FISHERIES-RELATED CONFLICTS IN THE CHILWA BASIN 
 
This chapter presents conflicts associated with fishing activities especially 
between resident and migrant fishers. In this Chapter, the study results relate to 
conflicts based on cultural, ecological, technological changes, socio-economic 
and institutional issues and policy and legislative frameworks. I also outline 
perceptions and beliefs of the respondents on the impact of the conflicts on 
resource status with a focus on possibility of overfishing the lake. The data 
analysis presents possible relationships on conflicts with co-management strength 
as outlined in Figure 12. 
 
5.1 Conflicts associated with cultural issues  
The results from the focus group discussions showed that conflicts that are 
associated with migrants occur due to social and economic reasons. The social 
aspects include access in form of power differential within the traditional 
structures whereby migrants do not seek authority from a village head (VH) to 
operate from his/her beach. This is due to the introduction of co-management as 
the Beach Village Sub-Committees (BVCs) appear to wield more powers and 
authority than the local leaders, for example, at Mposa. The parallel structures 
(BVC structure and traditional leadership) that exist in the fishing communities 
are a source of conflict over allocation of fishing areas and methods mainly 
between gill net and seine fishers.  
 
Another aspect is favouritism that the local leaders express towards Nkacha seine 
fishers from Lake Malombe and the resident Matemba seine fishers in return for 
fish catch portions (cha kwa mfumu) as a group of fishers at Ntila stated: 
When it comes to enforcement by BVCs during closed seasons, we notice that the patrolling 
teams always confiscate our Matemba seines leaving the makoka a mfumu, to continue fishing 
which are left for the local leaders. This demonstrates favouritism just because the local 
leaders look for the catch portions or cash during the closed seasons, which is also usually a 
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lean period when majority of households are food insecure from December to March. This is 
bad because we also need to fish to get money and buy food for our households. Moreover, 
we [Lake Chilwa fishers] always participate in fish resource management while our 
colleagues from Lake Malombe just come to fish without managing the fisheries resources. 
 
With the favouritism perceived by the resident fishers, conflicts between the 
fishers and BVCs or among resident and in-migrant fishers abound. Majority of 
the BVCs around the lake always seek permission from their local leaders before 
they go out patrolling on the lake during closed seasons. In most cases, local 
leaders appoint members of the BVSCs so that they have indirect influence on the 
committee’s activities. 
 
The co-management arrangement is mainly between the Department of Fisheries 
and Traditional Authorities that have BVCs dominated by artisanal19 fishers that 
operate fish traps, gillnets and long lines who take instructions from their local 
leaders. In this context, participation and partnership is not inclusive and hence 
management measures have been formulated to target the seine operators and not 
for the benefit of the Lake Chilwa fishery. 
 
5.2 Conflicts associated with ecological issues 
An ecological aspect refers to where seines and gill nets operate. In most cases, 
the seines damage gillnets during operations. However, advantages of the 
migrants include improvement of the local economy in terms of employment 
opportunities for the seine crews that include a few from the local fishing 
communities, increased fishing landings for fish traders and demand for fishing-
related activities such as boat building and boat engine repairs increases.  
                                                 
19 FAO (1995a) in the context of Malawian fisheries, defined artisanal fishery as a small-scale 
commercial fishing operation, using various nets and small plank boats or canoes, powered 
manually or by outboard engine. They are generally referred to as ‘Traditional Fisheries’ and can 
be divided into the group of fisher-entrepreneurs, who own the fishing equipment and the group 
of crew members, who are employed to operate or to assist in operating the fishing unit. In 
another publication, FAO (1995b) defines artisanal fisheries as those that are mostly 
commercially oriented and where the fishers operate their own fishing units, or with support from 
their immediate community 
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Access to distant fishing grounds involves use of bamboo poles (miponda) as 
shown in Figure 15 and paddles (malemu or nkhafi) as shown Figure 16. The 
Lake Malombe fishers introduced use of paddles in 1980s. Traditionally Lake 
Chilwa fishers operate seines in inshore waters or localised areas where they 
construct temporary structures for dwelling (zimbowera). They claim offshore 
fishing targets breeding and immature Matemba while mature ones migrate to 
shallow and marshy areas as one old seine fisher at Khanda stated: 
The Matemba breeding stock and immature ones are located in deeper waters after which 
they migrate to shallow and marshy areas for feeding and hiding. These are the areas I target 
for seining but you see that our colleagues from Lake Malombe go to the deeper areas using 
their planked boats propelled manually by use of malemu [paddles] instead of miponda 
[bamboo poles] where I believe are spiritually reserved sites [sanctuaries] for fish breeding 
and yet they operate their seines there. The migrant Nkacha fishers always fish in the 
sanctuaries. This is unfair to our tradition and culture, which involves giving respect to our 
spirits.        
 
 
Figure 15: Fishers in a planked boat using miponda (bamboo poles) 
Photo by Hara (2006) 
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However, from 2005 there were suggestions to regulate access to the fishery 
resource indirectly. One BVC chair at Mchenga on the Lake Chilwa south 
indicated:  
Since I cannot physically chase away the migrant Nkacha fishers because of the rights that 
every Malawian has, by constitution, in terms of access rights with respect to the fisheries 
resources, we will just come up with rules that will restrict operations of the Nkacha seine in 
open waters. We will just limit use of fishing equipment like malemu [paddles] and instead 
tell them to use miponda [bamboo poles] to propel their boats. I am certain that they will not 
go far because bamboo poles cannot propel their big plank boats to the open waters. 
 
 
Figure 16: Lake Malombe fishers propel planked boats by using paddles 
Photo by COMPASS (2005) 
 
The introduction of limited access measures specifically affects the full-time 
resident Matemba seine fishers who adopted open water seining techniques and 
the in-migrant Nkacha fishers who operate by using paddles. The Lake Chilwa 
variability induces migration within the lake and attracts full-time seine fishers 
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from Lake Malombe. Any measures aimed at limiting access would not be in the 
interest of the seasonally full-time fishers who land larger catches of fish. The 
seine operators contribute to the local economy in terms of small-scale businesses 
such as restaurants, rest houses, sell of foodstuffs and wares belonging to the 
local residents due to their high fish catches from Nkacha seines.  
 
Additionally, the Nkacha seine net owners seek local crew and hence offer 
employment opportunities to young unemployed men who take up fishing as 
safety net. Field observations and even data from the co-management survey 
shows young people (18 years old) becoming fishers, which can negatively affect 
their educational prospects. There are also problems like marriage break-ups 
mainly as some in-migrant fishers seek resident status by taking women some of 
whom are married as their wives as one fisher at Mposa stated: 
The in-migrant fishers, especially those from Lake Malombe propose marriages, which are 
temporary as they break up once the fishers return to their lake during recessions with a view 
of getting pieces of land for farming owned by their wives. These forms of marriages are 
common here and our chiefs encourage them because they benefit from such arrangements in 
form of giving tribute to the local leaders. 
 
This is also a source of conflicts between in-migrant and resident fishers and 
local people. Despite these issues, the restriction on accessing fishing areas 
through use of paddles can be an important tool for resource tenure. What is 
important is to give authority and power to community-based organisations 
(CBOs) including BVCs to allocate fishing areas to migrants and charge a certain 
landing fee for the benefit of the households. The decentralization policy 
demands transfer of power from central government to local government and 
even devolve authority to lower structures. The fisheries sector is one of the 
targeted sectors for decentralisation of its functions. Therefore, any suggestion to 
institute access rights will benefit the resource users. 
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5.3 Conflicts associated with technological changes 
Fishing technologies have been introduced in Lake Chilwa mainly from 1970s 
(Table 18) although at national level production of nylon nets for constructing 
gillnets started in Malawi (then Nyasaland) in 1958 (Kalk et al., 1979). The 
Department of Fisheries introduced beach seines to utilize underexploited fish in 
the lake. In the 1980s, migrant fishers form Lake Malombe introduced Nkacha 
(open water seine operated by using two boats and paddles) while from 1990s 
gauze wire has been used to catch fish in the lake. The local fishers consider 
Kwakwaza as an old seining method originally for the lake. Fishers load their 
canoes with Matemba seine nets and propel it to fishing grounds by using 
bamboo poles (miponda) and instead of paddles (nkhafi) that Lake Malombe 
fishers introduced on Lake Chilwa especially from the 1980s. 
 
Table 18: Introduction of fishing methods in Lake Chilwa (first three columns) 
reported by respondents (N=166) with 46 respondents indicating that they did not 
know about the new technologies 
 
Technology Who introduced when Impact Source  
Nylon nets Government 1958 Change of nets 
from fibre nets to 
nylon nets 
Interviews and 
Kalk et al. 
(1979) 
Kwakwaza ancestors Old 
fishing 
method 
Conflicts with 
gillnet fishers 
Migration and 
co-management 
survey 
interviews 
Matemba  seine DoF 1970 Conflicts with 
gillnets fishers 
Migration and 
co-management 
survey 
interviews 
Nkacha Migrants 
Blantyre Netting 
Company (BNC) 
Chiuta fishers 
Tanzania traders 
1980 Conflicts between 
local fishers and 
migrant as 
described in 
Section 6.1 
Migration and 
co-management 
survey 
interviews 
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DoF and MAGFAD 
Mozambicans 
Mosquito nets migrants 1980s Conflicts between 
local fishers and 
migrant as 
described in 
Section 6.1 
Migration and 
co-management 
survey 
interviews 
Gauze wire 
(Gozi Waya) 
Mangochi fishers 
 
2004 
 
Conflicts between 
local fishers and 
migrant as 
described in 
Section 6.1 
Migration and 
co-management 
survey 
interviews  
Usodzi-wa-
Mululu 
Mangochi fishers 
 
2004 
 
Conflicts between 
local fishers and 
migrant as 
described in 
Section 6.1 
Migration and 
co-management 
survey 
interviews  
Use of paddles 
enabling fishers 
to exploit open 
water fishery 
resources 
Mangochi fishers 2004 Conflicts between 
local fishers and 
migrant as 
described in 
Section 6.1 
Migration and 
co-management 
survey 
interviews 
Source: Co-management survey (2004) 
 
A group of fishers at Namanja cautioned that the wide use of fine meshed seines 
as shown in Figure 17 could be detrimental to the Lake Chilwa habitat. They also 
claimed that use of Nkacha seines destroy gillnets set in open waters where 
Matemba seines do not operate. 
The introduced seining technologies are destructive. Seines or Nkacha and gauze wire are 
non-selective. They catch fish of all sizes including non-target species. They also destroy 
breeding grounds for Makumba due to the dragging effect. As they propel their boats to the 
fishing grounds, the Nkacha fishers also destroy gillnets. 
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Figure 17: Chair of Seine Fishers Association demonstrating a Gozi Waya net 
Photo by Hara (2006) 
 
Linking to the above is the issue about resource tenure. Although not explicit, 
there appear subtle indications on reluctance of the resident fishers to allow 
fishers from elsewhere to exploit ‘their’ fisheries resources. The local fishers 
claim that Nkacha seining cleared vegetation in Lake Malombe, a situation they 
do not want to experience on Lake Chilwa. At Mposa, fishers expressed 
resentment against the Lake Malombe fishers who they claimed had overfished 
their lake by using Nkacha. The fishers argued: “Lake Malombe was weedy in 
the past as is the case with Lake Chilwa but today the lake is clear of the weeds 
due to Nkacha.” Already the in-migrant fishers are using Usodzi wa Mululu 
fishing method, which clears the vegetation. In this context, they fear Lake 
Chilwa would also be cleared of vegetation. They further argue that Lake Chilwa 
fishers cannot migrate to Lake Malombe because of differences in depth and 
mesh sizes of the nets.  
 
During focus group discussions the resident fishers (26 May 2006, Mposa beach) 
indicated that it was easier to change Nkacha seine into a Matemba seine, as it 
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just involves changing the smaller meshed panel on the bunt while the converse 
involved a complete change of the net. Additionally, it was easy for Lake 
Malombe fishers to operate on Lake Chilwa. A group of gillnet fishers at Mposa 
explained: “It needs a skilled person to dive under water to tie the footrope of 
Nkacha seine.” They also claimed that the in-migrant seine fishers always operate 
their gears on full-time basis, thus, operating even during November-March rainy 
season, a period when catching of juvenile Matemba is common in open waters.  
 
The conflicts arise due to the introduction of new fishing practices and between 
resident or local fishers and in-migrant fishers. Warner (2000) argued that a 
combination of demographic change through migration and the limits to 
sustainable harvesting of the natural resources including fishers are the 
underlying cause of conflict over the utilisation of the natural resources. On Lake 
Chilwa, conflicts of this nature are common usually from full-time fishing 
operations by seine operators, usually over eight months of fishing within a year. 
This explains a direct impact of conflicts on co-management strength, which can 
be either positive or negative. It can be positive where conflicts result in 
improved access to natural resources by artisanal fishers but can be negative 
where it blocks access to fishing areas with underutilised fisheries resources.  
 
5.4 Overfishing issue 
Another conflict arises in terms of possibility of causing overfishing in Lake 
Chilwa. While some scholars believe Lake Chilwa cannot be overfished (Kalk et 
al., 1979; Sarch & Allison, 2000) due to the resilient nature of the ecosystem, the 
local fishers strongly believe that overfishing can occur on the lake, as a certain 
woman seine owner at Mchenga stated: 
When I started fishing in 1997 with the seine net, which my father gave me, I used to land 
high catches with subsequent high daily revenue from fish sales. I bought a car and built a 
house within one year. However, the situation changed from 2000 when the daily sales were 
declining to the point of depending on income from the house rent and car hire services.  
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The divergent view of the possibility of overfishing of Lake Chilwa fish stocks 
contributes to conflict between the migrant seine fishers and the resident fishers 
using traditional seines and other passive gear types (fish traps, long lines and gill 
nets). Consequently, there are conflicts among partners in the co-management 
arrangement as presented in Chapters 7 and 8.   
 
When gaining access to the landing beaches, the in-migrants Nkacha fishers also 
pay something either in monetary or material form to the chief for favours. This 
undermines the duties of the BVCs, which have a mandate to regulate access of 
the new entrants or in-migrants into Lake Chilwa fishing waters. Chapter 8 
examines these issues as they affect co-management mainly in terms of 
participation, transparency and accountability. 
 
5.5 Socio-economic aspects 
Conflicts arise in different forms. Kambewa (2006) states that in the Lake Chilwa 
wetland conflicts tend to associate with access and control over resources that are 
important to households’ livelihoods. In a fishery, divergent interests arise due to 
differences in ethnic origins of the user groups, gender, colonial domination and 
fishing class (Malasha, 2003). Although not explicit in this study, ethnic 
differences have been associated with conflicts over utilisation of fisheries 
resources. There is linkage of certain gear types to specific ethnic groups. The 
Yao from Lake Malombe are associated with the introduction of Nkacha seines 
on Lakes Chilwa, Chiuta, Malombe and Malawi. Scoop and cast nets on Lake 
Chilwa are for the Sena people from Lower Shire valley. In most cases, conflicts 
occur when the introduced fishing gear is more efficient in exploiting the 
resources.  
 
On the classes of fishers, conflicts between small-scale20 and large-scale fishers 
have been prevalent on Lake Chilwa in the recent past. The most prominent 
conflicts arise between gillnet fishers and Nkacha seine operators. The gillnet 
                                                 
20 In the context of Lake Chilwa, the small-scale fishers refer to those using fish traps, cast nets, 
scoop nets and long lines while the large-scale fisher operate seine nets and gillnets. 
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fishers complained that the Nkacha seine fishers destroyed their set gears in open 
waters as one gill net fisher at Ntila complained: 
The problem with seine fishers is that they operate their seines everywhere including in 
places where we set our gill nets. In the past, gillnet fishers set their gears in the open waters 
since seine fishers could not access such fishing areas. However, nowadays with the coming 
of the Nkacha fishers from Lake Malombe the whole lake is under exploitation. The problem 
is that the seining operations in the open waters damage our gill nets and it becomes difficult 
to recognise who is responsible for such damage. We the gillnet operators end up buying new 
gillnet materials on amore frequency which is costly. 
 
The Nkacha seine operators are mostly in-migrants who have introduced the gear 
and its fishing technique on the lake. Additionally, membership in BVCs depends 
on where a member comes from, thus, between being a resident or an in-migrant 
and by gear type or fishing technique. In many cases, membership to BVCs 
includes the local or resident fishers only with very few exceptional cases where 
in-migrants also become members. An in-migrant fisher can become a BVSC 
member only if he secures a permanent residence status through marriage, as one 
BVSC member at Chinguma explained: 
All BVCs in this eastern area are composed of local fishers. We do not have in-migrant 
fishers on committees because we know that one day the fisher will go somewhere and leave 
the BVSC. After all, the in-migrant fishers seem not interested in fish resource management. 
The lake Malombe fishers failed to manage their lake. 
 
The traditional small-scale fishers operating gillnet and fish traps are in BVSCs 
and not the commercial operators that use seines. The small-scale fishers and 
traditional leaders formulate regulations without participation of the seine 
operators who operate on full-time basis. This implies exclusion of Nkacha seine 
operators from decision-making processes making the whole process lack 
inclusiveness, which is an attribute of good governance. The DoF appears to lack 
conflict management skills, as the small-scale fishers believe that it supports the 
commercial fishers. 
 
The local fishers feel the in-migrants are a source of socio-economic conflicts. 
Fish catch competition is one major source of conflict between the local fishers 
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and migrant fishers from Lake Malombe.  The seine migrant fishers land higher 
catches than the gillnet fishers. The local gillnet fishers at Swang’oma beach 
explained that: 
…the higher fish catches by the in-migrant operating Nkacha seine can induce reduced prices 
of fish, as they land more fish from the distant open waters where many of the local fishers, 
cannot go. We the local gillnet, fish trap fishers strongly believe that the seining operations 
especially with Nkacha destroy gill nets. On the other hand, the in-migrant fishers entice 
young girls of school-going age to exploitation through sex for money activities and 
unplanned marriages just because of more cash they earn from fishing. In some cases, our 
marriages have broken up due to relationships between married women and Nkacha fishers. 
With the risky sexual relationships, we are also afraid of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which 
may put lives of the girls at risk.  
 
Majority of the chiefs support the in-migrants for socio-economic and 
technological reasons. The Nkacha (open water seine net) fishers catch larger 
amounts of fish for sale to fish mongers. Usually their presence on beaches is 
associated with increased economic activities such as shops, rest houses, 
restaurants and transport. There are also conflicts related to land that the in-
migrants may rent or loan for food production. One chief on northern Lake 
Chilwa contended:  
I feel it is important that we allow the in-migrant fishers to operate in our areas. Apart from 
their fish landings, which are larger due to use of Nkacha seines, they also use land, which 
could be lying idle. As you know, many of these seine fishers from Lake Malombe are rich 
and hence have adequate capital to invest in our villages mainly in terms of farming in which 
case they also employ young men, which I believe is necessary.  
 
However, the resident fishers argued that ‘the chiefs support the in-migrants 
because they always get cha kwa mfumu21, which is traditionally acceptable as a 
token of thanks’.  
 
Other social cultural issues include theft of gear and catch, gender, beliefs in use 
of traditional medicine and demand for token of thanks (cha kwa mfumu). Theft 
                                                 
21 A portion of fish catch given to a local leader as a way of tribute. In other places like Mangochi 
they call it mawe (Hara et al. 2002 while on Lake Chilwa it is termed cha-kwa-mfumu) 
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of gears and fish catch is common among fishers as a source of conflict in Lake 
Chilwa and other water bodies. Usually, the seine operators can steal fish caught 
in overnight set gillnets or nets lying on beaches. A gill net fisher at Mposa 
complained: 
The seine operators have destroyed my gill nets and yet this is what I was depending on for 
my livelihood. In addition to that, they have even taken the nets with the fish. This is the 
reason we do not like these Nkacha fishers because they fish in open areas that we designated 
for gill netting only.  
 
On gender aspects, it is not easy for women to buy fish from zimbowera. This is 
because the fishers that reside in the zimbowera have a belief that ‘fishing 
activities are for men only and involvement of women on water may affect 
amount of the catch’, as a fisher at Kachulu stated. However, this may not be true 
since men fish while half-naked, and hence men do not want women to see them 
while fishing. This restricts women to buy fresh fish in very few landing beaches.  
 
Use of traditional medicine is common among fishers in Africa including those of 
Lake Chilwa although this was not explicit during the study due to sensitivity of 
the issue. Fishers believe that use of medicine will protect them from bad omen 
or bad luck and from fierce animals like hippos (Malawi News 8-15 December, 
2007). The conflict lies on the fact that there is a belief that any bad omen is 
associated with being bewitched.   
 
In selected landing beaches, traditional authorities demand a regular portion of 
fish from fishers especially from in-migrants that operate seines. While this is a 
traditional way of expressing gratitude to the traditional leaders for the beaches 
they use, nowadays it may be termed as corruption mainly in cases where 
traditional leaders allow illegal fishers to operate during closed seasons. Conflicts 
arise between the resident fishers and the in-migrants over the illegal operation of 
the seines. Majority of the interviewed fishers cited the conflicts in Ntila and 
Kachulu beaches. 
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During closed season, there are special seines that our traditional leaders allow to operate for 
food. They earmark such seines not for confiscation by BVCs. Therefore, we always ask 
whether the closed season is only for the ordinary fishers and not including those in authority.   
 
Land tenure systems are also in contestation between resident and in-migrant 
fishers. The in-migrant Nkacha fishers can easily get pieces of land through 
marriage or by renting it from poor households. The resident fishers feel the in-
migrant fishers were also getting their land, which they use, for rice growing. 
Several groups of fishers at Ntila, Namanja and Chinguma contended: 
While we allow the Nkacha seine fishers to operate in Lake Chilwa after they destroyed their 
fish stocks in Lake Malombe, they are also engaged in getting our land. They have temporary 
marriages just to ensure that they can easily access land. This is unfair… 
 
5.6 Conflicts associated with policy and legislative frameworks 
Policy and legislative frameworks governing natural resource use in the Chilwa 
basin (Annex 11) have been in conflict with each other. At national level, the 
policies and legislations on water use, environmental, land, forestry, parks and 
wildlife and fisheries have been in conflict with each other. For instance, the 
ministries responsible for agriculture and irrigation promote cultivation along 
riverbanks for food security and yet it promotes siltation of the rivers and the lake 
due to soil erosion.  
 
At international level, the Ramsar Convention that promotes the principle of wise 
use of the natural resources with participation of the community largely 
recognises numbers of bird species for protection. The fishery component is not a 
determining factor in declaring wetlands of importance as Ramsar sites. Legal 
pluralism seems to apply to Lake Chilwa ecosystem with conflicting issues and 
yet the local fishing-farming household used to manage the ecosystem in a 
holistic manner as a group of fishers on Chisi Island stated: 
 We used to utilise and manage Lake Chilwa as one ecosystem with fish, water, birds, grass, 
trees and land with guidance from our traditional leaders unlike nowadays when I hear about 
BVCs for fish, Mwayi wa Mbalame Association for birds, Village Natural Resource 
Committees for trees and so on. During drought, we offered sacrifices to have water, which 
refilled the lake and subsequently have fish and grass…    
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The above statement shows how difficult it may be to introduce policy 
frameworks to guide management of fish, water, wildlife mainly birds, land, and 
forests. It also follows how difficult it may be to have a co-management 
arrangement for each one of the natural resources. The problem lies on having the 
same people elected into positions in the community-based natural resource 
committees. Eventually there is limited efficiency in resource utilisation and 
effectiveness in achieving intended objectives of the co-management 
arrangements.   
 
5.7 Who has the power: gear owner or crew? 
In another dimension, conflicts occur between gear owners and fishing crews. At 
certain times, especially during farming seasons when fish revenue decline due to 
post harvest losses of Matemba, shortage of labour (crew) exist among seine 
fishing units. The available crew can become powerful in terms of making 
decisions as to where and when they can operate as fishers at Ntila, in northern 
Lake Chilwa explained:  
There comes a time when fishing crew members are unavailable to many seining units. When 
employment in other sectors like agriculture becomes promising, the crew switch their 
occupations. There has been labour migration from south to centre [regions of Malawi] over 
the past years, which involved recruitment of young men to work in tobacco estates. 
Conflicts arise in cases where few fishing crews are available and can demand to operate the 
seines at their own will. They can even get the seine net confiscated by operating during 
closed season, in which case, the gear owner loses while the crew can go to another seine 
fishing unit. Competition over fishing crew becomes so serious that short-term contracts that 
may last for a day are common.  
 
These problems are more common among the indigenous Matemba seine fishers 
and not the in-migrant Nkacha fishers from Lake Malombe. The Nkacha seine 
fishers always bring their own crew that are on long-term contracts. Very few 
Nkacha seine units have crew from Lake Chilwa due to lack of Nkacha seining 
skills, which are traditionally inherent among the Lake Malombe seine operators.  
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5.8 Conclusion 
Conflicts due to fisher in-migration trigger the households’ social pressure or 
collective action as presented in Chapter 7. The main conflicts include 
competition over space or resource, competition on prices, social problems, 
inherent ‘ownership’, and perceived wrong partners in the co-management 
arrangement. The same problems were also prevalent on Lake Chiuta.  
 
On competition over space or resource, Nkacha fishing has been in conflict with 
gillnets and fish in open waters where they believe there is juvenile fish. By 
August, Nkacha seine operators go to fish in waters as far as over 5km and they 
use 22nkhafi for paddling their fishing vessels to distant fishing areas and not with 
23miponda operated by local Matemba seine fishers. On price changes, seine nets 
influence lower prices due to high catches. The opposite occurs when catches are 
lower mainly by fish trap and gillnets that are gear types largely by resident 
fishers. Therefore, competition over prices occurs between fishers using cheaper 
gear types (gillnets, fish traps and long lines) and Nkacha seines mainly by in-
migrants.  
 
Finally, the results in this chapter show that migration triggers conflicts among 
fishers especially between the locals and in-migrants. The main issue focuses on 
fishing grounds and the type of fishing gears they use. The traditional leaders 
grant permission for any access to the landing beach. In the next chapter, I 
explore the role of the traditional leaders in the co-management of Lake Chilwa 
mainly with respect to how they support BVCs.  
 
                                                 
22 Nkhafi is a local term for paddle 
23 Miponda are bamboo poles use for propelling fishing vessels. 
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CHAPTER 6 
LAKE CHILWA CO-MANAGEMENT: PARTICIPATION, 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY  
 
In this Chapter, I focus on the fourth research question that centres on the 
assessment of Lake Chilwa co-management. The key aspects include 
participation of key actors, support that BVCs get from TAs, transparency and 
accountability. First, I present a background to the co-management by relating it 
to the pre-colonial rule as to how user communities with guidance from their TAs 
were involved in natural resource management in the Lake Chilwa basin. 
Governance reforms are another key area I analyse by associating them with 
socio-political and economic transformation.   
 
On participation, I examined how the fishers were engaged in BVC activities. 
Furthermore, I analysed the past and present roles of the Traditional Authorities 
to provide a basis for argument on how best the local leaders, as key actors would 
fit within the co-management arrangements and other fisheries development 
projects.  
 
The chapter also presents findings on the relationship between the water level 
variability on both seasonal and periodic levels and collective action as 
community’s strategy towards fishery recovery initiatives. Specific reference lies 
on the challenges and opportunities of fisher migrations and their impacts on the 
co-management arrangement. In co-management, the issue is on access to fishing 
beaches by migrant fishers with respect to the role of traditional authorities and 
BVCs in permitting the migrants.  
 
I also assessed Lake Chilwa co-management by focusing on accountability as to 
how fishers elected their BVSC members. It was also necessary to identify which 
authority got reports from the BVSCs. This was to determine whether they were 
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accountable to their fishers (downward accountability) or to their local leaders, 
DoF and district assembly (upward accountability).   
 
Finally, assessment of the transparency of the co-management involved 
examining questions on: (a) whether the co-management partners made decisions 
publicly, (b) whether TAs and BVSCs held their meetings openly and (c) how the 
authorities reported on the use of funds. 
 
For understanding of the basis of the current co-management arrangement, the 
following sub-section provides a background to the previous governance systems, 
which included traditional or community-based fisheries management system, 
centralised fisheries management system and fisheries co-management.   
 
6.1 Evolution of management systems on Lake Chilwa  
This sub-section outlines changes in fishery management regimes experienced in 
Malawi, with specific reference to Lake Chilwa. The aim is to understand how 
roles of traditional institutions and government have changed over the years and 
whether policies by the colonial and independent governments have influenced 
principles of co-management. Understanding of the past management regimes is 
useful in designing appropriate participatory fisheries management programmes 
in small and shallow lakes. The historical perspective in the management regimes 
provides an analytical basis for assessing the impact of variability on collective 
action that is necessary in those particular management approaches (GTZ, 2001). 
This section also outlines a timeline of events for Lake Chilwa fisheries 
management systems to examine changes in management systems in relation to 
other socio-political, economic, policy, technological and ecological changes 
such as recessions.  
6.1.1 Ethnic settlement patterns, political and socio-economic transformation 
The historical background of the ethnic settlement patterns, political and socio-
economic transformations in terms of fishing policy changes have had a major 
influence on the evolution of Lake Chilwa fisheries management strategies. It is 
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necessary to understand ethnicity, as it is a social identity to particular groups of 
people. It may influence the way people make decisions.  
 
The historical background of the ethnic settlement within the shire Highlands 
including the Lake Chilwa catchment area and the Shire Valley is not clear. 
Nevertheless, Schoffeleers (1987) indicates that the Maravi states expanded 
aggressively before and after 1600. After the Iron Age, the early settlers were the 
Maravi people who established their kingdom in Malawi, Zambia and 
Mozambique. Vaughan (1982: 353) states: “for most of the eighteenth century 
the Shire Highlands, Upper Shire valley and Chilwa basin were occupied solely 
by Nyanja people living on the margins of what had been the Maravi state 
system, and organized into small, kinship-based political units”. 
 
Thereafter, the Mbewe Yao from Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) settled 
around the area in the 1860s while the Lomwe also from Mozambique migrated 
to the area in late 1890s after arrival of the European settlers and missionaries in 
the 1870s and 1880s respectively. The European settlers established estates on 
vast areas of apparently uninhabited land while the missionaries were engaged in 
spreading the word of God.  
 
The establishment of the large farming areas triggered migration of the northern 
Malawians (then Nyasas) who together with the Lomwe were the first to work in 
the estates and (Vaughan, 1982). The local Nyanja and Yao were reluctant to 
work in the estates since the Nyanja were farmers by occupation and the Yao, 
traders within their settlements. The implication was that the settlement patterns 
influenced land ownership with the Nyanja and white settlers owning lager areas 
of land for farming. The Nyanja had authority over the control of the commons 
including fish. During in-depth interviews, one chief in the southern Lake Chilwa 
indicated that: “The Nyanja lived along the lake mainly to farm and utilise the 
natural resources including fish. The common food crops grown then were millet, 
sorghum and later maize.” 
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However, the coming in of the Yao who were associated with the Portuguese in 
trading activities, had disrupted settlement patterns of the Nyanja through ethnic 
conflicts and wars during the slave trade within the Lake Chilwa catchment area. 
These conflicts and slave trade ended upon arrival of the Church of Scotland 
missionaries in the late 1880s and early 1890s (Vaughan 1982). By then the white 
estate owners introduced thangata24 system, which disgruntled the natives. 
Therefore, the Reverend John Chilembwe (a Nyasa) led an uprising against the 
white settlers in 1915 to abolish the system. After his death during the uprising, 
the fight continued until the thangata system ended in the 1930s.   
 
Following the ethnic settlement, the subsequent political, socio-economic and 
policy transformations influenced the fisheries governance. There had been 
changes in political authority from tribal dominated rule to the British colonial 
rule in the early 1900s, which later resulted in the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland in the 1950s. Malawi and Zambia broke away from the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland to become independent states in 1964. Chirwa (1996) 
asserts that conflicts between colonial rulers and the ‘African natives’ emerged 
when the white settlers introduced hut tax. The increased fish production policy 
especially from Lake Malawi was due to the need to supply fish to the British 
armed forces from southern Africa on their way to East Africa for the World War 
II while tea estate owners of Mulanje and Thyolo used Lake Chilwa fish to feed 
workers (Chirwa, 1996; Hara, 2001; Vaughan, 1982).  
 
The change from one-party rule to multi-party democratic state instituted in 1994 
had also influenced governance reforms including co-management, 
decentralisation, devolution and deconcentration with popular participation, 
accountability and transparency as the mechanisms of governance (Béné & 
Neiland, 2005). There was a shift from traditional fisheries management (before 
1930s) to centralised during the colonial era (1880s to pre-independence time 
before 1964) and post independence in one-party-state of government to early 
                                                 
24 A system whereby the local people could work without pay during the colonial era especially in 
coffee and tobacco estates  
 
 
 
 
 127 
 
1990s that coincided with the ushering in of the multi-party system of 
government.  
 
Apparently, during the political transformation there was a shift from subsistence 
to cash economy. Hickling as quoted by Kalk et al. (1979) notes that the 
commercialisation of the Lake Chilwa fisheries commenced in 1950s. This 
replaced the barter trade (fish for cloth or guns) that the natives and the 
Portuguese practised during the slave trade era in the area before the coming in of 
the British missionaries (Vaughan, 1982).  
 
The fisheries management regimes have also been characterised by changes in 
the policy framework with the Natural Resource Ordinance developed in 1949 
and subsequent revisions of the policy made in 1973 and 1997 (Njaya, 2007). 
Apart from the fisheries policy and legislative changes, other relevant policies 
include forestry, water, agriculture, environment and wildlife (Annex 11). All 
these changes including formulation of policies and legislative frameworks based 
on sectors like fisheries, land, forestry, water and wildlife (legal pluralism) have 
had influence on the fisheries resource utilisation with socio-economic and 
political changes influencing policy reforms. The co-management regime in the 
multi-party era faces several problems in understanding roles of the stakeholders, 
responsible fisheries management in a transparent and accountable manner with a 
broader participatory process of the resource users, and limited mechanisms to 
address conflicts.    
 
The evolved management system changes on Lake Chilwa include traditional 
fisheries management, centralised fisheries management and co-management. 
The changes occurred mainly due to the influence of colonialism around mid 
1800s, economic shifts from subsistence to commercial economy in the 1970s 
and climatic change. Figure 18 illustrates the management regime changes.  
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Figure 18: Evolution of fisheries governance types on Lake Chilwa from pre-
colonial era to independent and multiparty democratic era 
Adapted from Njaya (2002) 
 
Figure 19 shows the timeline of events that led to the introduction of co-
management in Lake Chilwa. The drought that occurred between 1990 and 1994 
influenced partnership between river-based traditional leaders and DoF to 
conserve remnant fish stocks in lagoons and rivers that flow into Lake Chilwa.  
1. Traditional Fisheries Management 
(before 1946) 
• Pre-colonial era 
• Abundant fish stocks, low population, 
subsistence economy 
• Traditional leaders had authority to 
control 
• Effort control: seining in turns  
• Beach ownership by local leaders and 
some people  
2. Centralized Fisheries 
Management (1946-1995) 
• Colonial/independent era 
• State controlled resources 
• Biological control 
• Licensing for revenue 
• Lake dries up 
3. Co-management with Riverine 
Committees (1995) 
• Malawian and Mozambican river-based 
local leaders create a joint programme 
on protection of remnant stocks 
• No fishing in lake due to recession 
• Ban on seining and poisoning in 
water pools along rivers, lagoon and 
river mouths 
• River-based local leaders enforce 
rules  
Lake 
dries 
up 
4. Co-management I with Traditional 
Authorities (1996-2005) 
• Recovery of fishery achieved 
• Partnership: local leaders (lake) and 
government – river-based leaders sidelined 
• BVCs (gillnet and fish trap and long line 
fishers) under control of local leaders 
• Ban on nkacha, stay on zimbowera and 
introduce a 6-month closed season 
• Joint enforcement patrols and fine illegal 
fishers, conduct meetings and workshops 
5. Co-management II with seine 
fishers (from 2005) 
• Catches decline, number of fishers 
increase, in-migrants introduce 
destructive fishing methods 
• Collective action: Pressure groups 
(Matemba seine fishers) are formed 
• FD and seine fishers associations 
are in partnership, local leaders are 
sidelined 
• Informal ban on use of gauze wire, 
Mululu fishing method, nkacha, 
use of paddles and fishing on open 
waters (where fish is believed to 
breed) 
Involvement 
of seine 
fishers 
Centralised 
fisheries 
management 
 
 
 
 
 129 
 
Year     Event      Responsibility 
 
 
1990-94   Low lake levels due to drought 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Timeline of events that led to establishment of co-management  
Source: Focus Group Discussion at Ntila and interviews in October 2004 
1995 
Suspension of fishing in rivers/lagoon 
1995 
Development of a 
management plan and 
Ramsar site declaration 
1995-96 Complete drying up of Lake Chilwa 
Collapsed fish stocks 
Refilling of Lake Chilwa 
Repopulation of fish species 
Formation of river-based committees 
1990-94 Low lake levels due to drought 
1996 
1996/97 
1996-99 
Formation of Beach Village Committees 
Formation of Lake Chilwa Association 
composed of Traditional Leaders 
Capacity enhancement: training (group 
dynamics and business management) 
identity cards, patrol boats, study tours 
1996/97 
1999 
1997-
2000 
1995 
2001-06 
• Increase of nkacha in-migrants 
• Decline in fish catches 
• Collective action: formation of resident seine 
association resist new fishing technologies 
Climatic change 
 
Local leaders and DoF
 
DoF, Parks and 
Wildlife and 
University of Malawi 
Natural causes and 
compliance  
 
DoF, GTZ, Local 
leaders and DoF 
DoF, GTZ, World 
Bank, COMPASS, 
MRFC, DANIDA 
Good catches, in-
migrant seine fishers, 
resident seine fishers 
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6.1.1.1 Traditional fisheries management system before 1900 (pre-colonial era) 
It is still unclear whether the past traditional form of managing natural resources 
by Traditional Authorities25 had any specific management strategies. Donda 
(1997) asserts that during the pre-colonial era demand for fish was lower 
probably due to less population than at present. Dissi & Njaya (1995) indicated 
that chiefs were in control of assigning landing beaches to fishers on Lake 
Chiuta, which could indirectly imply regulating effort. However, it is uncommon 
for small-scale fishers to experience restricted access to the fishing areas as long 
as his conduct is acceptable. It was rather during the colonial period when chiefs 
had a mandate to control access. This was to demonstrate their powers and 
authority. The chiefs had powers to collect licenses as Chirwa (1996:364) states:  
With the introduction of Indirect Rule and the establishment of Native Authority treasuries in 
1933, chiefs in the lakeshore districts were empowered to collect fees on canoes made in their 
areas. The Forest Ordinance (Forest Rules GN. 12/32) forbade the cutting of trees for canoes 
without payment of a royalty to the chief in whose area the tree was cut. Quotas were imposed 
on trees to be cut for canoes. 
 
This implies that chiefs could have powers to limit access.  However, it is 
debatable whether the revenue collected was for managing the fisheries resources 
or merely for government revenue, as has been the case at present.   
 
In the traditional fisheries management system the landing beaches had 
chairpersons appointed by the local chiefs assigned to draw up a timetable for 
seining operations. The beach chairpersons still exist in African countries for 
example Uganda (Republic of Uganda, 2003). The local chiefs have mandate by 
virtue of their authority to control use of their beaches. The chiefs are responsible 
for settling social conflicts, which arise due to theft of fishing gear or land 
encroachment.  
 
                                                 
25 The term “traditional authorities” include different local institutions. They are mainly non-
elected chiefs holding offices based on their ethnic groups (Wilson et al. 2005). 
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However, there have been some incentives locally know as mawe26 or cha-kwa-
mfumu for the chiefs to be engaged in the control of the beaches. Currently, many 
fishers in Malawi still give tribute mawe or cha-kwa-mfumu to their chiefs, as a 
way of respect (Hara, 2001). The change of authority from the traditional leaders 
to other systems especially, co-management, has brought about conflicts in some 
cases between the local level institutions and the local leaders (Njaya et al., 
1999). The traditionally grounded mawe has been a controversial practice in fish 
resource management as some scholars consider it a recipe for corruption where 
some chiefs allow the illegal fishers to operate in their areas with the aim of 
obtaining more tribute on a regular basis (Njaya et al., 2006).  
 
On Lake Chilwa, the local fishers had rules, agreements and norms that they 
enforced at household or village level as shown in Table 19. One chief stated, 
“Although the biological or socio-economic rationale for such rules remains 
unclear, what is important is the socially bound pressure that influenced 
compliance to the rules”.  
 
Table 19: Norms, regulations and agreements in the traditional management 
system indicating socio-economic rationale for each regulation 
Rule/norm Socio-economic rationale 
Seining in turns (according to To ensure equity on the access to the fishing grounds 
Large meshes (nets made of 
fibrous plant material) and 
large spaced traps 
Large size fish was culturally accepted for consumption and 
for higher price  
Adapted from van Zwieten & Njaya (2003) 
 
                                                 
26 Mawe, as locally called on Lake Malombe and cha-kwa-mfumu on Lake Chilwa, is a 
predetermined amount of fish mostly well selected fish - big in size if it is tilapia or a tin for the 
smaller fish species given to the local leader by the fishers as a way of respect for using the beach.  
In agricultural terms, Vaughan (1982) defines mawe or cha-kwa-mfumu as tribute the local leaders 
(Nyanja and Yao) extracted from their subjects.  
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During that time, population was smaller than at present and fishing was mainly 
for subsistence use. The main gear types used were fish traps and gill nets made 
of fibrous materials (chopwa). 
6.1.1.2  Centralised system (1946-1995)  
The colonial government assumed responsibility to ensure efficiency in resource 
exploitation and utilisation and hence formulated regulations as shown in Table 
20. While the government introduced licensing of beach seines and gillnets on 
Lake Chilwa in 1960s (Ratcliffe, 1971), the exploitation of the fishery resources 
remained largely unregulated. The main problem is that the licensing system is 
considered a revenue generation scheme and not as a management. The capacity 
of the Department of Fisheries in enforcing fisheries regulations became 
constrained due to limited budgetary provisions. 
Table 20: Regulations in the centralised system (pre-1995 recession) indicating 
socio-economic rationale for each regulation 
Rule Socio-economic rationale 
Minimum size of tilapia was set at 100 mm 
 
To fetch a higher price 
Headline length for Matemba seines should 
not exceed 300  m 
 
Equitable distribution of benefits 
Minimum mesh size for gill nets was set at 
2¾ inches (69 mm) 
 
Larger fish fetches higher market prices 
Licensing of seines and gill nets Revenue for the government 
 
 
Trawlers to pay commercial licence fees Generate revenue for the government 
Adapted from van Zwieten & Njaya (2003) 
6.1.1.3 Co-management arrangement (post 1995 recession) 
The Lake Chilwa co-management was a response to a crisis of lake recession 
after a three-year drought period (1992-1994). As was the case in 1968 when a 
similar recession occurred, a strategy was necessary to facilitate recovery of the 
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collapsed fishery. The first strategy involved conducting artificial restocking by 
breeding O. shiranus chilwae in ponds at Domasi and then releasing the fish into 
the lake. However, this could be more expensive due to required resources such 
as funds, human and technical skills. Furthermore, it was practically difficult to 
breed Matemba (B. paludinosus) in ponds for restocking in the lake, hence 
natural restocking during the 1995 recession was the only suitable strategy.  
 
The traditional leaders and DoF suggested that for a successful natural restocking 
programme, there was a need to conserve all fish stocks in Mpoto lagoon and 
reservoirs along the influent rivers that include Domasi, Likangala, Thondwe, 
Phalombe, and Sombani in Malawi, and Mnembo and Chimazi in Mozambique. 
The aim was to have the conserved fish stocks repopulate the lake after refilling. 
The households had a similar idea, as that was what they had been doing during 
the past recessions. A similar programme took place in 1968.  
 
Therefore, a collective action with involvement of the river-based households in 
this recovery management strategy was important, as it would be easier to 
enforce regulations. The local leaders and DoF organised meetings in several 
villages located along the major influent rivers seeking to work out an effective 
partnership for enforcement of rules, which they formulated and publicised on 
radio and newspapers. The rules were as follows: 
(a) Ban on the use of poisonous plants (katupe) for fishing in rivers flowing into 
Lake Chilwa.  
(b) Ban on seining operations in all influent rivers and lagoon. 
(c) Ban on the use of seines from 1996 to 1997. 
 
Upon refilling of the lake in 1996, DoF decided to seize the opportunity for 
introduction and expansion of the co-management framework with all the lake-
based fishing communities. A meeting was organised at Chilema in 1996 with the 
lake-based traditional chiefs and excluded the river-based traditional leaders. The 
meeting reviewed the regulations as shown in Table 21 with the introduction of a 
closed season and transfer letters as new rules. They agreed to review some 
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regulations while maintaining the licensing and mesh size restrictions regulations 
formulated under the centralised management.  
 
Table 21: Regulations in the co-management arrangement indicating socio-
economic rationale for each regulation  
Rule/norm Social-economic rationale 
Lake Chilwa and Mpoto lagoon should 
be closed from 1 December to 1 April  
 
To enable fishers to work on their farms 
Riverine fishing is closed from May to 
September 
 
To protect breeding Matemba when swimming 
upstream so that fishers catch them abundantly and 
hence high income when upon returning to the lake 
 
Nkacha is a prohibited gear To avoid competition with the existing beach 
seines  
 
All gillnets and seines should be licensed 
 
Revenue for government 
Fishing should be done during the day 
time only 
 
For easy inspection of gears 
Any thief or non-compliant fisherman 
should be evicted 
 
Ensure security of fishery products and compliance 
to regulations 
Every fishermen should be registered 
with a BVC and pay a fishing licence 
 
Revenue for the government and community 
(proposal) 
 
All fish traders should not market their 
fish within the waters 
To ensure that fish landed is checked by BVCs 
Adapted from van Zwieten & Njaya (2003) 
 
Towards the end of 1996, the DoF sensitized the households on the need to form 
BVSCs. The fishers were mostly those operating fish traps, gillnet and long line 
became members into 48 BVCs through elections. In the following year, 1997, 
six TAs and four Group Village Heads (GVHs) around the lake formed the Lake 
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Chilwa Fisheries Management Association. The association had no elected fisher 
to represent the interests of fishing households. The co-management arrangement 
was criticised since no representative from the fishing community was included 
in the association (Lowore & Lowore, 1999; Njaya et al., 2002). This implied that 
the reviewed rules were not in the interests of the fishers but for the benefit of the 
association, especially for charging penalties in the form of fines imposed on 
illegal fishers. Additionally, the exclusion of seine fishers in the BVSCs meant 
that there was limited participation of other user groups in the co-management. 
However, through meetings conducted during the United States International 
Development Agency (USAID) funded programme, many local seine fishers 
joined the co-management as partners through their own association and did not 
want to recognise the existing one composed of the chiefs.  
 
After recovery of the fishery in 1998, there was an influx of in-migrant Nkacha 
fishers from Lake Malombe. In response to the migration, the local fishers 
formed a pressure group to regulate fishing practices of the migrant Nkacha 
fishers as shown in the timeline of events (Figure 19). The local seine fishers are 
now supporting the BVSCs and are in the process of formulating a new 
regulation to ban use of paddles (malemu) to prevent Nkacha fishers from 
accessing offshore fisheries resources. They also demand a change on the closed 
season reducing it from six to four months.  
 
The Lake Chilwa seine fisher involvement has shifted the form of co-
management partnership from TA-DoF to seine fisher-DoF. As a result, the 
Matemba seine fishers have now become actively involved in the BVCs. This 
clearly shows that co-management is dynamic (Njaya, 2007) and local fishers 
tend to fight for a cause whenever there is a tangible reason or problem. This is 
where the inherent ability to protect local property rights is also in practice within 
the lake. One key informant (crewmember) from Machinga district indicated: 
People from Zomba chased us, and yet the lake is one. They took away our boats and gears 
telling us to leave Kachulu area because it belonged to them. When we approached local 
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leaders from the area, they did not pay any attention to us, indicating that we should indeed 
get away from their fishing places. 
 
6.2 Assessment of Lake Chilwa co-management  
6.2.1 Support from key co-management partners 
6.2.1.1 Support by Village Heads 
In this study, traditional leaders refer to the Village Heads (VHs) that are closer 
to the fishing or landing areas and Traditional Authorities that are usually far 
away from the lake but their influence on the co-management activities is 
significant. The respondents observed that the VHs provide support to the 
BVSCs. A few fishers at Mposa indicated that: 
Our Village Head is engaged in BVSC activities mainly when new fishers come here. He 
makes sure that we register the in-migrant fishers and then pay something to our TA who 
stays far away from here. The TA also supports the BVSCs by presiding over cases of illegal 
fishers caught fishing during closed seasons. 
 
The main reason is that the area is accessible to fisheries extension agents. 
Consequently, meetings between the fisheries extension agents and the fishers are 
more frequent than in the other southern fishing zone. The trend is similar even in 
respect of DoF support. Additionally, the village head and TA are both involved 
in the BVSCs due to money they get from illegal fishers as a seine fisher 
indicated: 
It is tough to fish here without giving a cha-kwa-mfumu [catch portions] or money to the 
village head that also sends some to his TA. This is unlike in other areas where village heads 
do not see what BVSCs are doing. Of course, you need to give something in form of money 
to a village head but once you do that, you can stay as long as you can. However, here you 
need to pay money or give cha-kwa-mfumu on a regular basis.   
 
6.2.1.2 Support by Traditional Authorities 
Respondents in the southern and eastern parts indicated that BVSCs lacked 
support from the Traditional Authorities. In comparison, the respondents reported 
that TAs in the western and northern Lake Chilwa supported their BVSCs. The 
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TAs supporting the BVSCs usually ask their VHs to “confiscate any seine 
operated in the rivers to protect remnant fish stocks for repopulation of the lake 
after recovery”, as a few informants at Mposa explained.  
 
Lowore and Lowore (1999) and Njaya et al. 2002 criticize the partnership of TAs 
and DoF as it seems fishers become observers. The perceived TA support takes 
the form of charging fines on illegal fishers, although the leaders often fail to 
account for the money. As one BVSC member at Kachulu indicated:  
Our chiefs are interested in money and not fisheries management. Imagine any offender is 
told to pay over K20,000 as a fine and for a particular closed season 40 illegal seines can be 
confiscated which translates into a lot of money. The problem is that we do not know how 
much the TAs collect and for what purpose they use the money. Moreover, it is, we [BVSCs] 
that do much work and yet we do not get any share from the money collected. 
 
The sentiments show that fishers do not appreciate the role of the traditional 
authorities. They rather support their village heads’ role. Furthermore, it appears 
co-management places emphasis on enforcement during closed seasons. The co-
management partners do not perform other duties, for example, counting the 
number of fishers on beaches to maintain registers, inspecting boats and gears, 
licensing and developing infrastructure like toilets.  
 
Another point is that active participation of the traditional leaders depends on 
several factors. First, the traditional leader should have an interest in fisheries 
management, as evidenced by the river-based ones during recession periods.  
Second, location of the traditional leaders matters. The traditional leaders that are 
more active are those that are close to extension services. The DoF extension 
agents always encourage the traditional leaders to support the BVSCs. Where the 
traditional leaders have active beaches, for example Mposa, they tend to focus 
much on revenue generation and not fisheries management. 
 
6.2.1.3 Support by District Assemblies and Non-governmental Organisations 
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The District Assemblies have never provided any direct substantial support to the 
BVCs on Lake Chilwa. The district authorities attend meetings of BVCs upon 
invitation from the DoF. Likewise, for the non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) there are very few that have provided support to BVCs. A group of 
fishers at Chisi Island noted: 
Since co-management started, we have never seen any district authority from our assembly 
coming here to talk about fisheries management. We see our District Commissioner 
sometimes presiding over meetings called by Department of Fisheries. The District 
Commissioner has never supported us in terms of by-law formulation or enforcement. On 
NGOs, we are just familiar with the ones involved in bird hunting but not directly with our 
work. 
 
The above explanation shows that not many DAs and NGOs show interest in 
fisheries management. The reasons could be due to less publicity about the 
importance of fisheries resources in their districts or that their priority areas are 
on infrastructure related projects.    
6.2.2 Participation in co-management activities 
Assessment of participation centred on attending meetings and patrolling the 
lake. Participation of the respondents in attending BVC meetings was generally 
low in all the fishing zones although the floodplain recorded highest with a mean 
perception level of 3.27 (Table 22). The least was the southern part where water 
level is relatively stable with depth of over 2m. The northern floodplain area is 
where BVCs are actively involved in patrolling the lake with support of their 
village heads. It is during the planning of the patrolling programmes that the 
BVCs meet.  
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Table 22: Perception levels for respondents (N=166) with missing cases on the 
participation in BVC activities. On the involvement in BVC formation N=92 with 
missing cases = 74 (1 skipped and 73 not familiar with BVCs). On patrolling, 
N=93 and missing data=73 (1 skipped and 72 not familiar with BVCs) while on 
attendance of BVC meetings, N=88 and missing data= 78 (6 skipped cases, and 
72 not familiar with BVCs) by fishing zone in the co-management attitude 
survey.  
Question Fishing Zone N Mean of 
perception 
level 
Sig. 
       
1. Were you involved in the formation of   North (<1.5m) 26 3.27 0.04** 
the BVC? Centre (1.5-2m) 23 2.04  
  South (>2m) 43 2.21  
  Total 92 2.47  
2. How often do you patrol the lake?  North (<1.5m) 26 3.12 0.07 
 Centre (1.5-2m) 23 2.61  
  South (>2m) 43 2.05  
  Total 92 2.49  
3. How often do you attend BVC meetings? North (<1.5m) 22 4.27 0. 16 
 Centre (1.5-2m) 22 3.14  
  South (>2m) 44 3.70  
  Total 88 3.70  
**Means are statistically different (p=0.04)  
Source: Co-management survey (2003) 
 
During follow-up meetings with BVCs, the respondents indicated that the 
authorities (DoF and TAs) ask them to attend sensitisation meetings about any 
new management measures and not during formulation of such measures. One 
committee member on Chisi Island explained: 
The authorities [TAs and DoF] tell us to attend meetings to inform us about new regulations 
after they review the old ones without consulting us. For example, they are telling us to stop 
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fishing while residing in zimbowera [temporary shelters constructed in open waters] and yet 
this has been our traditional way of fishing. We just get instructions to comply with what they 
agree to do.   
 
This means that the co-management also lacks transparency since the BVCs are 
excluded from decision-making processes as they just receive instructions taken 
elsewhere. It would be appropriate to involve the BVCs since they represent the 
interests of the fishers.  Similar results emerged on how frequent the respondents 
participate in patrolling the lake. Generally, patrolling of the lake was rare. 
However, the same northern part of the lake with the largest floodplain scored 
highest with mean perception level of 3.12 and the deepest part with over 2m was 
the lowest. The deepest area is remote where enforcement team of DoF rarely 
goes to patrol with BVCs unlike the floodplain area where it is easily accessible 
by DoF staff. 
 
In contrast, participation of respondents in BVC meetings was higher than in 
formation of the committees and patrolling the lake. Similarly, the floodplain area 
scored highest with a mean of 4.27. This fishing zone has fishers also taking part 
in patrolling and being involved in the BVC formation as compared to the other 
zones. Based on the results, I can conclude the strength of co-management 
arrangement in Lake Chilwa differs. The northern floodplain area with more in-
migrant fishers and hence more conflicts is stronger than in the other two fishing 
zones, that of the centre and the south.  
6.2.3 Accountability 
I assessed accountability of the BVCs by looking at how they are elected and to 
whom they submit their reports. This was to determine whether they were 
accountable to their fishers (downward accountability) or to their local leaders, 
DoF and district assembly (upward accountability). Majority of the respondents 
(about 85%) indicated that the whole community elects their BVCs (Figure 20). 
DoF and local leaders play a role in electing members into BVCs, which weakens 
accountability of the fisher committees to their represented fishers. In this 
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context, they report to the traditional leaders, DoF, not representing views and 
interests of the fishers.  
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Figure 20: Graph presents the process of electing members into the Beach Village 
Sub-Committees with N=166. Valid cases were 93 and 73 were missing cases 
(one respondent did not know while 72 were not familiar with BVSCs).  
Source: Co-management survey (2003) 
 
Despite the fact that majority of the respondents indicated that the BVCs were 
elected openly elected by the community, the whole process lacked transparency 
as decision on who to appoint came from either their chiefs or DoF as fishers at 
Chisi and Chinguma and a fisheries assistant noted: 
In some areas, the village heads or chiefs have appointed their relatives to become BVSC 
members so that it becomes easier to share proceeds from confiscated nets. For example, on 
the Lake Chilwa east, Village Head Namalele appointed his wife to be treasurer of the BVSC 
there with an aim of sharing money that they got from in-migrant fishers as fees.  
6.2.4 Transparency 
On the transparency of co-management, questions included the following: 
(i) Do co-management partners make decisions publicly? 
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(ii) Are meetings open? 
(iii)Do authorities report publicly on the use of funds? 
 
On decisions-making processes, majority of the respondents indicated that they 
do not know how both the DoF and TAs made decisions regarding formulation of 
management measures. For example, groups of seine fishers at Mposa and 
Swang’oma beaches stated: 
The authorities do not ask about our views regarding any new management measures for 
Lake Chilwa. For example, when Department of Fisheries and TAs met at Chilema in 1996, 
they just told us to stop seining in the river mouths without any explanation. To us this was 
cruel because at that time we were dependent on such fishing activities to get money for food 
for our families.   
 
Despite the co-management arrangement, DoF still appears dominant in decision-
making processes. The local leaders are also more dominant in making decisions 
than the BVCs who just get instructions from DoF and TAs. In this respect, there 
is limited transparency in terms of decision-making processes. 
 
Majority of BVC members indicated that meetings that aim to formulate 
management measures were not open. They stated:  
The Department of Fisheries and TAs agree on formulating new fishing rules without asking 
us the fishers what we want. There are rules that apply during recession period and others 
after recession. For example, we cannot have the closed season regulation now, which is six 
months. During the 1995/96 recession that was applicable but not now. Therefore, if we were 
to attend such meetings we could advise them on the most appropriate rules.  
 
The above sentiments show that the Lake Chilwa co-management is still 
centralised at the lower level. The fact that DoF and TAs actively formulate new 
fishing rules without involvement of the resource users, explains why this study 
can characterise the co-management arrangement to be of limited transparency.   
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In addition, TAs and DoF collect penalty fines especially from the fishers caught 
during closed season. For example, one fisheries extension officer stationed at 
Kachulu indicated that:  
…from 1998 to 2002, the TAs could demand over K20,000 from every confiscated net. 
Therefore, with nets ranging from 40 to 60 the TAs could accumulate over K100,000. The 
fishing community and we as BVSCs do not have any information as to how the TAs spent 
the money.  
 
This means that transparency on the use of funds was lacking in the co-
management. Additionally, an ‘elite capture’ had characterised the centralised co-
management at the lower levels (TA level), which was to the advantage of the 
TAs and not the fishers.      
6.2.5 Impact of the work of BVSCs on fish stock levels  
I assessed the impact of co-management institutions on the resource status by 
examining responses to the questions outlined in Annex 2 (Section 8) of the co-
management attitude survey. The questions are as follows:  
(a) Do you think there is more fish now because the BVSC has been 
working? 
(b) Do you think the village is better off because of the BVSC? 
(c) How often do you attend BVSC meetings 
 
In the co-management attitude survey, the perception levels varied (Table 23). 
Generally, perception levels on the roles of BVSCs towards fish stock status in 
Lake Chilwa were low with a perception mean level of 2.22. The main reason is 
that it is easier for the Department of Fisheries extension unit to access these 
areas. They are closer to district fisheries offices and have passable road networks 
unlike on the southern, eastern and northern areas. In addition, the western part 
has had prominent meetings especially during closed seasons with attendance of 
politicians including ministers. The local leaders in that area are also able to limit 
in-migrant Nkacha fishers from Lake Malombe.  
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Table 23: Perception levels of respondents with N=166 on the impact of the 
BVSCs on fish stock levels and living standards of the households. On having 
more fish due to the work of BVSCs, the valid N=96 with missing values of 70 (1 
skipped and 69 not familiar with BVSCs). ANOVA showed significant 
differences on the perception on more fish due to the work of the BVSCs, 
F(2,93)=22.61, p<0.05 by fishing zone. There was a range of 1-3 on the 6-step 
perception ladder. On the improvement of the living standards of the households 
in their village due to the BVSCs, valid N=96 with missing values of 70 
indicating lack of BVSCs in their villages and 2 being skipped ones. ANOVA 
showed significant differences on the perception on village better or worse off for 
the past years F(2,94)=4.311, p<0.05 by fishing zone. There was a range from 1-
6 on the 6-step perception ladder 
Question Fishing Zone N Mean 
perception 
level 
Sig. 
         
1. Do you think there is more fish in the lake   North 26 2.19 0.00** 
due to the work of the BVSC? Centre (1.5-2m) 27 2.70  
  South (>2m) 43 1.93  
  Total 96 2.22  
2. Do you think the village is better or worse  North (<1.5m) 26 5.12 0.07** 
off than five years ago? Centre (1.5-2m) 27 5.63  
  South (>2m) 44 4.89  
  Total 97 5.15  
Source: Co-management survey (2003) 
 
However, the respondents perceived that their villages were better off due to the 
work of the BVSCs with a mean score of 5.15 (Table 23). The results show that 
the villages are better of due to the BVSCs mostly because the respondent 
thought that the lake fishery recovered after the co-management arrangement, as 
one fisher at Mposa noted: 
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The Lake Chilwa BVSCs assisted government to have the fishery recovered because of their 
involvement in enforcement of the regulations on closed season and nkacha ban. This started 
when the lake dried up in 1995 but also when it receded in 1968 although we did not have 
BVCs that time.  
 
The perception levels on fish abundance in the lake due to the work of BVSCs, 
was low for the whole lake (Table 23). The main reason given was that there was 
an increase in nkacha seine fishers from Lake Malombe from 2000, which 
resulted in low catches since nkacha was operating in both shallow and open 
waters. The local fishers indicated that the increased nkacha seines in the shallow 
lake was a threat to breeding Matemba and Makumba fish and could eventually 
lead to overfishing. During one of the focus group discussions at Mchenga beach, 
the local fishers stated: 
Catches were good from 1997 when fishing resumed on this lake after the recession. It was 
until this year, 2003, that we have had low catches because our colleagues from Lake 
Malombe have dominated the whole lake. They operate in rivers, flood plain areas and in the 
open waters where we, the locals, regard as sanctuary areas. 
 
Another reason is that the TAs took advantage of the co-management for 
financial gain. A BVSC on the northern side explained:  
Our traditional leaders like this [co-management] programme not necessarily for managing 
fisheries resources but because they get money and fish catch portions from the in-migrant 
fishers from Lake Malombe. They take this programme as one way of generating their 
income. 
 
This assertion implies that the in-migrant fishers are an ‘elite capture’ of the Lake 
Chilwa co-management. It is financially rewarding the local leaders in one way 
or another because they get money upon arrival of any fisher on their beaches. 
Therefore, incentives for the local leaders co-management seems focused more 
on material and financial gain than on resource management. Previous studies on 
the qualitative assessment of co-management on the lakes (Njaya et al., 1999; 
Hara et al., 1999; Donda et al., 1999) support these results. Key reasons given 
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were that the forms of incentives for TAs in the co-management centred more on 
gaining fish catch portions or money rather than on resource management.  
 
6.3 The emerging seine fisher-DoF co-management  
There is interest especially among the local seine fishers that operate Matemba 
seines to have the rules reviewed. They claim that the current rules are not for 
resource management since they promote removal of vegetation. In 2006, the 
resident fishers proposed the following rules, which are locally in force. 
 
(a) Gear type restrictions 
The local fishers are against use of the new gear types. During interviews at 
Mposa a group of local fishers indicated: “gauze wire, mosquito nets and Nkacha 
seines are gear types that are non-selective because of their fine meshes”. The 
fine meshed gear types operate in both shallow and deeper waters targeting 
various fish species especially Matemba. Since they are non-selective, the local 
fishers consider them destructive to the habitat and fish stocks as supported by 
biologists (Banda & Hara, 1995).  
 
(b) Fishing method restrictions 
The local fishers propose a ban on Usodzi wa Mululu, which involves clearing 
aquatic vegetation around the fishing area and use of a seine net. Fishers cast the 
seine around a given area and then remove all the aquatic vegetation inside to 
expose the target fish for easy catch. One key informant at Swang’oma claimed: 
“the fishing technology is disastrous since it removes vegetation that is necessary 
for food and provision of hiding places for the fish”.  
 
(c) Fishing techniques restrictions 
The local fishers traditionally use bamboo poles for paddling their dugout canoes 
or planked boats. The fishers stated that with use of the bamboo poles, they 
cannot go to open waters for distant fishing, but they can exploit the open water 
fisheries resources only if they use paddles. They are interested in exploiting fish 
stocks located in shore based resources and not those in the open waters. The 
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fishers indicate that the traditional restriction of fishing in open waters aims to 
conserve such stocks, as one TA at Chisi Island explained: 
We do not encourage fishers to fish in open waters. We want to conserve such stocks. You 
need to know that the open water stocks migrate into marshy areas for breeding or feeding. 
Therefore, we target such inshore stocks when fishing. We have always been against the 
promotion of open water fishing by the Department of Fisheries since the 1970s. We could 
not say anything against the idea of open water fishing by introducing large plank boats with 
engines since we were in the one-party rule. Now with our democracy we say, no to open 
water fishing to avoid overfishing. Therefore, we are trying our best to formulate a rule that 
will restrict their movements to access the open water stocks. 
 
Therefore, the fishers proposed a ban on the use of paddles (malemu) when going 
out to fish but use bamboo poles (miponda) to propel the dugout canoes and boats 
on water. The Lake Malombe migrant fishers always use paddles with their 
planked boats when accessing distant fish resources, in which case this rule 
targets them. 
 
Apart from prohibiting use of Nkacha, gauze wire and Usodzi wa Mululu, which 
promote removal of vegetation, it can be argued that the other rules banning use 
of paddles are just restricting access by targeting the in-migrants Nkacha fishers. 
The local fishers fear that the removal of vegetation may threaten fish stock 
levels and experience the same situation as that on Lake Malombe. Such an 
argument is however in contrast with that by other biologists, for instance, Furse 
et al. (1979) who observed that Lake Chilwa has a high regenerative capacity and 
hence overfishing can take place.   
 
Based on the issues outlined above, there appears to be another form of 
partnership evolving between the DoF and the seine net association. The seine net 
association is mainly composed of local Matemba seine owners maily from the 
Lake Chilwa area excluding the Nkacha seine owners mostly from Lake 
Malombe. The same scenario led to introduction of Lake Chiuta co-management 
(Njaya, 1998). The emerging partnership can provide an opportunity for an 
effective form of co-management implemented in situations where either a crisis 
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or conflicts occur. In this context, co-management becomes a strategy for 
addressing conflicts.  
 
However, there can be threats based on an ‘elite capture’ (Béné & Neiland (2005) 
and ‘a fox in a hen’s pen’ phenomena Jentoft (1993). With the inclusion of the 
most powerful seine fishers in the BVCs, their participation contribute to a strong 
co-management process, however, if not properly planned and implemented there 
could be a violation of rules including mesh size, closed seasons and licensing of 
gears. It can be difficult to regulate the seine fishers who could be members or 
relatives of the BVSC members. 
 
6.4 Lake Chilwa co-management type 
Currently, Lake Chilwa co-management ranges from instructive to consultative 
type depending on the fishing zone. In 1996, the co-management was largely 
consultative. It was the time when the lake receded. Both DoF and fishers were 
formulating strategies to recover the fishery. The river-based Village Heads and 
fishers actively participated in enforcing the fishing ban in river mouths and 
lagoons. However, when the Village Heads together with TAs from the lake-
based area joined the co-management they became more influential in decision-
making to the extent of abandoning the river-based groups and not listening to the 
lake-based BVCs and VHs. One BVSC chair at Ntila beach explained: 
As soon as our TA became involved in the fish resource management programme, we knew 
that our roles were over. There was no way we could ask him [TA] about the regulations let 
alone money they get from confiscated nets. We became passive in our activities and left 
them to work with the government [DoF]. There was a time when we thought we could 
change the closed season period from six months to three, but there was no way we could 
make our views known to government because of the TA. 
 
Thereafter, the co-management shifted to the instructive side in 1998 when the 
government and local leaders jointly drew up strategies for recovery of the 
fishery in 1995/96. It was a top-down co-management regime. The participation 
of the TAs was for their benefit we can describe that as an ‘elite capture’. The 
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most powerful and authoritative class of people became partners leaving out the 
fishers who had interest in the management of the resource. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Governance of Lake Chilwa fisheries resources has undergone several changes 
mainly influenced by socio-political and economic issues. In the past (before 
colonialism), management was not an issue because fish was plentiful and people 
caught fish for consumption only. With the commercialisation of the economy 
and changes in the political landscape, management became an issue because 
people wanted to catch more fish for sale and fishers from other water bodies 
came to fish in Lake Chilwa. The demand for fish was higher because of the 
growing Zomba town and the establishment of tea and tobacco estates in 
Mulanje/Thyolo and Zomba, respectively, which required plenty of fish to feed 
the workers. More sophisticated and efficient methods of fishing were thus 
introduced onto the once naïve lake. The colonial government then assumed 
responsibility of managing the fishery with the aim of ensuring efficiency in 
resource exploitation and utilisation. This was a highly centralised system and 
traditional leaders who previously were custodians of the resources were engaged 
in correcting fees for the local government.  
 
The co-management is characterised by shifts in partnership. While the initial 
collective action aimed to conserve fisheries resources in lagoons and rivers, the 
DoF initiated the subsequent co-management arrangement, which had limited 
participation of the fishers especially the seine operators. The lake-based local 
leaders that worked in partnership with DoF during the recession replaced the 
river-based ones. Furthermore, the DoF did not conduct any situation analysis to 
assess how co-management could be designed taking into account the seasonal 
and periodic lake level fluctuations. The DoF adopted the initial earlier co-
management arrangement by recognising local leaders as partners and not the 
fishers.  
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The co-management regime lacks participation of seine fishers and hence seems 
to target them especially by formulating regulation on the closed season for seine 
fishery without their input. Moreover, the local leadership now views co-
management as means of generating money through the tributes that they receive 
from migrant seine fishers.  
 
Additionally by definition, a BVC is supposed to be composed of fishers, traders, 
processors and boat builders but this is not the case on Lake Chilwa and other 
lakes. Accountability is weak since certain local leaders and DoF technical 
officers have taken the lead in appointing BVC members. Despite the election of 
the sub-committee members by villagers, there is some influence from the local 
leaders and DoF technical officers. What this entails is that the members become 
accountable to those who appointed them and not to their fellow fishers, 
processors, traders and boat builders. In effect, there is upward accountability as 
opposed to downward accountability.  
 
Transparency is also lacking with most of the decisions made by the local leaders 
and DoF without the knowledge of the resource users. Despite these limitations, 
the local leaders play a major role in enforcing the regulations they formulated in 
1996 to facilitate recovery of Clarias gariepinus, Barbus paludinosus and 
Oreochromis species. The local leaders have formulated heavy fines for illegal 
fishing to minimise use of non-selective seines and mosquito nets during closed 
seasons. 
 
Generally, the fishing community does not recognise the role of the district 
assemblies despite the decentralisation rhetoric since the 1990s. The 
decentralisation process lacks commitment in its implementation. The 
government has not yet implemented the planned fisheries devolution programme 
with functions of extension licensing of small-scale gear types and enforcement. 
Additionally, capacity of the district assemblies in terms of appropriate skills in 
handling finances and resource management is weak (Hara 2008). Owing to the 
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constraints, the level of participation, accountability and transparency, which are 
mechanisms of good governance, is limited, as discussed in Chapter 8.   
 
In the flooded area the fishers operate seasonally mainly from January to April 
when the area is in flood and hence attract Matemba, Mlamba and Makumba fish. 
Following the abundant fish stocks, fishers operating various gear types migrate 
to the area and hence conflicts occur especially between gillnet and seine fishers 
and between resident and migrant fishers. The southern part is of relatively stable 
water levels. Migration of fishers is less frequent than in the north. BVCs located 
in the flooded area conduct meetings and patrol their fishing zone more 
frequently than the BVCs that are in the southern part.   
 
Based on the typology of co-management as shown in Box 2, currently, Lake 
Chilwa co-management ranges from instructive to consultative type depending on 
the fishing zone. In 1996, the co-management was largely consultative. Then it 
shifted to instructive in 1998 when the government and local leaders jointly drew 
up strategies for recovery of the fishery in 1995/96 with lake-based TAs in a top-
down manner. In this context, there is dynamism in terms of the type of co-
management. During recession, co-management is stronger because interest of 
the fishers in fish stock management measures higher than after the recession. 
What they show as of interest to them after the recession is just advancement of 
principles of management of the fisheries resources by ‘exclusion’ of the migrant 
seine fishers that land more catches and fish in areas where the local fishers also 
do. Conflicts emerge due to competition over fish prices, fishing areas, status or 
class (between resident and migrant; gear type and asset ownership), and 
ethnicity (although not explicitly identified but associated as presented in this 
Chapter and the previous two Chapters 5 and 6.  
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CHAPTER 7  
DISCUSSION 
 
In this Chapter, I discuss the study results and draw key issues on water level 
changes, migration, conflicts and co-management for formulation of appropriate 
management strategies for Lake Chilwa in relation to the conceptual framework 
(Figure 12). In particular, I describe the evolving pattern of fishing techniques in 
response to the variability of the ecosystem, and their effects on the households’ 
livelihoods. The chapter also examines discourses on whether it is possible to 
overfish Lake Chilwa. Finally, it discusses the roles of local leaders and 
communities, and magnitude and patterns of migrations.  
 
The research problem that I identified in this study relates to household and 
community responses to changes in water levels of Lake Chilwa both seasonal 
and periodic. The responses include migration of fishers, collective community 
actions and conflicts that arise mainly due to migration of fishers.  
 
7.1 Water level changes and changes in fishing technologies 
The human population changes in the Chilwa basin is due to either natural birth 
or in-migration of people from elsewhere including fishers from other lakes. For 
the recent past especially from 2000, the majority of fishers from Lake Malombe 
have tended to adopt a dual settlement pattern. They invest in fishing units 
operated on both Lakes Malombe and Chilwa. Sarch & Allison (2000) and Mvula 
(2002) argue that a co-management regime that aims to regulate fisher migration 
across lakes is not appropriate as it limits livelihood strategies of the migrants. 
Additionally, Jul-Larsen et al. (2003) state that in ecosystems that naturally 
fluctuate, horizontal intensification based on a simple increase in numbers of 
fishers may actually have little impact on the stock level in a long term.  
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These arguments appear not to consider impacts of new fishing technologies on 
habitat destruction, as they focus on the livelihoods of the migrant fishers and not 
the fishing methods and gear types they employ. The migrant fishers from Lake 
Malombe introduced new fishing methods and gear types that are destructive and 
hence not locally acceptable. While migration of fishers is generally acceptable, 
the locally binding rules should apply to the migrants. If it is seining operations, 
the Nkacha seines of the in-migrants should modify theirs to match with the 
Matemba seines allowed in the fishing area. With the new fishing methods that 
destroy aquatic vegetation, there are fears that these practices could result in a 
similar destruction of Lake Chilwa fisheries as they did in Lake Malombe.  
 
Despite the high regenerative capacity of the lake, the fishing households claim 
that over-fishing would still occur on the lake as observed on Lake Malombe 
(FAO, 1993; Banda & Hara, 1995; Donda, 2001; Hara, 2001; Hara et al., 2002). 
Biologists disregard the destructive side of the introduced fishing methods, which 
are a source of conflict between resident and migrant fishers. Furthermore, there 
is no policy related to migration of fishers. The complexity of the issue stems 
from the fact that biologists disregard local knowledge.  They observe that 
conventional management of Lake Chilwa is not suitable due to the high 
variability nature of the ecosystem (Sarch & Allison, 2000; Goulden, 2005). 
 
In response to the introduced destructive fishing methods, by 2004 the local 
fishers collectively took action by forming a pressure group, which was 
composed of Matemba seine fishers only. They established a partnership with the 
DoF to confiscate illegal nets and engage fishers caught using fishing methods 
believed to be destructive especially Usodzi wa Mululu, gauze wire and Nkacha; 
and proposing change of the closed season. In 2005, they formed an association 
composed of Matemba seine from Kachulu, Mposa and Swang’oma beaches with 
the specific aim of introducing measures to exclude Nkacha seine from Lake 
Chilwa. 
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However, Kalk et al. (1979) and GoM (1962) caution against use of under-
meshed gillnets. They believe that any fishing method that promotes removal of 
aquatic vegetation like Nkacha or Usodzi wa Mululu may threaten stock levels. 
Delaney et al. (2007) suggests that the reduced sizes of Barbus paludinosus in 
Mnembo River on the eastern side of Lake Chilwa might be due to overfishing. 
Knowing that Lake Malombe went through a similar situation where Nkacha 
operations promoted removal of aquatic vegetation which serves as hiding places 
for breeding and juvenile fish, resident Lake Chilwa fishers have expressed their 
concerns on the growing number of Nkacha in-migrants.  
 
Most of the conflicts identified in the study are associated with migrations, 
operational nature between static gillnets and active seine gear types and the role 
of local leaders that allow the in-migrants to operate in their areas. Although not 
explicit, other factors that have contributed to the conflicts include the 
competitive nature of the fishing businesses with the in-migrant Nkacha fishers 
landing more fish than the local fishers and the in-migrants accessing to farming 
land in the highly densely populated Lake Chilwa plain. The Lake Chiuta 
community experienced a similar problem between late 1980s and mid 1990s 
(Njaya, 2002).    
    
7.2 Migration of fishers 
The study results show that majority of the resident fishing households do not 
migrate from Lake Chilwa to other lakes. The study also specifically examined 
the form of migration (inter- or intra-lake migration), resource user groups by 
gear type and areas for policy formulation. Consequently, this specificity brings 
in different interpretations, which either agree or disagree with the hypothesis 
that high water level viability results in high migration of fishers. 
 
Insignificant numbers of the Lake Chilwa fishers are involved in inter-lake 
migration. A few fishers migrate to other lakes either seasonally or periodically 
during recession times. Limitations are largely due to fishing techniques. Their 
fishing techniques employing traditional fish traps, gillnets and Matemba seines 
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are suitable to their shallow ecosystem. The households’ ability to adapt to 
fishing and farming gives them an opportunity to change their livelihood 
strategies without necessarily moving to other water bodies in case of drought 
and recessions. This shows that variable water level ecosystems trigger fisher 
migrations within the context of inter-lake migration involving the Lake Chilwa 
fishers and intra-lake migration by Nkacha seine fishers from Lake Malombe.  
 
On gear type, the seasonal and periodic water level variability largely triggers 
migration fishers operating expensive gear types (seine and gill net) as compared 
to those operating cheap gear types (fish traps and long lines). The policy 
implication is that the traditional fishing techniques are suitable to specific types 
of ecosystems in terms of livelihood strategies.  
 
The southern and eastern fishers migrate more than the northern and western 
marshy area fishers do. The reason is that fishers migrate to the northern fishing 
areas seasonally from December to April to exploit the abundant Matemba fish 
stocks. The seines and gillnet fishers are highly mobile as compared to long lines 
that are concentrated in deep eastern fishing waters and fish traps in the southern 
marshes. This implies that there is need for caution when making general 
statements about migration of fishers in Lake Chilwa and other lakes. This study 
has therefore contributed to the understanding of the specific fishers by gear type 
that migrate on Lake Chilwa either from other lakes or from within the same lake. 
It is now clear for the policy makers to make decisions regarding migration of 
fishers by gear type.  
 
A comparison among three water bodies, Lakes Chiuta, Chilwa and Malombe on 
perceptions of changes in number of fishers on various beaches indicated that the 
Lake Chilwa scored the highest of them all. By Traditional Authority, the 
northern and western marsh composed of Kawinga, Mlomba, Mposa and 
Kuntumanji has higher level of perceptions on migration in those areas. These 
areas are shallower than the southern and eastern areas of Lake Chilwa.  
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Within Lake Chilwa, the fisher migrations exhibit variations by gear type use 
especially seines and fishing zone mainly in terms of open water or floodplain 
areas. Majority of gillnet and fish trap fishers are farmers. They fish from April to 
November. The households farm during the rainy season as another livelihood 
strategy. This is unlike the seine fishers that are dependent on fishing as their 
major economic activity throughout the year. They are commercial fishers 
because their investment into the fishing business is enormous (over MK120, 
000, which is about US$85 at an exchange rate of US$ 1 to MK140) as compared 
to the fish trap and gill net fishers (MK5, 000 only, which is approximately 
US$38) as stated by one fisher at Mposa. Therefore, measures that aim at 
sustaining Lake Chilwa fishery should focus on economic returns for these seine 
fishers while checking their destructive fishing technologies.  
 
In Lake Chilwa, migration takes different forms: migration within the lake called 
intra-lake migration, and between Lake Chilwa and others known as inter-lake 
migration. Reasons for the migration include ecological and socio-economic as 
previously reported by Kraan (2005) and Salagrama (2005). The ecological 
factors trigger mobility of fishers into areas where active fishing takes place 
based on the gear type at certain times of the year. The fishers operating seine 
nets and fish traps migrate to the northern marshes from January to March 
following good catches of Matemba. During these months, the area is flooded 
and hence provides a suitable feeding and breeding ground for the fish. When 
water level drops the fishers shift to land their fish on the western marshy area as 
it becomes uneconomic to land in the northern marshes due to longer paddling 
time.  
 
By fishing gear, the majority of migratory fishers own gillnet rather than other 
gear types. This is due to the fact that gillnet setting requires a deeper water level. 
The same applies to long line fishers. However, fish trap owners use the swampy 
areas to set their traps. Fish trap fishers migrate to nearby beaches and mostly the 
open water temporary shelters (zimbowera). Nkacha seine fishers migrate both 
within and outside Lake Chilwa (inter and intra-lake migratory patterns) while 
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Matemba seine fishers only migrate within the lake (intra-lake migration). It is 
interesting to note that majority of fishers who have never migrated elsewhere are 
those owning seines and to some extent gillnets. From the sample, two seine 
fishers and three gillnet fishers had never migrated elsewhere since the 1960s and 
the early 1970s.  
 
By fishing area, fishers migrate to exploit abundant Matemba stocks during rainy 
seasons (January to April) in the northern marshes and migrate towards the 
southern part as the water level drops. By August, distance to the fishing waters 
becomes long which forces some fishers especially those operating cheaper gears 
including fish traps and gillnets to shift to farming. This makes Lake Chilwa 
fishers dependent on farming and fishing. They sometimes become fishing 
opportunists, as they set their fish traps in rice fields during cultivation. In some 
instances, fish like Makumba feed on rice stalks thereby reducing harvest 
quantities.  
 
Periodically, there is movement of fishers from Lake Chilwa to other lakes 
especially Lake Malombe. This migration is restricted to Lake Malombe fishers 
who return home to continue fishing in either Lake Malombe or Lake Malawi. 
Lake Chilwa fishers who own traditional gears especially fish traps, gillnets and 
long lines do not migrate to distant water bodies. A few fishers that are resident 
between Lakes Chilwa and Chiuta occasionally migrate to Lake Chiuta for a 
limited period. When recession occurs on Lake Chilwa, the majority of the 
fishers opt for other types of occupation to sustain their livelihoods until such a 
time that the lake recovers. The fishers are engaged in farming vegetables on high 
fertile soils of the lakebed while others migrate to tea and tobacco estates and 
towns for employment. Those along the eastern border with Mozambique migrate 
to nearby towns and villages within Mozambique for gleaning or working in 
farms in return for food.  
 
In some cases, long-term migrations both into fishing and into non-fishing 
activities occur. It may also involve migration of fishers from villages to towns or 
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cities at particular times of the year either to sell fish or to settle and look for 
alternative livelihood activities when catches are poor (Salagrama 2005). When 
Lake Chilwa recession occurs, food stocks are exhausted and households seek 
food relief from donor organisations and government. These are policy issues that 
are important when designing food security programmes in the Chilwa basin.  
 
The results from this study indicate that socio-economic, policy, technological 
and environmental factors influence the fishing-farming households’ response to 
the variability of Lake Chilwa. These changes follow a cyclic pattern whereby 
during normal27 water levels, the households respond by practising fishing and 
farming as major economic sources to support their livelihoods. During 
recession, however, the households farm mainly in the wetland areas while others 
do businesses or seek employment elsewhere. 
7.2.1 Tenure systems 
A question on tenure rights that include land in the floodplain fishing areas and 
water has been central to the fish-farmer households. With farming during 
recession periods, there is communal or private property ownership of land. The 
VHs recognise their land and so do the individual farmers. Owing to land 
constraints in Lake Chilwa basin (Peters, 2002; Kambewa, 2006), conflicts are 
common especially where claims of ownership involve a traditional leader 
apportioning it to more than one person. In areas with rice schemes, land given to 
tenants is state property. Although the new Land Policy recognises the state as 
the principal owner, its legitimacy remains contested by chiefs, primarily because 
they want to retain their customary powers for allocating land (Kambewa, 2006).    
 
When the farming area is flooded open access to the resource is a common 
characteristic. Although there has been an initiative to develop a common 
property right regime through the Lake Chilwa Participatory Fisheries 
Management Programme (PFMP), its implementation has been delayed due to 
                                                 
27 Period between major recessions such as from 1969-1994 when the water level changes were 
just seasonal 
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limited commitment and weak capacity by DoF and local district assemblies. The 
decentralisation process that provides a framework for local community 
participation in development work has not yet produced any successful results, 
due to lack of accountable members in the assemblies and weak capacity of the 
local district authorities (Njaya, 2007). 
7.2.2 Migration as a livelihood strategy  
Migration of fishers is of two types. First, there is migration that takes place 
within Lake Chilwa, and second, migration that involves movement of fishers 
from the lake to others. Fishers migrate within Lake Chilwa on a seasonal basis 
between the southern and northern marshy areas. This usually takes place 
unusually during the rainy season when the north is flooded. The fishers target 
Barbus species that breed during the flooded period of November to March 
(Jamu & Brummet, 1999).  
 
The capital-intensive seine fishery involves a higher mobility of fishers than the 
other traditional gear types (gillnet, fish trap and long lines). With the continued 
ban of seining on Lake Chiuta, the seine fishery appears confined to Lake Chilwa 
and other water bodies including Lakes Malombe, Malawi and the Shire River 
system. Fishers migrate to other lakes only during major recessions. However, 
only a few fishers with seines migrate due to gear technological differences.  
 
Generally, results from this study show that migration does not contribute 
significantly to the livelihoods of the Lake Chilwa fishing households during 
recession periods. Fishers that migrate mainly own gillnet and mostly operate 
within Lake Chilwa. In terms of seine fishers, the results show that very few 
migrate to other water bodies because their traditional Matemba seines lack the 
suitable depth to operate effectively in a similar way as the Nkacha seines do on 
Lakes Malombe and Malawi. A policy implication on these results points to the 
fact the Chilwa basin population is vulnerable to climatic changes mainly in 
terms of drought and recessions. Safety net mechanisms are necessary with 
diversified income sources for risk distribution (Béné & Neiland, 2005). During 
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drought, food security is threatened, and hence farming and dependence on other 
natural resources like birds and keeping livestock could alleviate human 
suffering.  
7.2.1.1 Fishing for livelihoods 
Fishing is the dominant occupation for Lake Chilwa households. The termination 
of mine contracts that enabled Malawians to work on South African mines from 
the 1960s to the 1980s has left fishing as the only means of earning cash for 
households within the Lake Chilwa basin. Furthermore, because of the resiliency 
of the Lake Chilwa fishery, some fishers from Lakes Malawi and Malombe 
migrate to operate their seines in Lake Chilwa on an annual basis. This increases 
pressure on the resource. If not checked, the increasing investment levels and 
number of operators will be at variance with the scientific explanation that Lake 
Chilwa has high prolific breeders (Matemba) (Sarch & Allison, 2000). The 
resident fishers disagree with these scientific and economic justifications, as they 
continue to blame DoF for introducing seining technology. To them fish trapping, 
gillnetting and long lining were their major fisheries. Any proposed measures 
focusing on tenure rights will be widely accepted by the resident fishers, mostly 
those operating fish traps, gill nets and long lines.   
7.2.1.2 Fishing for economic reasons 
While the majority of the fishers operate their gears on part-time, the in-migrants 
are full-time fishers. The migrants transfer their fishing assets including Nkacha 
seine, planked boat and accessories like paddles and ropes. Fishing crew also 
transfer due to their special skills in diving to tie footropes in water, an operation 
rarely used by local fishers. Additional costs include an ‘access fee’ paid upon 
arrival and regular fish catch portions given to the TAs as tribute. Because of 
high transportation costs involved in migrating from Lake Malombe to Lake 
Chilwa the Nkacha seine fishers usually fish illegally to cover their costs. 
Whether it is during the closed season or the gear is destructive, is not a major 
concern for the in-migrants. The only motivation is high returns within the 
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shortest period. Consequently, fishers report that Makumba has never recovered 
to levels as those between 1970s and early 1990s.  
 
Apart from accessing the fisheries resources, the in-migrant fishers also gain 
access to farming land through marriage or receive it from chiefs at the expense 
of local people. In some cases, poor households enter into rental agreements of 
the resident’s land with the in-migrant fishers due to increased costs of farming 
inputs that include seed and fertilizer. The inputs are mainly needed in some 
areas with poor sandy soils especially the northern part (between Lake Chilwa 
and Chiuta) where a sand bar separates the two lakes. Matiya (2005b) also asserts 
that Lake Malombe fishers own larger pieces of farming land than non-fishers. A 
proportion of the poorer resident households do not have adequate land for 
farming. 
 
7.3 Impact of water level changes and migration on co-management 
7.3.1 Roles of the traditional authorities in co-management  
This sub-section discusses the major impact of water level changes on co-
management. In this aspect, I refer to roles of the Traditional Authorities (TAs) 
that are a major focus in the Lake Chilwa co-management and for comparison 
sake, the District Assemblies, non-governmental organisations and Village 
Heads. I single out the Traditional Authorities because they collaborated with 
DoF during the recession to formulate management measures for the lake.  
 
Mbalanje (1986) referred to a Traditional Authority as the head of a community. 
Each administrative district in Malawi has areas, which TAs with several group 
village heads (GVHs) control. In turn, the group village heads have authority 
over the village heads (VHs).  Under the village heads, are family leaders called 
limana or eni mbumba (clan or sub-clan heads) in some areas especially among 
the Nyanja.  
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The role of traditional institutions in the management of natural resources in the 
southern African region has been ambiguous and controversial. One school of 
thought is that changes made in the post-colonial period led to the erosion of the 
capacity of traditional institutions from effectively managing natural resources. 
Mamimine & Mandivengerei (2001) argue that modern institutions are in conflict 
with traditional authorities a situation, which has the potential of leading to the 
degradation of a resource.  
 
Vaughan (1982) describes kinship ties that existed among the Nyanja in the 
Chilwa basin around the 18th Century. The Nyanja was the dominant ethnic group 
at that time and were organised into small-kinship-based political units that 
shared a common cultural tradition characterised by a territorial religious cult, as 
well as by the economic exchange based on ecological diversity. Farming was the 
mainstay of the tribe because of the fertile soils, which relegated fishing to a part-
time activity. Apart from farming and fishing, the Nyanja were also involved in 
hunting game including birds and making salt as additional occupations. 
 
Response to the catastrophes such as drought is associated with certain practices 
including dancing Tchopa and offering sacrifices to ancestral spirits. These 
traditional practices aim at receiving rains from their ancestral spirits that link up 
with their god (Chisumphi). In effect, they ask for rains to replenish the lake and 
for crop production since crop failures are common during recessions. This is 
ostensibly intended to benefit the whole community within the basin and other 
areas. Communities within the Lake Chilwa basin consider natural catastrophes, 
drought and diseases outbreaks like smallpox and measles as punishment from 
the ancestral spirits for the community’s evil ways. When this occurs, the 
community believe that some people within the community may have offended 
the spirits. However, beliefs in such deities are waning due to the growing 
influence of Christianity and commercialisation of the fisheries. Nonetheless, 
these practices are still common in other parts of Malawi like Nsanje district 
where villagers still conduct traditional rituals (Makolo believers) in deference to 
Mbona (god) asking for rains (Malawi News, 2007).   
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The question about the TAs’ role in Lake Chilwa co-management may be 
justified as a stakeholder group within the co-management arrangement. It is a 
requirement that only elected members should be members of the fishing-farming 
committees (Ribot, 2002), as a way of promoting accountability to the groups. 
This is usually within the decentralisation and devolution processes of state 
functions to local governments and fishing-farming communities respectively 
(Njaya, 2007). The argument, however, fails to recognise the roles of the African 
traditional leaders in resource management before colonialism mainly in the 19th 
Century. During that time the TAs were mainly involved in settling disputes, 
allocating land for landing fish and farming, controlling cutting down of trees and 
leading communities in seeking rains from their ancestral spirits. In situations 
like Lake Chilwa where BVC members may migrate to other areas, the traditional 
leaders are responsible for monitoring the fishing activities through their 
permanent beach-based representatives (nduna), otherwise illegal fishing may 
increase in that village.  
 
In some areas, however, traditional leaders nowadays appear be more concerned 
with financial reward. In beaches like Kachulu and Ntila, local leaders and BVCs 
demand regular payments (cha-kwa-mfumu) for use of the beach. Although this 
has been an old practice, the introduction of co-management has benefited the 
elite or local leaders. In the past, the village heads could get a certain amount of 
fish of good quality and larger size as tribute for letting fishers use the beach. 
However, from 1995, the village heads do not only get fish, but also money to 
allow illegal operations during closed seasons.  
 
There are multiple institutions responsible for allocating resources like land in the 
wetland, which are now becoming private property. Kambewa (2006:88) asserts 
that ‘some traditional leaders have turned land into their personal property’ and 
yet it is illegal to hold land as a private property in the new Land Policy (GoM 
2002b). This assertion agrees with what the study found in that the traditional 
leaders are assuming ownership of landing beaches and hence exercise their 
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powers as to who should have access. BVC formation with alienation of these 
customary institutions in terms of rules and organisational structures will lead to 
failure of co-management as power contestation becomes common in this case 
(Hara and& Nielsen 2003). 
7.3.2 Roles of other key co-management partners  
There is limited participation of the District Assemblies on fish resource 
management. Seymour (2005) indicates that the district commissioner for Zomba 
could not articulate the role of the district assembly in fisheries management. The 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have limited interest in natural resource 
management especially fisheries management. The three district assemblies of 
Zomba, Phalombe and Machinga that share Lake Chilwa have not yet materially 
supported enforcement, extension or research activities apart from attending 
workshops organised by DoF. Co-management is not only about partnership 
between the state and the fishing community but also civil society groups 
although Wilson et al. (2005) argue that inclusion of members that do not take 
fishing as their primary livelihood strategy can not represent interest of the 
fishers in the same way the fishers could. 
 
7.4 Participation, accountability and transparency 
Based on the results in Chapter 7, partnership of the Lake Chilwa co-management 
had been largely limited to DoF and the traditional chiefs until 2006 when the 
seine fishers became actively involved in participatory fisheries management. 
The key participants, which are fishers, in this context, did not participate in the 
process. Additionally, civil society groups and other decentralised structures like 
District Assemblies (DAs), Area Development Committees (ADCs) and Village 
Development Committees (VDCs) were not actively involved in the fisheries 
management activities. Participation of the DAs, ADCs and VDCs has been 
mainly in political and infrastructural development issues. The District 
Assemblies have not yet played their role in the fisheries co-management (Njaya, 
2007).  
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For an effective co-management arrangement, governance reforms are necessary. 
This includes issues of decentralisation and devolution processes. In this respect, 
the co-management regime should be inclusive with broader partnership of all 
fisher groups by gear type ranging from those operating cheap fish trap and 
gillnets to those using expensive seine nets.  
 
In Malawi, the centralised approach is still evident in the case of legal provisions 
outlined in the Malawi Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1997 
despite initiating the co-management arrangements in early 1990s. For example, 
Sections 5(1) and 4(1) give powers to the Director of Fisheries to appoint 
members of the Fisheries Advisory Board, and Honorary Fisheries Protection 
Officers respectively. The Director has powers to develop local management 
plans, which he or she can unilaterally impose. Although in this process 
consultations take place with the local communities, they lack opportunities to 
advance their interest in the co-management arrangement. Given this legal 
arrangement, it will be no surprise that the overall level of participation is low.   
 
Hara et al. (2002) point to the fact that the composition of the fishing-farming 
committees is crucial. In Malawi, the fishing committees are not always 
composed of fishers only. Owing to the initial promise of paying sitting 
allowances and buying Nkacha nets by donors, power rather than need and 
relevance determines composition of BVCs formed around Lake Malombe. In 
some studies (Hara, 1996; Hara & Nielsen, 2003) it was found that participation 
by actual fishers in BVCs was low (30%) while participation of people engaged 
in various other occupations was high (70%). The sitting allowances are a clear 
example of an institutional arrangement leading to perverse incentives, 
undermining the co-management initiative. In sharp contrast, the same survey 
found that Lake Chiuta BVCs that initiated the co-management process were 
composed of over 90% fishers.  
 
The fact that there is low representation of the seine fishers in the fishing 
committees is problematic. It means that they cannot participate in the decision-
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making about rules and regulation that target the use of specific gear types, like 
Nkacha. The de facto exclusion of many fishers from the committees has resulted 
in co-management practices that lack not only transparency but also legitimacy. 
Unsurprisingly, this leads to general non-compliance to regulations on closed 
season, mesh and gear sizes and licensing. One reason cited for the specific 
exclusion of (migrant) Nkacha fishers, is the consensus about the destructiveness 
of the practices they use. However, most lakes are characterised by multi-species 
and multi-gear fishing practices, and it is therefore unlikely that BVCs will 
consist of only Nkacha fishers. It is likely that long line-gillnet and fish-trap 
fishers will be in the fishing committees as well.  
 
Another question centres on how accountable the Beach Village Sub-Committees 
(BVSCs) are to the fishing community. While the fishing households elect 
BVSCs, in some areas traditional leaders just pick the fishing-farming 
committees (Hara 1996). Consequently, the sub-committee members become 
more accountable to the traditional leaders who chose them and not to the fishers. 
The Lake Chilwa co-management generally lacks downward accountability of the 
BVSCs, TAs and DoF especially in the south-western parts due to limited 
interaction with fishers. In the area, Village Head (VH) Namalele appointed the 
sub committee members whose accountability is upward and not downward. The 
sub-committees report to their local leaders and do address the concerns of fellow 
fishers. Accountability is mainly about elections and representations. In the 
western perspective, emphasis is on elections or representations by elected 
members while in the African perspective it may not be applicable due to the 
influence of the local leaderships. Traditional leaderships or kingdoms are 
inheritance from one generation to another and in some communities, they 
command more respect than governments.  
 
Finally, the DoF and district assemblies do not respond to any issue or proposal 
that the households raise with urgency; for example, that of banning fishing 
technologies that promote clearing of aquatic vegetation or any faming methods 
that trigger siltation of rivers and the lake. The co-management arrangement 
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focuses more on the fishery component, unlike in the past when traditional 
management considered all natural resources including land, water and birds in a 
decentralised framework, as means of minimising conflicts on the structures for 
the co-management and decentralisation (Njaya, 2007; Katerere, 2000).  
 
There was a high compliance with the rules formulated to facilitate recovery of 
the fishery. The chiefs played a greater role towards community mobilisation and 
publicity of the informal rules on the prohibition of seining and use of poisonous 
plants. This strategy worked since the local fishers found the rules legitimate 
during that recession period. It took two to three years to realise catches of 
Mlamba in 1997, then good catches of Matemba and Makumba in 1998 and 1999. 
The fish landings increased to about 12,500 tonnes (GoM, 1999) in 1999, which 
was an indication of the fishery recovery. This explains the shifting of Lake 
Chilwa co-management from consultative to instructive as presented in the 
Section 7.6 in the previous chapter. 
 
Pomeroy (2005) asserts that fisheries co-management arrangements in some areas 
have shown that involvement of traditional leaders in the management structures 
was one of the conditions for the success of such arrangements. Historically, 
chiefs have had control over fishing since 18thCentury, especially among the 
Nyanja in the Maravi Kingdom as Vaughan (1982:356) notes: “Only in the case 
of the fishing industry of Lake Chilwa is the evidence of significant chiefly 
control over an important industry”. The implication is that any policy changes 
that exclude chiefs in decision-making processes and their consent may not 
succeed. Co-management should, therefore be based on the traditional values and 
culture. In this context, application of useful traditional practices like authorising 
access to beaches by chiefs is necessary. 
 
However, the continued enforcement of the regulations after recovery of the 
collapsed fisheries, lost legitimacy. Fines that the TAs demanded from illegal 
fishers became their incentives for their active participation in the co-
management arrangement. The co-management lacks participation of the fishers 
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and has limited transparency and accountability. The main interest for the TAs 
was to confiscate illegal nets and charge fines ranging from K20, 000 to K30, 
000. In some places, tribute influences continued illegal operations during closed 
seasons by Nkacha seine fishers. In this case, the local leaders become 
opportunists to benefit from co-management through penalty fees and tributes 
they get from illegal fishers. During the key informant interviews one respondent 
(Committee Chair for Ntila BVSC) indicated that: 
The influence of TAs in the co-management is not for resource management but rather for 
their personal benefit. They encourage us to confiscate seines especially of those who do not 
respect the local leaders. The local leaders get angry when I confiscate Nkacha seines that 
‘belong’ to the local leaders. There are gears that are for the local leaders that I refer to them 
as makoka a mfumu.  
 
The shift in partnership from river-based local leaders to lake-based local leaders 
has also resulted in a shift of objectives from conservation of the remnant stocks 
to socio-economic benefits with TAs getting money from confiscated illegal 
seine nets. This is critical as the ecosystem is bound to recede again, hence 
participation of the river-based local leaders will be necessary, and yet they are 
presently not participating in fisheries management programmes like training. 
The shift in objectives has also created conflicts between the seine net users and 
the lake-based TAs since they seem to allow introduction of illegal fishing 
operations (Usodzi wa Mululu and Gozi Waya) and hence the formation of a 
pressure group to protect the resource.  
 
Usually, the community’s motive for participating in co-management originates 
from either benefits mainly in form of financial resources that donor funded 
projects provide when implementing such co-management initiatives or 
identifying strategies on resolving conflicts especially in cases where there are 
increased rates of in-migrants who introduce new fishing technologies that are 
often more efficient (Wilson 2003; Hara et al. 2002). On the government side, co-
management has provided a platform to demonstrate democratic entrenchment 
into the fishing-farming community although it has failed to address challenges 
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like policy review, lack of guidelines for PFM agreements This is achieved 
through participation, accountability and transparent mechanisms that are 
pronounced in decentralised fisheries management regimes (Bėnė and Allison 
2005; Njaya 2007). 
 
It is nearly a decade since Malawi’s legislature approved the fisheries legislation. 
However, no substantial progress has been made towards implementation in 
terms of by-law formulation, signing of management agreements and 
development of management plans. Implementation of the PFM has lacked a 
proper programme. In some cases, the DoF has implemented the activities just to 
fulfil donor funded project requirements. Furthermore, the PFM needs a fully 
decentralised framework, which is not yet in place. These are key aspects that are 
necessary to finalise steps of the PFM process.  
 
While it is necessary to assess co-management based on what is on the ground, as 
previous evaluation studies (Njaya et al., 1999; Donda et al., 1999; Hara et al., 
1999; Hara et al., 2002) show, there is also a need to examine what the 
government has done in terms of creating an enabling environment. The 
establishment of the Fisheries Fund (FF), as provided for in the Fisheries 
Conservation and Management Act of 1997, would reduce corruption among 
BVCs and traditional authorities. Their planned activities would attract funding 
from such a Fund. The appointment of the Honorary Fisheries Protection Officers 
would also support enforcement activities thereby reducing illegal gear types and 
fishing methods. The previous co-management assessment studies have 
emphasised the institutional arrangements and operational capacity without 
looking at what both DoF and community planned and achieved. Probably, the 
DoF has not done what it planned and yet community structures have been in 
place for over ten years. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter concludes the thesis based on the research questions, results and 
discussions as outlined from Chapters 1 to 7. Firstly, I focus on the influence of 
lake level changes on fishing households, subsequent responses of the households 
towards the lake level changes including migration of the fishers, and co-
management arrangement and conflicts. I draw conclusions by examining how 
demographic changes due to fisher migrations induce conflicts, which in turn, 
affect co-management resilience or strength as outlined in the research 
framework. Secondly, I propose a course of action for optimal utilisation of the 
fisheries resources in Lake Chilwa and sustainable livelihoods of the fishing-
farming households. 
 
Based on the conceptual framework (Figure 12), I draw key conclusions on the 
impact of the lake levels of Lake Chilwa on the livelihoods of the households.  
 
8.1 Water level changes, migration and livelihood 
As a response measure, the Lake Chilwa households apply diverse livelihood 
strategies in response to the fluctuating environment. The responses of the local 
fishing households to variability include shifting from fishing to farming or vive 
versa and migrating to other fishing beaches. There is less frequency of migration 
in deeper areas located in the south of Lake Chilwa. For occupational migration, 
fishers abandon fishing at particular times of the year especially from September 
to December. They farm rice and vegetables along the dry exposed areas of the 
lake for cash incomes pending flooding in February when fishing resumes. 
During this period, farming activities are in a trough state. As Landes & Otte 
(1983) assert, introduction of any innovations on Lake Chilwa may experience 
socio-economic constraints. The Lake Chilwa fishers are against any innovations 
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regarding fishing methods. This implies that there is likelihood of resistance for 
adoption of any of the new technologies if not in the interest of the local people.  
 
Wilson et al. (2005) examine different categories of resource utilisation in 
relation to resource tenure by looking at people who utilise a fishery resource by 
virtue of being closer to it, while in some cases there are people from other places 
who come to exploit the resource. The interaction between the two groups may 
be either positive or negative depending on group type. On Lake Chilwa, the 
local leaders benefit from the in-migrants as they obtain money (cha-kwa-
mfumu). Another beneficiary is DoF due to licensing of the Nkacha seines, which 
are a source of government revenue. Some fish traders support the in-migrants 
due to higher catches they land as opposed to local fishers. This conflict of 
interest leads to collective action among local fishers in their attempts to exclude 
the outsiders from accessing the fisheries resources.  
 
Lake Chilwa depicts floodplains, shallow and deeper water areas. These areas 
have different characteristics in terms of fishing gear types used, fish species 
caught, land use patterns and traditional institution arrangements. The variable 
nature of the ecosystem induces migrations within (intra-lake) and across lakes 
(inter-lake). Looking at the whole lake, the results show that there is high in-lake 
migration due to the variable lake levels depending on gear types. Resident 
Matemba seine and in-migrant Nkacha fishers and some gillnet operators are 
highly mobile within the lake as opposed to those fishers operating fish traps and 
long line and other less important ones, cast nets, scoop nets, lumba and kungwi.   
 
The seasonal and periodic impacts of the Lake Chilwa water level changes on the 
livelihoods of the fishing households in the wetland are a common practice 
within the fishing community. The fishing-farming households’ livelihoods from 
both fishing and farming in upland areas is threatened by drought, which after 
three consecutive years, results in recession of the lake. Fishing, which at times 
becomes a ‘safety net’ for the local fishing community in terms of employment 
opportunities and source of food comes to a halt due to the climatic effect.  
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In this context, the floodplain and fishery components of the lake are, therefore, 
important for both economic and livelihood dimensions of the fishing households 
that includes the local and in-migrant fishers and fish traders. However, they are 
part of the cultural and traditional systems within the localities. The economic 
benefits through commercial fishing activities are, however, largely for the in-
migrants from elsewhere especially Lake Malombe. Very few seine fishers from 
Lake Chilwa migrate to other lakes during recessions while the opposite happens 
seasonally and periodically. This is due to the technological differences for 
constructing and operating the seines. The Lake Malombe Nkacha seines are 
deeper with most of them over 10m deep while the Lake Chilwa Matemba seines 
are less than 6m in depth. Heavy exploitation of the fish resources is due to use of 
the Nkacha seines, which operate in open waters where the local fishers cannot 
reach. The Lake Malombe fishers use paddles (nkhafi and malemu) while the 
local Lake Chilwa fishers use bamboo poles (miponda), which cannot take them 
to far distant fishing waters. 
 
Within the ecosystem migration tends to be variable due to water depth and types 
of gear used. The seasonal flooding and drying regimes of the lake are more 
common in the northern and western marshy than the southern and eastern 
marshy areas. The intra-lake migration involving Lake Chilwa fishers is almost 
insignificant mainly due to different fishing technologies and fishing status (part- 
or full-time).  
 
Migration of the fishers is thus characterised by gear type and fishing zone. Seine 
and gillnet fishers are highly mobile as compared to fish trap and long line 
fishers. The seine fishers are ‘professional’ in that they are dependent on full-time 
fishing for their cash income while the other ‘traditional’ fishers can fish on part- 
or full-time basis. There are more in-migrant fishers in the northern floodplain 
area than in the south where water level is stable. Apparently, conflicts are more 
prevalent in the floodplain area than in the southern deeper part of the lake due to 
seasonal influx of migrants to the north. 
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The study results do not support the idea of local Lake Chilwa fishers migrating 
to other lakes, as an insignificant number of Lake Chilwa fishers do so during 
seasonal drying up of the northern marshes and periodic desiccation of the lake. 
In contrast, the Lake Malombe fishers migrate to Lake Chilwa seasonally and on 
a periodic basis after recovery of the fishery during recession times. Economic 
incentives drive migrants from Lake Malombe to Lake Chilwa. The fishers crop 
the abundant fish stocks for economic gain while the resources exist.  
 
During low catch periods or closed seasons, they go back to Lake Malombe. In 
recent years, many Nkacha fishers have invested in fishing units (boats and 
Nkacha/Matemba seines) on both lakes. This is a way of spreading fishing risks, 
as they tend to earn revenue from either of the two units at times of closed 
seasons, poor catches and seasonal fishing patterns. The commercially oriented 
fishers are opportunists that migrate to any place as long as their costs are 
covered. While in the past they were not interested in farming, they have now 
gained access to land on Lake Chilwa for rice farming. The in-migrant fishing 
investors have either rented land or used land belonging to the local women as 
their wives.  
 
To majority of the local fishers around the lake, fishing is a part-time occupation. 
Commercial oriented fishing has been new to the area after learning from migrant 
fishers from Lake Malombe. Based on the above explanation the question on 
resource tenure and ‘free riding’ becomes central in this context. The Lake 
Chilwa fishers are involved in resource management strategies while the in-
migrant fishers from other lakes reap the benefits. This is where conflicts 
associated with migratory patterns of the fishers become central to the basis of 
collective action and co-management.  
 
8.2 Co-management 
Community participation is not new to the Lake Chilwa basin although co-
management or collective action that African countries adopted in the early 1990s 
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appears to be a new concept. In 1968 when the lake dried up the DoF and local 
community formulated a strategy for recovery of the collapsed fishery by banning 
fishing in rivers and lagoons. They formulated a similar strategy during the 1995 
recession. During recession, community participation becomes strong while in-
between recessions it is weak. 
 
The typology of co-management is characterised by fishing zone with the 
floodplain area having more conflicts and more fishers participating than in the 
stable fishing zone of the southern part. It is clear that where conflicts occur, co-
management appears stronger. This links to areas where there are increased 
migrations of fishers. In this situation, co-management is a tool with which to 
exclude outsiders and address conflicts. 
 
However, the development of a co-management programme on Lake Chilwa has 
not recognised the key actors mainly the river-based communities that 
participated in the conservation of remnant fish stocks in lagoon and rivers during 
the recession of 1995. In addition, the seine fisher, both local and in-migrants 
were excluded from participating in the co-management. The following sub-
sections conclude the thesis and present a course of action to minimise 
vulnerability and shocks that the local fishing households experience due to the 
lake level changes. 
 
8.3 Conflicts 
Differences in fishing technologies and fishing activities are main sources of 
conflicts in Lake Chilwa. There are conflicts among fisher user groups mainly 
between seine fishers and gill net operators. The latter complain against damage 
that the seine cause to their gill nets in open waters. At times, there are cases of 
theft that occur while gill net fishers are at home. In addition, the in-migrant seine 
fishers have been favoured locally due to their higher fish landings than the local 
fishers. This tends to induce competition and hence reduce prices for the traders 
and fish for local villagers’ consumption. The local leaders have also benefited 
from the in-migrants through payments of either cash or fish catch portions (thini 
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la mfumu). During closed seasons, there are designated seines (makoka-a-mfumu) 
that the BVCs are allowed to operate as instructed by their local village heads. 
This tendency compromises co-management effectiveness with majority of the 
BVCs receiving instructions from their local leaders despite being elected by 
their communities. Consequently, they become accountable to their local leaders 
and not their fellow fishers. This lack of accountability has negatively affected 
performance of the co-management arrangement in Lake Chilwa (Lowore & 
Lowore, 1999; Njaya et al., 1999).  
 
Based on this argument, the role of the local leaders in the co-management 
arrangement should therefore focus on providing guidance to the resource 
management programmes based on recommendations from the BVCs. The co-
management institutions should be accountable to their fishers in a downward 
accountability scenario and not the opposite. The limited support from the TAs 
should provide a critical element of extension programmes on Lake Chilwa. All  
proceeds from monetary sanctions should be transparently accounted for with a 
certain proportion budgeted to support BVC activities that may include message 
delivery, maintenance of beach registers for fishers, gears and fishing vessels, 
enforcement activities and other rural based development projects like sanitation 
and environmental management. 
 
Ethnic differences, though, salient, can be another potential source of conflict. On 
Lake Chilwa, the historical ethnic settlement patterns with Nyanja being the first 
to settle owned larger pieces of land than the Yao who came second. The Lomwe 
that came last settled in the area by asking for a share of land from the earliest 
settlers.  
 
The other source of conflict is the perceived destructive nature of the introduced 
fishing methods (Nkacha seining, gauze wire and Usodzi-wa-Mululu) by the in-
migrant fishers. Seining and gill netting have been associated with mobility of 
Lake Malombe fishers and Lake Chilwa fishers respectively, as in most cases, the 
migrant fishers operate on full-time basis unlike the local fishers most of whom 
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(70%) operate as part time operating between 6 and 7 months per year fishers 
(Landes & Otte 1983). They become opportunists to fishing during flooding 
periods (January to April) and abandon fishing during the dry season. This means 
that they take up fishing and farming as their livelihood strategies.  
 
8.4 Major lessons and recommendations  
Based on the research questions, and conceptual and co-management 
frameworks, the major lessons drawn from this study include migration of fishers 
based on seasons and periods and by gear type, conflicts and relationships that 
exist between water level changes and household strategies.  
8.4.1 Fishing and migration  
Fishing is on a seasonal basis mainly from January to April in the north while for 
the south it may be throughout the year depending on targeted species and gear 
type used. Conflicts tend to emerge between resident and migrant fishers because 
for the locals fishing is largely on part-time basis while the migrant fishers who 
may be of ‘professional’ class fishing is on a full-time basis.   
 
However, the local fishers aim at excluding the Nkacha in-migrant fishers from 
exploiting the abundant Lake Chilwa fisheries resources. This exclusion is also 
prevalent in BVCs as only the local fishers that mainly operate cheap gear types 
like gillnet and fish traps and long lines become elected members of the BVSCs. 
However, the local fishers claimed that the introduced fishing technologies 
(Nkacha, gauze wire and Usodzi-wa-Mululu) could pose a threat to the stock 
levels of the lake. Despite this claim, what becomes the source of conflict is the 
competition in fish landings between the migrants and local fishers. With the 
highly skilled fishing techniques from Lake Malombe in the use of Nkacha, the 
migrant fishers are able to land larger quantities of fish than those by the local 
fishers. In addition, the widely publicised destructive nature of the Nkacha on 
Lake Malombe by DoF, is another source of conflict as the seine net is taken as a 
destructive gear that removed aquatic vegetation Lake Malombe in 1970s and 
1980s and hence not to be allowed in other lakes.   
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While migration is a livelihood strategy, I conclude that there is need to specify 
which fishers in terms of type of fishing gears benefit from their nomadic life. 
This is necessary for formulation of an appropriate policy direction with 
strategies for consideration during recessions, normal fishing period and floods. 
Fishers operating seine and gillnets are more mobile within the lake than those 
operating fish trap and long lines, which are the dominant gear types.  
8.4.2 Effect of water level changes on co-management 
Governance issues are necessary for improved accountability, transparency and 
participation. The participation of civil society groups including all riverine and 
lake-based traditional leaders, BVCs, and DoF will ensure effective participation 
of the marginalized groups to their benefit, although Donda (2001) argues that the 
BVC composition is important for co-management effectiveness, hence need to 
have majority of fishers with similar interest on resource management as an 
incentive to become BVC members.  
 
For effective decentralised fisheries management, there is a need to enhance 
capacity of district assemblies in the form of skills, adequate staff and equipment 
for effective delivery of services to the co-management institutions. In addition, 
the DoF should finalise steps on the PFM including registration of fishing-
farming committees, establishment of a Fisheries Fund, identifying BVC 
boundaries and clear membership, appointment of honorary fisheries protection 
officers and signing of management agreements with enforceable by-laws and 
management plans. It will then be most appropriate to assess the co-management 
outcomes after creation of the enabling environment that includes implementation 
of governance reforms (decentralisation and devolution).  
 
With poor planning and implementation, co-management will not be a strategy 
for poverty reduction among the vulnerable and marginalized segments of the 
society but for the rich (Béné & Neiland, 2004). Empowerment of the poor in 
decision-making processes and access to resources at sustainable level is a 
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recommended policy action for poverty reduction. Additionally, Isaacs et al. 
(2005) recommends formulation of poverty reduction strategies in co-
management arrangements, which will also serve as an incentive for the 
community. Empowerment is necessary for the local community in these present 
times when commercialisation of the fishery and globalisation issues can become 
challenges beyond the capacity of the local fishers. 
 
The Lake Chilwa co-management type is dynamic both at seasonal and periodic 
level and at fishing zone level. Fishing households actively participate in the 
management of fisheries resources (co-management) during recessions and at 
fishing level, in the floodplain area more than in-between recessions and in the 
southern Lake Chilwa due to water stability at seasonal level. This means that 
using the co-management arrangement typology Lake Chilwa exhibits different 
types based on water levels. It is consultative in the floodplain area and 
informative in the deeper southern area.   
 
Conflicts emerge due to water level changes as fishers compete over fish 
landings, prices, and fishing grounds especially in the floodplain area during the 
rainy season mainly from January to April. Resource access and tenure system 
also contribute to the conflicts mainly in terms of power and authority between 
the Beach Village Sub-Committees and Traditional Authorities. There is also an 
‘elite capture’ of the co-management, as the Traditional Authorities tend to 
centralise management of the resources at their levels.   
 
 
8.4.3 Overfishing dilemma 
A critical question centres on whether overfishing can occur in Lake Chilwa as it 
relates to one of the major causes of conflicts between in-migrants and local 
fishers. The fishers believe that the overfishing can occur on the lake because of 
the introduced destructive fishing methods. Furse et al. (1979) assert that 
biological and environmental issues, which have been of major concern within 
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the Lake Chilwa catchment area, can affect fish production. In addition, Kalk et 
al. (1979) recommend conservation of Typha swamps around Lake Chilwa. She 
notes that the fundamental role of rivers and peripheral flood plains and swamps 
serves as an inoculum source of plankton, benthos in shallow lakes and hence she 
could not recommend focusing on the management of the open water without 
management or protection of the surrounding swamps and/or floodplains.  
8.4.4 Integrated management plan 
UNEP (1981) also recommends formulation of environmental management 
policies that would cover the whole catchment area of shallow ecosystems like 
Lakes Chilwa and Chad. This emphasises the need to manage the whole lake, 
wetland and its catchment area as the fishing-farming households used to do in 
the past. Culturally the households at village, TA level or basin level could also 
consider management of all the common pool resources (land, water, birds, fish, 
wildlife and forestry resources) in the Lake Chilwa ecosystem. They were 
praying to their ancestral spirits for rain, which eventually led to refilling of the 
lake and hence fishing activities could resume after two-three years. Therefore, 
formulation of an integrated management plan that aims to reduce fishing 
methods that involves removal of aquatic vegetation, deforestation in the 
watershed areas and pollution into Likangala River, as it passes through Zomba 
municipality is necessary (Njaya, Chiotha & Kabwazi, 1996; Jamu & Brummet, 
1999; GoM, 2000).  
8.4.5 Traditional ecological knowledge  
The human element is also important since management of the fisheries resources 
is part of the local community’s culture (Chipeta, 1979). Therefore, involvement 
of the fishing-farming community in the management of the resource (co-
management) with consideration of their use of the indigenous knowledge will 
promote optimal utilisation of the highly variable fish stocks from Lake Chilwa. 
Furthermore, the community’s involvement will minimise conflicts that arise due 
to measures that the local leaders formulate in a top-down manner within the co-
management arrangement. However, the adaptive form of co-management is 
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necessary, as it will promote utilisation of the fisheries resources when they are 
abundant and cease fishing during recessions. It is illogical that the closed season 
that the traditional leaders introduced during recessions in 1995 continues being 
in force without any revision.   
 
Another issue is about empowerment and roles of partners. The community 
empowerment includes assignment of clear rights and responsibilities to 
stakeholders mainly the fishing-farming communities, government (local and 
central) and non-governmental organisations. The study results show limited 
participation of fishers, district assemblies and upward accountability of the 
BVCs and lack of transparency in terms of how the co-management institutions 
make decisions. Therefore, it is necessary to revise the co-management set up 
with fishers playing a key role and having support from district authorities and 
their local leaders. Capacity building for the co-management institutions is also 
important. Normann (2006) recommends that the enhancement of skills through 
training should not target the fishing-farming households only, but also the 
fisheries technical staff.  
8.4.6 Social stratification 
By occupation, the Nyanja people are farmers and fishers. They grow maize, rice, 
sorghum and millet, and fish by using traditional gear types that include fish 
traps, gillnets and Matemba seine. They take fishing as a ‘safety net’ mainly 
during recession or flooding times. The Yao have been involved in fishing for 
business and hence could consider fishing as a source of employment. The 
Lomwe were labourers in the pre-colonial times but later became engaged in 
fishing especially at a later stage after transformation of the economy from 
subsistence to commercial to supplement earnings from low crop yields during 
drought. They have also been working as crew in Matemba seining operations 
although for the past three to four decades a few of them have begun to invest in 
fishing. Understanding of these differences is important so that policy makers are 
able to target specific development programmes that aim at enhancing social 
 
 
 
 
 181 
 
security of households to particular areas, although it may be challenging to do so 
due to mixed ethnic groups because of marriages.  
 
Additionally, with such diverse resource user groups in the Lake Chilwa, it is 
necessary to analyse their social stratification when planning development 
initiatives for clear identification of relevant stakeholders, vulnerable groups, 
conflicts and their socio-economic needs. Policy interventions need to be more 
general in nature to target various vulnerable groups including women and the 
youth that are dependent on seasonal fishing. Women are active farmers within 
the Lake Chilwa basin and are at times engaged in small-scale businesses by 
trading various commodities including fish, crop products and bakery products. 
The youth are engaged in fishing as crewmembers hence they need alternative 
means of livelihoods to reduce risks and vulnerability caused by the lake level 
variability. Promotion of small-scale businesses for the youth and improved 
economic opportunities to provide employment for those with some level of 
education will reduce their dependency on fishing.  
8.4.7 Improved crop and livestock productivity 
Fishing and farming constitute the key occupation for the Lake Chilwa 
community. Phiri, Meke, Kamundi & Salubeni (1999) indicated that crop 
production, fishing and fishery-related trade and livestock production are the 
main economic activities for Lake Chilwa wetland. However, due to limited land 
holding capacity, agricultural policies should aim to increase farm productivity. 
Farming is an important occupation to the Lake Chilwa households at times being 
more important than fishing especially during recession periods or seasonally to 
the northern-based households where water recedes from July to November. 
Nevertheless, the high population affects landholding capacity.  
 
With the continued rise in human population within the wetland and catchment 
area of Lake Chilwa, majority of the households will have smaller pieces of land 
of less than one-quarter of a hectare by 2020. This calls for agricultural and land 
policy reforms. These should target the marginalised and vulnerable households 
 
 
 
 
 182 
 
by promoting their access to land and farming inputs through subsidy 
programmes. Implementation of the new land policy that has raised concerns to 
some researchers (Kambewa, 2006) should take into account existence of the 
poor households. An equal opportunity to land access is the key to farm 
productivity and food security.  
 
The livestock production policy should target the Chilwa basin households that 
depend on selling household assets like farm animals and poultry in times of 
catastrophe like hunger due to drought or floods during heavy rain seasons. The 
livestock may therefore reduce vulnerability of the fishing-farming households 
during recession periods. Mfitilodze (1999) identifies the following key 
constraints to livestock production in the wetland: institutional, limited land, 
management skills of farmers, poor infrastructure, diseases, and insufficient feed 
and breeding stock. To address the problems, he recommends access to capital 
for farmers, veterinary services, and establishment of cooperatives for production 
of rural based tanneries. He also recommends rearing of sheep and goat 
production due to their non-competitiveness with man for food and lack of taboos 
associated with their consumption, and hence can contribute to household food 
security and poverty reduction.  
8.4.8 Conflict management 
Fisheries management mainly borders on addressing conflicts, which may relate 
to policy, operational and socio-economic parameters. Delays in addressing 
conflicts coupled with inadequate skills to handle them by the responsible 
authorities like DoF or the fishing-farming committees and association leads to 
many problems in the fishing operations. For example, there have been 
operational conflicts between fisheries using gauze wire, Nkacha and Usodzi-wa-
Mululu fishers (perceived destructive gear types by the local fishers) and the 
other fishers operating gill nets, seines and fish traps. Up until now, the DoF has 
not paid any attention to the ban on the perceived destructive gear types by the 
local fishing households. This lack of urgency can make the BVCs lose trust in 
DoF and hence weaken the co-management arrangement. Therefore, it is 
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necessary that DoF technical officers examine validity of the proposed ban of 
gauze wire, Nkacha seines and Usodzi-wa mululu.   
8.4.9 Policy intervention 
There is a need to harmonise policy and legislative frameworks for Lake Chilwa. 
Being a RAMSAR site, emphasis has been on the conservation of birds while 
other natural resources like water, fish, land and forestry appear neglected. The 
households depend on both fish and birds for food and cash income. It is, 
therefore, important to reduce conflicting issues regarding governance of the 
natural resources for diversified livelihoods and optimal utilisation of natural 
resources that the fishing-farming households utilise during recession periods. 
There is a need to examine policies that promote community-based management 
of natural resources. In addition, policies on adaptability and vulnerability of the 
fishing-farming households in the Chilwa basin are necessary to address poverty 
and food security issues. There, it is important to promote farming, fishing, and 
utilisation of other natural resources in an optimal manner.  
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Annex 1: Description of the main fishing gear types and methods applied in 
Lake Chilwa 
 
Matemba seine net  
Matemba seine nets are local seines suitable for operation in Lake Chilwa. The 
nets usually measure 80-200m in length, 2-3m in height, mesh measurement in 
the wings is 8m and in the central part 4mm. Fishers use the nets for catching 
small fish (Matemba). In the absence of natural beaches, fishers haul the nets into 
the boats. Fishing mainly demands a crew of 9 people who get half the amount of 
revenue earned from that particular fishing operation. The other proportion goes 
to the owner of the gear who takes care of the net and maintains the fishing 
vessel.  
 
Gill nets 
Several types of gillnets are in use. 
(a) Nets with 33mm mesh size, approximately 1.3m in height, stretched 
between bamboo poles. Its length ranges from 50-500m long. Fishers 
commonly use it in open water. 
(b) Nets with 33mm mesh size, approximately 1.8 in height with stone 
weights and wooden floats. Length of the nets can be 500m and operate in 
open water. 
(c) Nets with approximately 18mm mesh size, about 0.6m in height, stretched 
between bamboo poles. It is mainly common in vegetation-covered areas 
along the lakeshore. 
 
Scoop nets 
The scoop net consists of a triangular piece of netting measuring approximately 
2m x 2m x 2m. The mesh size is about 15mm. The net remain open by two 
bamboo poles. The scoop net usually catches Oreochromis shiranus chilwae. 
 
Long lines 
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The long lines consist of the main line with branch lines and large hooks. Fishers 
use both dead or live bait and only Clarias species are a target species. 
 
Bamboo traps 
The bamboo traps are round baskets measuring about 30cm in width and 50cm in 
length, with a single throat. Fishers operate is during receding lake levels in 
shallow waters and among the floating vegetation or reeds with bait. 
 
Nkacha seine 
Fishers operate Nkacha seines in Lake Malombe only. Nkacha seines measures 
over 250m long and 5m deep and have meshes of less than 12.5mm on the bunt 
although the recommended mesh size is a minimum of 19mm. Fishers operate 
Nkacha seines in open waters unlike other beach seines that are shore-based.  
 
The Lake Malombe fishers developed Nkacha seines after a serious decline of 
fish stocks in late 1970s having realized that they could not catch as much 
Kambuzi as they could with kambuzi seines traditionally known to exploit 
Copadichromis species locally known as Kambuzi.  
 
Biologists and fishers indicate that the Nkacha seines have been responsible for 
the collapse of Chambo fishery on Lake Malombe due to the nature of its 
operations like fishing in open waters, almost covering the whole water column 
when fishing on the lake thus destroying suitable habitat for fish breeding and 
feeding as it removes aquatic vegetation. The other proportion goes to the owner 
of the gear who takes care of the net and fishing vessels in terms of maintenance. 
The main intriguing aspect observed during Nkacha operation while on water is 
that one crew member dives to locate where the footrope is, and he ties it to form 
a bag before hauling the net into one of the canoes or boats. The fishing method 
uses a crew of usually 9 people, a diver locally called bilamani, who gets twice 
the amount of money that the other crew members get.  
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Annex 2: Migration Survey Form 
 
Beach:…………………………Village:……………………………TA:………………………District:……………………….. 
 
Name of 
Fisher 
When 
fishing 
started 
Gear 
type 
Where (beach) fishing has been done for the past 10 years 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Present 
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Additional guiding questions for migration survey 
 
Personal details and fishing history 
1. Name, age, home village, TA, district, marriage status, number of 
dependents 
2. When did you start fishing? 
3. How many gear types do you own? 
4. Do you fish on full- or part time basis? (Full time >8 years) 
 
Migration 
1. Are you allowed to land or fish anywhere in the lake? Can you compare 
access to the fisheries resources between now during the co-management 
and before? 
2. What prompts you to move from one beach to another? Is it water level 
changes or abundance of fish stocks? 
3. Have you ever been to other lakes? Explain 
4. Have you ever crossed the lake to Mozambican side of this Lake Chilwa? 
 
Access procedures 
1. How do you approach local leaders when going t new beaches? 
2. Do you give the traditional leader something like money or fish? If so, 
how frequent do you do that? 
3. How has been the mode of payment between gear owner and crew? 
4. When you move to other beaches, are you accepted by traditional 
authorities there? 
 
Investment 
1. How much did you spend as capital for your fishing business? From 
where did you get the capital? (farming, fishing, piece work, employment, 
TEBA contract, borrowed money from banks, inherited or other sources 
etc) 
2. How much do you get on average per week? 
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Annex 3: Survey on calendar of events, livelihood diversification and coping 
mechanisms for fishers and households in the Lake Chilwa wetland area 
 
Guiding questions 
1. Can you outline the economic activities you do on annual basis – specifically 
indicate what you do every month for the whole year?  
2. How did the fishery dependent communities survived during the 1968/69 
recession and 1995/96 recession? 
3. Which fishers by gear type migrated to other lakes? Mention where they went 
for fishing 
4. Were they just farming or doing other income generating activities? Indicate 
the activities. 
5. Did they get food handouts?  
6. If yes, from where?  
(a) Relatives  
(b) Government 
(c) Local leaders  
(d) Religious groups  
(e) NGOs  
(f) Others  
7. How do people get fish? Which fish and from where get to their areas and 
how frequent do they consume the fish? 
8. How and from where did they buy their food?  
(a) Locally,  
(b) Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC)  
(c) Within the villages  
(d) Other districts or counties such as Mozambique 
9. Did they resort to other food types apart from maize as a staple food crop? 
Which food types are these? Were they farmed or wild foods? Mention the 
types 
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10. How do Chisi community that does not have land for farming survive during 
recessions? Do the same for Chinguma community, Swang’oma, Mposa and 
Namanja areas for comparative sake 
11. Consider social capital and natural capital in the framework in terms of 
collective action and fishery dependent livelihood systems 
12. What support do the communities get from local leaders, government, 
religious groups during lean periods of food in any year? Which months do 
people stay without food in general? 
13. Do authorities make decisions publicly? 
14. Are meetings open? 
15. Do authorities report about any use of funds publicly? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 210 
 
Annex 4a: List of key informants that include fishers, local leaders and 
fisheries technical staff interviewed in 2004 
 
Date Nameof Key 
Informant 
Position/Occupation Place 
May – August 
2004 
Chigaya Lake Chilwa Boat 
Association Chair 
Chisi 
 Chirwa Seine fisher Kachulu 
 Nasiyaya Seine fisher Ntila 
 Makochera Beach Recorder 
(Kachulu) 
Kachulu 
 S. Mwale Fisheries Technical 
Assistant 
Chinguma 
 Kawinga - Sub-
Traditional 
Authority 
Nkowola) 
Senior Chief Kawinga 
 Group Village 
Head Namanja 
Traditional leader Namanja (Lake 
Chilwa North) 
 Village Head 
Mpambiche 
Traditional leader Chinguma (Lake 
Chilwa East 
 Nkhalamba Seine fisher Njalo Island (Lake 
Chilwa South 
 Chasi (Ms) Seine fisher Swang’oma and 
Mpoto (Lake 
Chilwa South) 
 GroupVillage 
Head 
Nthambula 
Traditional leader Swang’oma and 
Mpoto (Lake 
Chilwa South) 
 Group Village 
Head 
Chimbalanga 
Traditional leader Kachulu (Lake 
Chilwa South East) 
 Mr Chimdenga Fisheries Assistant  Zomba Fisheries 
Office 
 Mr Bulugama 
 
Gillnet fisher Mposa (Lake 
Chilwa West) 
 Mr Mitumbu 
 
Fish trapfisher Khanda (Lake 
Chilwa West) 
 Barnett Jamali  
 
Fish trap fisher Khanda (Lake 
Chilwa West) 
 Mr  Kamoto  Gillnet fisher Kachulu (Lake 
Chilwa South East) 
 Masikini  Gillnet fisher Khanda (Lake 
Chilwa West) 
 Bambo Doka Fish trap fisher Mposa (Lake 
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Chilwa West) 
 Traditional 
Authority 
Mkumbira 
Traditional leader Chisi Island (Lake 
Chilwa Central) 
 Mrs Green  Mposa Women 
Group Chair 
Mposa (Lake 
Chilwa West) 
6-10 October, 
2006 
Mr Ajenga 
Chiwanda 
Farmer Mposa (Lake 
Chilwa West) 
 Mr Makwacha Seine fisher Chinguma (Lake 
Chilwa East) 
 Mr Pusepuse Gillnet fisher Ntila (Lake Chilwa 
North) 
 Mr Namgubudu Ntila BVSC Chair Ntila (Lake Chilwa 
North) 
 Mr Bamusi 
Kalonga 
Seine crew member Mposa (Lake 
Chilwa West) 
 Mr Chirwa Seine crew member Kachulu (Lake 
Chilwa South 
West) 
 Mrs Masikini Fish processor and 
trader 
Kachulu (Lake 
Chilwa South 
West) 
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Annex 4b: Focus Group discussions 
Date Place Number of Participants 
2 June 2004 Kachlu 17 (fishers, farmers, 
traders) 
17 May 2004 Mposa 22 (fishers, farmers, 
traders) 
15 August 2006 Mposa 8 (fishers, farmers, 
traders) 
4 September 2004 Chisi 11 (fishers, farmers, 
traders) 
5 September 2004 Chinguma 16 (fishers, farmers, 
traders) 
7 September 2004 Swang’oma 23 (fishers, farmers, 
traders) 
18 October 2004 Namanja 31 (fishers, farmers, 
traders 
16 November 2004 Ntila 19 (fishers, farmers, 
traders) 
16 August 2006 Ntila 12 (fishers, farmers, 
traders) 
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Annex 5:  Combined survey question schedule for the analysis of co-
management institutions 
 
          
Zone Name: 
Zone Number: ZONE        
 
Village Name: 
Village Number:     VILLAGE 
 
Interview type (CIRCLE ONE):   ZONE 
 
01 = BVC member 02 = Fisher 03 = Household  
 
This interview is what number of this type of interview for this village (CIRCLE ONE): NUMBER  
BVC    Fisher   Household 
   1 1           1 
   2 2           2 
   3 3           3 
   4 4           4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 
Unique ID for interview: 
Zone number    BVC Number     Village Number       Type          Number of this Type 
 
WRITE THE UNIQUE ID ON EVERY PAGE OF THE SURVEY SCHEDULE BEFORE 
BEGINNING THE INTERVIEW.  
 
BVC interview is to be done with four people randomly selected from the list of members of the 
BVC. 
 
Fisher interviews are to be done with the owners, or if owner is absent the operator, of 8 boats 
chosen at random from the boats fishing from the village when the team arrives in the village. 
 
Household interviews are to be done with four households randomly selected from the headman’s 
list of village residents.  Household interviews should be done with a “providing head of 
household or their spouse” meaning the senior man or woman living in the compound who is able 
to carry out economic activities.  
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Basic Instructions 
 
1. The basic unit of the survey is the zone. A team should expect to stay in a zone for one week 
and carry out a total of 32 interviews in this zone. These consist of 16 in each of two villages: 4 
household interviews; 4 BVC member interviews; and 8 fisher interviews.  When the team arrives 
in a new zone, say on a Monday morning, one member should go to one village to set up the 
interviews and the other team member should go to the other village to do set up. 
 
Village set up:  
 
(a)  When the set up person arrives in a new village, he or she should visit the local 
headman and inform him or her of their activities. From the headman he or she should 
get a list of all the households in the village. 
 
(b) The set up person should then visit the BVC chairperson (or other BVC leader if the 
chair is not available) to provide them with a list of all the members of the BVC.  
         
(c)  With the help of the BVC chair, the set up person should begin to fill out the village 
data sheet.  
 
(d) At an appropriate time of day when fishers can be expected to have their boats on 
shore the team should visit the all fishing boat-landing places used by fishers in the area 
under the responsibility of the BVC. They should list all the boats that are physically 
present on the village data sheet.  
 
(e) From the list of BVC members, the team should randomly select four members to 
interview. 
 
(f) From the list of households, the team should randomly select four households to 
interview. 
 
(g) From the list of boats at the landing places the team should select 8 boats. For each of 
these 8 boats the team will interview the owner, or if the owner is either not available or 
does not involve his or herself in the ongoing operations of the boat, then they should 
interview whoever is in charge of the boat’s day-to-day operations. 
 
2. The next day both members of the team should go to one village, and interview four persons 
each. The third day they should complete the first village. The fourth day they should go to the 
second village and interview four persons each. The fifth day they should finish the second 
village.  
 
3. The team must interview 16 people in every village. If a randomly chosen person cannot be 
located for the interview during the time the team is in the village, then the next person on the list 
should be selected.  
 
 
Reading the Survey Schedule 
 
What the interviewer wants to do is make every presentation of every question in every interview 
to every respondent exactly the same.  
 
R stands for Respondent, the person you are interviewing.  
 
The interviewer should read the questions in the interview schedule exactly as they are written. 
 
Words written in ALL CAPS are instructions for you, the interviewer. They are never to be read 
to R.  
 
 
 
 
 215 
 
 
Only words written in bold are to be read to R. 
 
The interviewer must not change the way that he or she reads a question from one time to the 
next. 
The interviewer must read all the questions in a neutral voice, treating all answers equally. 
 
The interviewer must never disagree with R’s response.  
 
The interviewer must never encourage R to answer in a certain way.  
 
The interviewer should avoid trying to explain questions. This is especially true of questions 
asking for R’s opinion. If a question is looking for a specific fact (for example, ‘how many people 
in this household fish’) then explanations are not a great problem.  
 
If the interviewer asked to explain something about an opinion question (for example ‘how fairly 
do you think the Department of Fisheries treats people in this village?) the only thing the 
interviewer can do is to repeat the question exactly as written. If this is not enough the interviewer 
should just write ‘question not understood.’ Explaining a question will mean that it is not asked 
the same way every time. If an opinion question causes many people to ask for an explanation 
there is something wrong with the question. This should be reported to senior staff for action.  
 
Words in [brackets] are options. The interviewer should choose one appropriate phrase among 
those offered. The brackets usually exist because I do not know R’s gender.  
 
Answers must be clearly marked with a heavy pen and never be placed on a line between two 
answers.  
 
A household is defined as those who eat together on a regular basis. If several co-wives live on 
the same compound and eat separately then the household of the eldest wife resident in this 
village should be what the household questions refer to.  
 
To probe means to encourage R to say more. For example if you asked R to list the fishing gear 
he owns and you keep asking “what other gear do you own” then you are probing. Many 
questions say DO NOT PROBE, which means I want to know only the things that come to R’s 
mind right away.   
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Section 1: Fishing information  
NOTE THAT THIS IS CAPTURE FISHING ONLY, AQUACULTURE AND FISH 
PROCESSING ARE ADDRESSED IN THE NEXT SECTION 
1. In the past year has anyone in this household ever gone fishing using any fishing gear larger 
than a line with a single hook or employed others to fish with his or her boat or gear?   
 1.NO   ----> GO TO NEXT SECTION        2) YES GOFSH11 
2. What are the most important species caught by members of this household?  
ASK R TO LIST THE MOST IMPORTANT SPECIES CAUGHT BY MEMBERS OF THIS 
HOUSEHOLD ACCORDING TO WHAT HE OR SHE THINKS IS “IMPORTANT”. ACCEPT 
HOW EVER MANY SPECIES R MENTIONS UP TO FIVE. DO NOT PROBE. FILL OUT THE 
FOLLOWING TABLE FOR THE SPECIES THAT R MENTIONS. 
Species What is the most 
important use of 
this species? 
How much of your catch of this 
species do you sell? READ 
RESPONSES AND ASK R TO 
CHOOSE ONE RESPONSE 
Is this species more 
important to you than 
five years ago, less 
important, or the same as 
five years ago? 
SPEC121 
OTH121-5 
   1.food    USE121 
   2.cash 
 1.all of it                        2. most of 
it  
 3. less than half of it     4. none of 
it 
SELL121 
1. less       2. same      3. 
more  
IMP121 
SPEC122    1.food     
   2.cash USE122 
 1.all of it                        2. most of 
it  
 3. less than half of it     4. none of 
it 
SELL122 
1. less       2. same      3. 
more  
IMP122 
SPEC123    1.food    USE123 
   2.cash 
 1.all of it                        2. most of 
it  
 3. less than half of it     4. none of 
it 
SELL123 
1. less       2. same      3. 
more  
IMP123 
SPEC124    1.food    USE124 
   2.cash 
 1.all of it                        2. most of 
it  
 3. less than half of it     4. none of 
it 
SELL124 
1. less       2. same      3. 
more  
IMP124 
SPEC125 
  
   1.food    USE125 
   2.cash 
 1.all of it                        2. most of 
it  
 3. less than half of it     4. none of 
it 
SELL125 
1. less       2. same      3. 
more  
IMP125 
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3 How many people in this household have gone fishing this past year?    ________ NUM13 
FOR THREE PEOPLE WITH THE MOST GEAR  GET THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION. 
What is the relation to 
head of household? 
How many boats 
does this person 
own? 
What gear does this person 
own? 
How much / many of 
gear? 
REL131 BOATS131 
 
A GEAR1311 othgr1311 
B GEAR1312 othgr1312 
C GEAR1313 othgr1313 
AMGR1311 
UNIT1311 
AMGR1312 
UNIT1321 
AMGR1313 
UNIT1333 
REL132 BOATS132 
 
A GEAR1321  othgr1321 
B GEAR1322 othgr1322 
C GEAR1323 othgr1323 
AMGR1321 
UNIT1321 
AMGR1322 
UNIT1322 
AMGR1323 
UNIT1323 
REL133 BOATS133 
 
A GEAR1331  othgr1331 
B GEAR1332 othgr1332 
C GEAR1333 othgr1333 
AMGR1331 
UNIT1331 
AMGR1332 
UNIT1332 
AMGR1333 
UNIT1333 
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IF R IS NOT ONE OF THE FISHERS SKIP TO THE NEXT SECTION.44 
 4. Now I would like to ask you some questions about your own fishing. 
   J F M A M J J A S O N D 
Which 4 months do you fish the most?     momon141-4             
Which 4 months do you fish the least?      lemon141-4             
LIST SPECIES FROM QUESTIONS TWO  
When do you fish for them? 
CHECK THE MONTHS 
spec141-5  spjan141-5           spdec141-5
             
             
othsp141-2             
             
are the  most important gears you use for fishing?  
AGAIN LIST DON’T PROBE 
When do you fish with each one? 
gear141-4 gejan141-4   geap141-
4 
       gedec141-4
             
othgr141-2             
             
Where does this person fish and what months 
does he fish there? 
RECORD AREAS WHERE R FISHES 
LIST DO NOT PROBE 
Lake lajan141           ladec141 
Grassy areas grjan141           grdec141 
River   rijan141           ridec141 
Lagoons lgjan141           lgdec141 
Other otjan141           otdec141 
Where does this person land fish and when does 
he land them there?   
RECORD NAMES OF LANDING PLACES 
PROBE FOR ANY OTHERS? 
land1411 lnjan141-3           lndec141-3
land1411             
land1411             
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   First and Second 
Importance 
How often do you sell 
to these people 
Indicate which kind of 
customer is the most 
important, which is 
the second most 
important, and how 
important the others 
are.  
(IMPORTANT = 
LARGEST SOURCE 
OF MONEY) 
People who sell the fish in large cities 
or outside this province. 
imp141-5 1. Often 2. Sometimes 
3.Never 
seoft141-5 
People who sell the fish in towns in this 
province 
 1. Often 2. Sometimes 
3.Never 
People who sell the fish in towns in this 
district 
 1. Often 2. Sometimes 
3.Never 
People who sell the fish in this and  
neighbouring villages  
  
 1. Often 2. Sometimes 
3.Never 
People who eat the fish  1. Often 2. Sometimes 
3.Never 
 
5. How many years ago did you begin to fish for the very first time? _____________ Years or _____Year started 
        YEARS15   YEARST15 
 6. How many years ago did you begin to fish on this [lake / river / swamp] for the very first time? 
__________________ Years or _________ Year started 
YEARS16   YEARST16 
7. Have there been any time since the beginning when you stopped fishing for an entire year or more? 
1. NO2.YES--------> How often have you stopped fishing for an entire year or more?  
STOP17 1. Just Once       2. Two or three times        3. Many times.  OFSTOP17 
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8.  Please tell us if you agree or disagree with each of the following descriptions of how you decide when to go 
fishing. CIRCLE ONE 
A.  I only go fishing when the farming conditions make it difficult to live only from farming.   
DEC181         Agree      Disagree 
 
B. I go fishing only during the seasons when there is little work  
to do in farming, then I return to farming when the work begins.                                           Agree     Disagree 
DEC182 
C. I both farm and fish all the time whether the conditions for  
farming are good or not.                                                                                                          Agree     Disagree 
DEC183 
D.  Farming has never been an important activity to me,  
when I was not fishing I was employed by someone or 
engaged in other business activities.        Agree —> Q10Disagree Agree   Disagree 
DEC184 
E.  Farming has been important to me, but in the past  
I was also employed by someone and I  
only started fishing when I left that work. Agree-----> Q10Disagree Agree   Disagree 
DEC185 
F.  I was never a farmer, I have only been a fisher or  
been engaged in other business activities. Agree   Disagree 
DEC186 
G.  I fish because fishing always gives me the highest cash  
income of all activities I can do. Agree    Disagree 
DEC187 
H.  I fish because fishing always gives me the most food for  
my family of all activities I can do. Agree    Disagree 
DEC188 
I.  I am fishing but it is not because it gives me the most  
food for my family or cash income.  Agree    Disagree 
DEC189 
J.  In the past I was a farmer, but I stopped now I only fish,  
but someday I hope to go back and farm again.      Agree–> Q9Disagree Agree   Disagree 
DEC1810    
K.  In the past I was a farmer, but I stopped now I only fish,  
and I want to stay a fisher from now on.       Agree–> Q9    Disagree Agree   Disagree 
DEC1811 
 
9. IF R AGREED WITH K OR L ASK -> Why did you stop farming? 
 
WYSTOP19         
10. IF R AGREED WITH D or E ASK—>     What activities were you doing? ___________________________ 
 
WHTAC110   250 CHARS 
 
11. Why did you leave?   WHLV110 OTH110 a) I was made redundant  b) I retired c) I did not 
like the work   d) I still do this activity when I am not fishing e) other 
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Section 2: Perceptions of the Resource and the Fisheries   
 
1. How has the overall amount of fish in the lake (river, swamp etc.) changed over the last five years? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER THREE ______________________AMT21 
 
2. Which species has in creased the most? ____SPEC22__________________ (RECORD SPECIES) 
 
3. Which species has decreased the most? ___________(RECORD SPECIES)    SPEC23 
4. How has the overall number of fishers on the lake (river, swamp etc.) changed over the last five years? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER THREE ________________________ CHNG24 
 
5. What new methods have been introduced? DO NOT READ, PROBE IF NECESSARY, FOR EACH 
METHOD MENTIONED FILL OUT THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION 
Method name Year first seen. How many are now seen? Who introduced 
this method? 
METH51-3   YEAR51-3 1. Few 2. Some 3. Many 
SEEN51-3 
WHO51-3 150 
CHARS 
  1. Few 2. Some 3. Many  
  1. Few 2. Some 3. Many  
 
6. How much have fishing practices in this area changed in the past five years? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR _____________PRAC26___________ 
 
 
7. How has the amount of money people are investing in fishing changed? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER THREE ________________________ 
MON27 
 
8. How many new fishers have come to fish from far away in the last five years? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FIVE ________________________NEWFIS28 
 
9. How many of the new fishers from far away fish in the same places where [you / your neighbours] fish? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FIVE ________________________FARFIS29 
 
10. How many fishers have left off fishing here in the last five years? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FIVE ________________________LFISH210 
 
11. What do you think are the two worst gears used in this fishery for the conservation of the fishery? 
 
 Gear  Why is this gear destructive? Who brought this gear?  Who uses this 
gear?   
GEAR2111-2 WHY2111-2      250 CHARS  WHOBR211-2   150 
CHARS 
WHUS2111-2 
    
.  
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Section 3: Enforcement and Compliance  
 
IF R IS NOT A FISHER SKIP TO THE NEXT SECTION 
 
1. What are the two most important fisheries conservation rules or measures in this fishery? 
FILL IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE 
Rule RULE311-2    150 CHARS  
How strictly do fishers in this place 
follow this rule?    
LADDER TWO 
STCK311-2  
Who told you about this rule? 1. DoF   2. Chief  3.BVC WHOT311-2 
OTHT311-2 
4.Other______________ 
1. DoF   2. Chief  
3.BVC  
4.Other_____________
_ 
Who made this rule?  1. DoF   2. Chief  3.BVC  
WHOM311-2 
OTHM311-2 
4.Other______________ 
1. DoF   2. Chief  
3.BVC  
4.Other_____________
_ 
Who punishes those who break this 
rule? 
1. DoF   2. Chief  3.BVC  
WHOP311-2 
OTHP311-2 
4.Other______________ 
1. DoF   2. Chief  
3.BVC  
4.Other_____________
_ 
How often are violators punished? 
LADDER 6 
PUN311-2  
 
2. Do the people in this village know when people are breaking fisheries rules here? 
  
 RECORD RESPONSE FROM LADDER TWO __________________________________ 
VILKNO32 
 
3. Does the BVC know when people are breaking fisheries rules here? 
 
 RECORD RESPONSE FROM LADDER TWO __________________________________ 
BVCKNO33 
 
4. Does the DoF know when people are breaking fisheries rules here? 
 
DoFKNO34 
 RECORD RESPONSE FROM LADDER TWO __________________________________ 
 
5. Does the Chief or sub-Chiefs know when people are breaking fisheries rules here? 
 
 RECORD RESPONSE FROM LADDER TWO __________________________________ 
CHIKNO35 
 
6. Does the village headman know when people are breaking fisheries rules here? 
HEDKNO36 
 RECORD RESPONSE FROM LADDER TWO __________________________________ 
 
7. Do fish traders encourage people to break fisheries rules? 
TRAD37 
 RECORD RESPONSE FROM LADDER TWO __________________________________ 
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8. Have you ever been caught breaking a fishing rule?  
 1. NO -> SKIP TO NEXT SECTION 2. YES YOU38 
 
9. Which authority caught you?   
 1. DoF   2. Chief  3.BVC 4.Other______________WHO39  OTH39 
 
  10. Was the punishment you were given harsh? 
 
 RECORD RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR __________________________________ 
HAR310 
 
11. What punishment(s) did you receive? ____________________________WHAT311 200 
 
12. What regulations did you violate? DO NOT READ, DO NOT PROBE, CHECK ALL THAT APPLY 
MESH312 A . Mesh size and other gear regulations 
CLOS312 B.  Closed or protected areas  
ACCRI312 C.  Access rights (R was fishing where he was not allowed but where other fishers are 
allowed)SEA312 D. Closed season  
   
13. Why did you violate this regulation?  
FILL OUT THE FOLLOWING TABLE FOR EACH VIOLATION IDENTIFIED IN Q 24 
      DO NOT READ   DO NOT PROBE CHECK ALL THAT R MENTIONS 
 
 Viol
ation Letter 
 from Q 24 
I have to make a living 
and support my        
family  
I don't think 
this regulation 
protects the fish 
stocks  
This regulation is 
unfair     
Other (Specify) 
  
VIO3131-2 LIV3131-2  PRO3131-2 FAIR3131-2 OTH3131-2  
 
 
      
 
   
 
     
 
 
 
 
  224 
Section 4: Household information 
 
1.  During the past twelve months did you or other members of your household REMIND R OF HOUSEHOLD 
DEFINITION work for pay or engage in any small businesses, crafts or selling activities? 
WORK41 
    1.NO -> GO TO QUESTION 2 
    2.YES ---> What specific kinds of work for pay or small businesses or crafts or sales would this be?  Which 
members of the household did each activity? 
 
Activity Do you own this business? Does this activity pay a regular 
salary? 
ACT421-3 1. No        2. Yes OWN421-3 1. No        2. Yes PAY421-3 
 1. No        2. Yes 1. No        2. Yes 
 1. No        2. Yes 1. No        2. Yes 
 
2. In the past 12 months have you or your [wife/ husband] farmed crops? 
FARM42 
1.NO 2.YES  ----> FILL THE FOLLOWING FOR EACH FIELD FARMED BY R’S HOUSEHOLD: 
Crop Kilos last  
harvest    
IF PICK AND 
EAT WRITE 
PE 
Proportion 
Sold 
Acquisition:          a) inherit                    
b) bought 
 c) rent or loan from relative  d) rent 
or loan from non-relative 
 e)   allocated by headman or chief f) 
other  
CROP421-4   OTHC4211-4 KILO421-4 PROP421-4 GOT421-4 OTHG421-4 
 
3.  During the past twelve months how many animals were kept by you or your household?   
Animals Number Animals Number 
Dairy cows COW43  Ducks DUCK43 
Beef cattle CATTL43  Sheep SHEEP43 
Goats GOAT43  Swine SWINE43 
Chickens CHICK43  Oxen for labour OXEN43 
 
4. Does your household own an ox cart? CART44     1.NO    2.YES 
 
5.  Do you own a motor vehicle or bicycle? 
    1.NO    2.YES => CIRCLE ONE (FOR LARGEST ONE):  TRUCK     CAR     MOTORCYCLE   BICYCLE 
OWN47 WHATOW47 
 
6.  In general would you say that your standard of living is better or worse than five years ago?  
   RECORD RESPONSE FROM LADDER SIX____________________LIVE49 
 
7. Please fill in the following. 
What type of water source does your house have? SOUR410 
What type of toilet does your household use? TOIL410  
 
8. How many houses total do you have at this or any other place?  ___HOUS411____ 
For each house: 
Type of wall. WALL4111-5      
Type of floor FLOR4111-5     
Type of roof. ROOF4111-5     
Number of rooms. ROOM4111-5     
9. What percentage of your family’s cash income comes from fishing? ___________________PERFS412 
YOU MAY USE THE ANSWER ABOVE IN QUESTIONS ONE AND TWO TO HELP R ESTIMATE THIS 
PERCENTAGE.  
10. Do you or you spouse have any cash savings that you can call on in an emergency? SAVE413 
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 NO     YES ===> If you were forced to live on this savings how long would it last  (CIRCLE ONE) 
 A WEEK    A MONTH SEVERAL MONTHS A YEAR  MORE THAN A YEAR 
              LAST413 
11. If you wanted to, do you know where you could get a loan large enough to buy a cow? 
NO   YES    LOAN414 
12. Do you have anyone living somewhere else who sends you money regularly? 
NO    YES —> MAKE SURE THIS IS REFLECTED IN ANSWER TO Q12 
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Section 5: Basic Demographic Information 
 
1. How old are you? ________ YEARS 
2.  
2. Did your father fish? (CIRCLE ONE) 
 1. NO 2. YES ---> Was there a time when fishing was his principal occupation? (CIRCLE ONE) 
 
3. To what ethnic group do you belong? _________________ 
 
4. CIRCLE IF R IS A             1. MAN            OR        2. WOMAN 
 
5. In this household, how many people eat together regularly (WRITE NUMBER ON LINE) 
 _____ adult men _______ adult women ________ children  
 
6. IF R IS A MAN ASK HIM TOTAL NUMBER OF LIVING WIVES ___________  
 
7. How many of these wives are included in this household as defined above. ____  
 
8. What is the highest grade of education that you entered?  __________       
 
9. How many children are you supporting? ________ CHILDREN 
 
10. How many days per week does your family eat fish?  DAYS  
 
11. How long have you been in this place? ______ years 
 
12. Where is your permanent residence?   READ RESPONSES, ASK R TO CHOOSE AND CIRCLE 
RESPONSE 
 a) this village  b) a nearby village-> GO TO Q14   
 c) another village in this district   —> GO TO Q14 
 d) outside this district ASK NAME OF DISTRICT:_____________________ —> GO TO Q14 
 
13. Is this village your ancestral home? (CIRCLE ONE)  
       1. NO–> GO TO QUESTION 18  2. YES—> GO TO QUESTION 18 
 
14 When did you go to your permanent home? (CIRCLE ONE) 
1. LAST MONTH     3. SEVERAL MONTHS AGO     4. OVER A YEAR AGO   
 
15. Do you or your husband stay at your permanent residence? 1. NO  2. YES 
 
16. What would you say is the main reason that you come to this place? READ RESPONSES AND CIRCLE 
THE ONE MAIN REASON, IF R GIVES MORE THAN ONE REASON ASK WHICH IS ‘MOST 
IMPORTANT’ 
 1. To fish    
 2. To buy fish and to sell fresh  
 3. To buy fish, process and sell      
 4. To farm  
               5. Other _______________________ 
  
17. Besides your own household REMIND R OF HOUSEHOLD DEFINITION AND WHERE APPLICABLE 
SAY: [including the households of your other wives] do you have good friends and relatives in this place that you 
can call on for assistance when you need it? 
 1. NO    2. YES => How many? (CIRCLE ONE) 1 OR 2    3 TO 5    5 TO 10    MORE THAN 10 
 
18. During the past twelve months did you stay (sleep for more than two weeks) anywhere outside this village? 
           1. NO 
           2. YES---> Please list each place you stay and indicate what activities you do when you stay there.   
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Place Total 
months at 
that place 
Distance 
from here 
(estimate 
kilometres) 
Activities (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY) 
Fish Fish 
Trading 
Raise 
crops 
Raise 
Animals 
 
Run a 
busin
ess 
Work for an 
employer 
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
 
19. Over the past two years have you spent enough time in this village to be familiar with the fisheries 
management work of the Village Management Committee 
 
1. No —> TERMINATE INTERVIEW      2. Yes ----> GO TO THE NEXT SECTION 
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Section 6: Perceptions of Important Stakeholder Groups 
 
1. How much do you think the Department of Fisheries supports the Beach Village Committee? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
2. How much do people in this village know about who gives the Department of Fisheries advice? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER ONE ________________________ 
 
3. How much do people in this village know about how the Department of Fisheries makes decisions? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER ONE ________________________ 
 
4. How carefully does the Department of Fisheries listen to the Beach Village Committee?  
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
5. How fairly do you think that the Department of Fisheries treats the people in this village? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
6. How much do you think that the RELEVANT NGO  supports the Beach Village Committee? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
7. How much do people in this village know about who gives the RELEVANT NGO  advice?  
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER ONE ________________________ 
 
8. How much do people in this village know about how the RELEVANT NGO  makes decisions? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER ONE ________________________ 
 
9. How carefully does the RELEVANT NGO  listen to the Beach Village Committee? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
10. How fairly do you think that the RELEVANT NGO  treats the people in this village? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
11. How much do you think that the District Assembly supports the Beach Village Committee? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
12. How much do people in this village know about who gives the District Assembly advice? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER ONE ________________________ 
 
13. How much do people in this village know about how the District Assembly makes decisions? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER ONE ________________________ 
 
14. How carefully does the District Assembly listen to the Beach Village Committee? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
15. How fairly do you think that the District Assembly treats the people in this village? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
16. How much do you think that the Village Headman supports the Beach Village Committee? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
17. How much do people in this village know about who gives the Village Headman advice? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER ONE ________________________ 
 
18. How much do people in this village know about how the Village Headman makes decisions? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER ONE ________________________ 
 
19. How carefully does the Village Headman listen to the Beach Village Committee? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
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20. How fairly do you think that the Village Headman treats the people in this village? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
21. How much do you think that the Chief supports the Beach Village Committee? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
22. How much do people in this village know about who gives the Chief advice? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER ONE ________________________ 
 
23. How much do people in this village know about how the Chief makes decisions? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER ONE ________________________ 
 
24. How carefully does the Chief listen to the Village Management Committee? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
25. How fairly do you think that the Chief treats the people in this village?  
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
MLOS6Q1. How much do you think that the Fishermen’s Association supports the Beach Village Committee? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
MLOS6Q2. How much do people in this village know about who gives the Fishermen’s Association advice? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER ONE ________________________ 
MLOS6Q3. How much do people in this village know about how the Fishermen Association makes decisions? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER ONE ________________________ 
MLOS6Q4. How carefully does the Fishermen’s Association listen to the Beach Village Committee? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
MLOS6Q5. How fairly do you think that the Fishermen’s Association treats the people in this village?  
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
26. Is there anyone that you see as being strongly opposed to the work of the BVC? 
 
 1.No  2.Yes —> Who are these people and why are they opposed?  
 
DO NOT RECORD NAMES, BRIEFLY DESCRIBE WHO THESE PEOPLE ARE AND WHY THEY ARE 
OPPOSED TO THE BVC.  
 
 1. _________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
 2. _________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  
 
 3. __________________________________________________________________________  
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Section 7: Participation in the Co-management Process 
 
1. How carefully do you feel the village management committee listens to people like you? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
2. How do you think BVC members are selected? (DO NOT READ RESPONSES BELOW, DO NOT PROBE, 
IF R’S RESPONSE DOES NOT FIT WITH A PRE-SELECTED CATEGORY WRITE THEIR ANSWER IN 
6.OTHER       CHECK ONLY ONE LINE) 
 1. THEY ARE ELECTED OPENLY BY THE WHOLE VILLAGE ______ 
 2. THEY ARE SELECTED BY THE HEADMAN OR THE CHIEF _______ 
 3. THEY ARE SELECTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES_______ 
4. THEY ARE SELECTED BY THE _____________________ NGO 
 5. THEY ARE SELECTED BY THE (CHECK ONE) HEADMAN/ CHIEF_____ DoF____  
 OR NGO_____ AND THEN THIS SELECTION IS APPROVED BY THE VILLAGE 
 6. OTHER ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. How often do you attend BVC meetings?  
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER TWO ________________________ 
 
4. Were you involved in the formation of the village management committee?   
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
5. How often do you go on patrol with the BVC? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER TWO ________________________ 
 
6. How carefully do you think that the village management committee listens to women? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
7. How carefully do you think that the village management committee listens to farmers? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
8. How carefully do you think that the village management committee listens to fishers? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
9. Which fishers does the BVC listen to more than other fishers? 
 1. It listens the same way to all the fishers. —> GO TO QUESTION 11 
 2. It listens more to ______________________________________________ 
10. Which fishers does the BVC not listen to at all? 
 _______________________________________________ 
 
11. How carefully do you think that the village management committee listens to people who do not live all year 
in this village but only come here to fish?  
RESPONSE FROM LADDER four ________________________ 
 
12. I would like you to tell me the other groups the BVC works with and how closely they work with them. AS R 
TO LIST THE GROUPS HE OR SHE THINKS THE BVC WORKS WITH. WHEN THE LIST IS COMPLETE 
ASK R TO ORDER THEM FROM THE CLOSEST TO THE FARTHEST AND THEN INDICATE IF THEY 
WORK VERY CLOSELY, CLOSELY, OR ONLY SOMETIMES. 
Group Rank Order How do they work together 
very closely closely only 
sometimes 
     
     
     
 
 
13. How carefully do you think that the village management committee listens to fish traders from this village? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
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14. How carefully do you think that the village management committee listens to fish traders that come from far? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
MLOS7Q1. Are you a member of the Fishermen’s Association? 
  1.No  2, Yes  
 
15. Are you a member of the BVC? 
  1.No—> GO TO THE NEXT SECTION 2.Yes 
 
16. How often does the Department of Fisheries send a representative to BVC meetings? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER TWO_____________________ 
 
17. How carefully do you think that the village management committee listens to the DoF representative? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
18. Are there any decisions that the BVC would never take without the agreement of the DoF? 
 1.No.  2.Yes->    What decisions would they never take without DoF? 
 
19. How often does the Village Headman sends a representative (or comes himself) to BVC meetings 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER TWO ________________________ 
 
20. How carefully do you think that the village management committee listens to the Village Headman (or his 
representative)? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
21. Are there any decisions that the BVC would never take without the agreement of the headman? 
 1.No.  2.Yes->    What decisions would they never take without the headman? 
 
22. How often does the chief sends a representative (or comes himself) to BVC meetings? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER TWO ________________________ 
 
23. How carefully do you think that the village management committee listens to the chief (or his representative)? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR ________________________ 
 
24. Are there any decisions that the BVC would never take without the agreement of the  chief? 
 1.No.  2.Yes->    What decisions would they never take without the  chief? 
 
25. How often does the village management committee get messages from the association? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER TWO________________________ 
 
26. How carefully do you think that the village management committee listens to the association? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER FOUR________________________ 
 
27. Are there any decisions that the BVC would never take without the agreement of the association? 
 1.No.  2.Yes->    What decisions would they never take without the association.  
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Section 8: Perceptions of the Benefits and Qualities of the Co-management 
Program 
 
1.  Do you think that the there are more fish now because the BVC has been working? 
1. The BVC has made no 
difference in the amount of 
fish 
2. The BVC has made a little 
difference in the amount of 
fish 
3. The BVC has 
made a lot of 
difference in the 
amount of fish 
 
2. Do you think the village is better off or worse off because of the BVC? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER SIX ________________________ 
 
3. Do you think the BVC members agree with each other more or disagree with each other more. How often do 
they disagree? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER TWO________________________ 
 
4. Do you think the rest of the village most often agrees or most often disagrees with BVC actions? How often do 
they disagree? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER TWO ______________________ 
 
5. How has the number of people punished for violating fisheries rules changed because of the work of the BVC? 
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER THREE____________________ 
 
6. How has the number of people violating the fisheries rules in this village changed because of the work of the 
BVC?  
 RESPONSE FROM LADDER THREE____________________ 
7 
. Has there any other development in this village that has been helped by the BVC programme? 
1.No 2.Yes----> What other development has been helped by the BVC programme? 
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Annex 6: Co-management survey sites 
 
 
Zone Number 
 
Traditional Authority 
 
Village/Beach Village Sub-
Committee 
 
3 
 
Kawinga 
 
5. Mchinguza 
6. Mtila 
 
4 
 
Mlomba 
 
7. Khuzumba 
8. Zumulu 
 
5 
 
Mposa 
 
9. Mapila 
 
6 
 
Kumtumanji 
 
10. Mtolongo 
11. Mchenga 
 
7 
 
Mkumbira 
 
12. Ngotangota 
13. Chaoni 
 
8 
 
Mwambo 
 
14. Mbalu 
15. Naphali 
 
9 
 
Nazombe 
 
16. Thanga 
17. Njalo 
 
10 
 
Mkhumba 
 
18. Chikolizi 
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Annex 7: Identified variables and their operationalisation for the co-management attitude survey 
 
Type Variable Level of Observation Method of Observation Operationalisation 
Individual Village Fishing 
Zone 
Demographics Individual 
ages 
x   Survey questions Ask age of Respondent 
Size of 
community 
 x x Documentary research, 
observation 
Estimate population of fishers on a beach 
or village 
Migration  x x Survey questions, 
documentary research, 
observation 
Magnitude and types of movements by 
fishers 
Variability of Resource   x Documentation and 
survey questions 
Number of species or fishers involved 
and the magnitude of fluctuation in their 
numbers and yearly round. Indicate 
number of fisheries sectors (traditional 
and commercial, physical type of 
resource (swamp, river, open lake, 
lagoon, estuary, flood) 
Support for co-management 
by DoF and donors 
 x x Observation, in-depth 
qualitative interviews, 
documentation 
Reasons agency is pursuing a co-
management effort 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age of 
programme 
x x x In-depth qualitative 
interviews, survey 
question, documentation  
Years programme has been operating 
Relations 
with 
Traditional 
Authorities 
(TAs) 
x x x In-depth qualitative 
interviews, survey 
question, documentation  
Role traditional leaders (Village Heads 
and Traditional Authorities) are playing 
in their own eyes and the eyes of the 
villagers 
Representat
ion (co-
manageme
nt 
x x x Observation, in-depth 
qualitative interviews, 
survey question, 
documentation  
People’s impressions of whose interests 
are represented and questions about 
whether and how Respondent sees his or 
her interests represented 
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Process 
Variables 
organogra
m, partners, 
representati
ve 
organisatio
n 
NGO 
participatio
n 
x x x Observation, in-depth 
qualitative interviews, 
survey question, 
documentation  
Role NGOs are playing in their own eyes, 
the eyes of other leaders and the eyes of 
the villagers their  
Relations 
with other 
community 
based 
organisatio
ns 
x x x Observation, in-depth 
qualitative interviews, 
survey question 
Role other groups are playing in their 
own eyes, the eyes of other leaders and 
the eyes of the villagers 
Structure x x x Observation, in-depth 
qualitative interviews, 
survey question, 
documentation  
The pattern of programme interactions 
across time and space 
Enforceme
nt 
(frequency 
of patrols) 
x x x Observation, in-depth 
qualitative interviews, 
survey question, 
documentation  
How and to what degree is compliance or 
non-compliance with regulations 
observed and sanctioned. Ask about both 
their experiences and those of others 
Types of 
measures 
used 
(formal v 
informal) 
x x x Documentation, in-depth 
qualitative interviews 
What management measures are or were 
in force and being considered for the 
future 
Gender x x x Observation, in-depth 
qualitative interviews, 
survey question, 
documentation  
Representation in decision-making 
processes, functions 
Responsive
ness to 
x x x In-depth qualitative 
interviews, 
How does DoF respond to fisheries policy 
initiatives from the local level 
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participatio
n (DoF and 
community
) 
documentation, 
observation of meetings, 
survey questions 
Transparen
cy of co-
manageme
nt 
x x x In-depth qualitative 
interviews, 
documentation, 
observation of meetings, 
survey questions 
Are decisions made publicly? Are 
meetings open? Is the use of funds 
publicly reported? 
Support for 
local co-
manageme
nt effort 
x x  In-depth qualitative 
interviews, 
documentation, 
observation of meetings, 
survey questions 
In the eyes of the village does DoF 
support local efforts with more than talk? 
This might include legal and material 
support 
Ladder of 
co-
manageme
nt activity 
x x x Observation, 
documentation 
Where does the project fall on the co-
management scale from instructive to 
informative? 
 
Conflicts 
Ethnicity x x x In-depth qualitative 
interviews, 
documentation, 
observation, survey 
questions 
Degree to which conflicts of these various 
types are salient within the fisheries of 
interest. This should include both direct 
and indirect questions for qualitative 
respondents. Attention should be paid to 
who raises what issues to management 
and why. Survey respondents should be 
asked about their own personal 
experiences   
Class or 
power 
structures 
or wealth 
of gear 
owners and 
workers 
x x x 
Gear / 
species 
x x x 
Theft x x x 
Markets x x x 
Multiple-
users 
x x x 
Locals 
versus 
outsiders 
x x x 
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and 
transbound
ary issues 
Resilience Legitimacy x x x In-depth qualitative 
interviews, observations, 
survey questions 
Expectations of compliance, level of 
participation, the familiarity and ease 
with which people respond when asked 
questions about management, citations of 
management as justification of past 
behaviour in neutral questions 
Attitudes 
towards co-
manageme
nt measures 
x x  In-depth qualitative 
interviews, observations, 
survey questions 
Attitude scale survey questions about 
specific measures and their relevance 
according to the Respondent’s 
perceptions 
Robustness  x x In-depth qualitative 
interviews, observations, 
survey questions 
Evaluations of whether management 
covers the geographical and biological 
range of the fishery, speed with which the 
situation can respond; whether co-
management institution allows 
cooperation with a broad range of other 
community –based organisations (CBOs); 
inclusiveness of co-management 
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Annex 8: Ladder scales used in the combined survey for the analysis of co-
management institutions 
 
EVERYTHING 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
Ladder 1  
 
 
SOME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTHING 
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ALWAYS 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
Ladder 2 
 
 
 
SOMETIMES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
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NEVER 
 
GREATLY INCREASED 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
Ladder 3 
 
 
 
STAYED THE SAME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
GREATLY DECREASED 
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COMPLETELY 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
Ladder 4 
 
 
 
SOME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
NOT AT ALL 
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VERY MANY 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
Ladder 5 
 
 
 
SOME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
NONE 
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VERY MUCH BETTER 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
Ladder 6 
 
 
 
THE SAME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
VERY MUCH WORSE 
 
 
 
 
  
244 
Annex 9: Participatory frame survey form for 2002 
 
FRAME SURVEY DATA FORM 
 
FS FORM 1: CRAFT DETAILS 
 
Name of Enumerator………………………………………. Date………………….. 
Beach…………………… Village…………………. TA…………………………… 
 
Gear 
Owner 
Original  
District 
Full-
Time/ 
Part-
Time 
Crew 
Name 
Original 
District 
Full-
Time/ 
Part-
time 
Craft Type Average 
weekly 
fish 
sales 
(MK) 
Dug-
out 
B-E B+E Others 
No. L No. L No. L No. L 
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Annex 10: List of migrants compiled in April 2007 
 
Name of fisher 
 
Number of Nkacha 
seine owned 
Place of operation 
Nampulu 2 Both at Kachulu (Lake Chilwa) 
John Chainjile 1 Returned to Lake Malombe 
Ladu Witness 1  
H. Kalichero 1  
J.B. Mayele 2 1 fishing unit at Kachulu and another on Lake 
Malombe 
Wisiki Ayatu 1 Kachulu 
Thomas Douglas 3 2 fishing units at Chapola and 1 at Kachulu 
Daudi Bamusi 2 Both at Chapola (Lake Malombe) which were 
moved from Kachulu 
Haji Frag 2 1 fishing unit at Kachulu and another on Lake 
Malombe 
Moffat Wecha 2 1 fishing unit at Kachulu and 1r on Lake 
Malombe 
Lajabu Kachepa 7 4 fishing unit at Kachulu and 3 on Lake Malombe 
Usumani  1 Kachulu 
Kasimu Alli 2 Kachulu 
Saidi White 1 Kachulu 
Gama 2 1 fishing unit at Kachulu and 1 on Lake Malombe 
Ali Mbeyani 1 Kachulu 
Tenesi Sumaili 1 Kachulu 
Bonali 2 Kachulu 
Auvi 1 Kachulu 
Raitala 1 Kachulu 
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Annex 11: Relevant key policy and legislative frameworks for the Lake Chilwa 
wetland and catchment area (Adapted from Njaya and Chimatiro 1999) 
 
Policy/Act Objectives/focus area Areas of common interests 
or divergent interests 
National Environmental 
Policy (1996) 
In response to the Rio de Janeiro’s Earth 
Summit under Agenda 21, the 
Government of Malawi formulated the 
Environmental Policy was formulated. 
In terms of fisheries, it aims at  
managing fish resources for sustainable 
utilisation, production and conservation 
of aquatic biodiversity 
• Reducing erosion and 
siltation in the Shire river 
• Minimise pollution from 
processing industries in 
Blantyre City or Lower 
Shire 
• Maintaining biodiversity  
National Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Policy 
(2001) 
The primary objective of the National 
Fisheries and Aquaculture policy is “to 
enhance the quality of life for fishing 
communities by increasing harvests 
within safe, sustainable yields” 
• Maximizing fish yields 
and promote fish 
conservation in 
participatory fisheries 
management arrangements 
• Establishing and sustaining 
the co-management of 
fisheries resources 
between the Fisheries 
Department and key 
stakeholders 
Fisheries Conservation 
and Management Act 
(1997) 
The focus is on sustainable utilisation of 
fisheries resources and aquaculture 
development. Central to this is the Local 
Community Participation (Part III) of the 
Act that articulates the need for 
community involvement in the 
management of fisheries resources in 
Malawi 
• Participatory fisheries 
management 
• Licensing of fishing gear 
• Registration of fishing 
vessels 
• Fishing rules under 
international waters 
• Aquaculture development 
rules 
National Forestry Act 
(1997) 
Among others, it aims at identifying and 
managing areas of permanent forestry 
cover as protection or production forest 
in order to maintain environmental 
stability; to prevent resource degradation 
ad increase social and economic 
benefits. In addition the Act aims at 
promoting community involvement in 
the conservation of trees and forest 
reserves and protected areas  
• Reducing erosion and 
siltation in the Shire river 
 
Water Resources Policy 
(1994) 
The policy aims at ensuring that all 
citizens of Malawi have and will have 
and will continue to have convenient 
access to water in sufficient quality and 
quantity; provide water infrastructure 
and services that will underpin the 
economic development of all sectors of 
the economy and preserve and enhance 
• Enhance aquatic riparian 
environments 
• If not properly managed, 
water abstraction may 
affect water levels in the 
river thereby affecting 
aquatic life such as fish 
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aquatic riparian environments. 
Irrigation Policy  The irrigation policy aims at promoting 
social and economic development 
through irrigate agriculture that is 
sustainable over time, economically 
justified financially viable, socially 
acceptable and technically sound 
without causing unacceptable impacts on 
the environment.   
• Ensures food security for 
the Lower Shire basin 
population  
• Promote riverbank 
cultivation of crops. This 
increases soil erosion and 
siltation if not properly 
planned 
Land Resources 
Policy/Act 
The Land Resources Policy and Act are 
under review. At present land is being 
governed by the land Act (Cap 15.01), 
the Customary Land Act (Cap 59.01) 
and the Registered Land Act (cap 65) 
• Soil conservation 
measures, good habitat 
planning and proper 
farming methods  reduces 
soil erosion and siltation 
Inland waters Shipping 
Act (195) 
For vessel inspection and registration • Does not recognise dugout 
canoes and small boats in 
terms of safety measures 
Agriculture and 
Livestock Development 
Policy (1995) 
Among others, the policy has emphasis 
in the following areas: increasing 
agricultural productivity, encouraging 
agricultural diversification, and increase 
food production by irrigation and 
drought resistant crops.  
• Proper farming methods  
reduces soil erosion and 
siltation 
• However, cultivation of 
crops along river banks 
promotes soil erosion and 
siltation thereby affecting 
spawning grounds of fish 
Parks and Wildlife Act This Act aims at ecosystem management 
through sustainable harvesting of 
sustainable yield and the need to 
preserve rare and endangered species 
and biotic communities.  
• Conserves biodiversity in 
which case threatened bird 
species are conserved for 
future generation 
Decentralisation Policy 
(1996) 
The Policy objectives are to: create a 
democratic environment and institutions 
in Malawi for governance and 
development at the local level which 
facilitate the participation of the 
grassroots in the decision-making; 
eliminate dual administrations (field 
administration and local government) at 
the district level with an aim of making 
public service more efficient, more 
economical and cost effective; and to 
promote accountability and good 
governance at the local level in order to 
reduce poverty 
• Promotes accountability 
and good governance at 
the local level 
• Facilitates the participation 
of the grassroots in the 
decision-making 
RAMSAR Convention Promotes wise use of natural resources 
with the involvement of the user 
community 
• Has principles of 
community participation in 
natural resource 
management especially for 
birds 
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Annex 12: Construction of migration and wealth scales 
 
Migration scale 
 
For analysis of the data, I worked out migration and wealth scales based on the co-
management attitude survey despite the complexity in measuring the degree to which 
households in rural areas are not native to the place where they are being 
interviewed. Basically, the migration scale had six parts: 
 
(a) The response to question (Q1), “Is this village your ancestral home?” If the 
answer is “yes” the respondent is scored 0 on this and all other migration 
scale questions, hence 0 on the overall scale, but  if the answer is “no” the 
respondent scores 1 for this question. 
 
(b) The response to  
Q2. Where is your permanent residence? (a) this village (b) a nearby village 
(c) another village in this district (d) outside this district 
 
A response of (a) or (b) is scored 0. A response of (c) is scored 1 and (d) is 
scored 2. 
 
(d) The response to the following qualified by the response to Q2: 
Q3. Do any of your wives (or does your husband) stay at your permanent 
residence? (a) No (b) Yes 
 
A response of (c) on Q2 and (b) on Q3 is scored 1, a response of (d) on Q2 
and on Q3 is scored 2. 
 
(d) The response to the following again qualified by the response to Q2: 
Q4. When did you last sleep at your permanent residence? (a) Last week (b) 
Last month (c) Several months ago (d) Over a year ago 
 
A response of (c) on Q2 and (b) on Q4 gets 1, (d) and (b) respectively get 2, 
(c) and (c) get 2.5, (d) and (c) get 3, (c) and (d) get 3.5 and (d) and (d) get 4. 
 
(e) Q3 and Q4 are also combined. If Q3 is (b) then (b) on Q4 is scored 1, (c) on 
Q4 is scored 2 and (d) on Q4 is scored 3. 
 
(f) Finally, the response to the following question: 
Q5. During the past twelve months, how many times did you stay (sleep for 
more than two weeks) anywhere outside this village? 
 
A response of 0 is scored 0, 1 or 2 scored 1, 3 or 4 scored 3 and 5 or more 
scored 4. If the responded answered (a) or (b) to Q2 they also score 0 here. 
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Wealth scale  
 
Similarly, I created a wealth scale based on ownership of household assets and cash 
remuneration that the households get regularly. The questions are in Annex 5, 
Section 4. I standardised the scores by using the "desc" command to create Z scores. 
Transformation of the data involved "recoding" the variables to give a ‘wealth’ score 
with three parts: poor (<0 to 0), rich (0 to 1) and very rich (>1). Therefore, the wealth 
scale had the following basic parts: 
(a) The amount of savings measured by the following questions: 
Do you or you spouse have any cash savings that you can call on in an 
emergency?  
NO     YES => If you were forced to live on this savings how long would it 
last? 
The scores were as follows:  a week 2, a month 4, several months 6, a year 8, 
more than a year 10 
(b) A scale based on the number of houses, roof material and floor type of the 
respondent’s houses. 
 (c) Whether or not the respondent was receiving regular cash remuneration from 
someone living elsewhere 
(c) Whether the household owned animals (cattle, ox, sheep, goats, swine, and 
chicken) 
 
All of these constituent questions or scales were standardized and summed to create 
the wealth scale. 
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Annex 13: Photos showing Lake Chilwa recessions in 1969 and 1995 
 
 
Lake Chilwa recession in 1968/69 (Kalk et al., 1979) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lake Chilwa refill in 1969 (Kalk et al., 1979) 
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Photo showing the 1995 Lake Chilwa recession as (Chiotha, 1995) 
 
 
Photo showing water level recovery in 1996 after the recession –  
photo taken at the same place as shown above (Chiotha, 1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
